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A long and extensive study of skillful human actions has convinced
me that our present conceptions of skills are not always adequate either
to the teaching of such skills or to a more general understanding of
their role in human life. Most of the literature in this field might be
described as either overly mechanical or vaguely mystical: the first
based on a conception of skills as a rigid mechanism of chained
physiological reflexes or as the manipulation of specific variables
leading eventually to the emission of the correct response, the second
on a conception of skills as a mysteriously ordained structure requiring
for its fulfillment only the proper psychic surrender. My study of
skills and my various experiments in teaching have led me to believe
that these present conceptions are not only constricted but in many ways
essentially false, that therefore no manipulation or readjustment of
them can lead to a fruitful result, and that a more adequate conception
of skills can be achieved only through an understanding and
reformulation of the deeper philosophical foundation on which our
present conceptions are founded.
IV
VThis dissertation contains a description of the problem
(summarized above), a selective exploration of our present philosophical
foundation, a possible reformulation of that foundation, and within that
reformulation the suggestion of a more adequate conception of skills.
My philosophical exploration focuses on the Cartesian structures of
understanding which seem to dominate so much of modern thought, and the
exploration is similar to much of the work done by Hans Jonas and
Marjorie Grene. My philosophical reformulation has been influenced by
the work of Merleau-Ponty
,
Erwin Straus, Helmuth Plessner, but most
particularly by Michael Polanyi. Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge
suggests a conception of human abilities and a conception of reality
within which I find a solution both to the general inadequacies of our
present philosophical foundation and to the inadequacies of our present
conception of skills.
In all my work with skills, there have always been intimations of
a kind of coherence and meaning which I have never been able to
adequately understand or explain. Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge
suggests to me that the structure of skills is analogous to any of the
structures—be they scientific or artistic—through which man is able to
reach beyond himself, and that therefore these intimations of meaning
and coherence are similar to those which a scientist or an artist may
feel when his work achieves a true coherence with nature. It is
toward
such a conception of skills that this dissertation is working.
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INTRODUCTION
Intimations of Meaning in the
Practice of Physical Skills
This paper, along with the rest of my doctoral work, is directed
toward the exploration of a problem I have come across in my work with
physical skills. The problem is not yet clearly defined; it is still
more of an intimation of something hidden and waiting to be discovered,
an intimation that in the development and practice of physical skills
there exists a kind of meaning and coherence that is not usually
recognized.
Let me give you an example, a story I heard from a friend when I
was learning to fly sailplanes. In the spring when storm systems sweep
up from the Mediterranean and cross Europe at high speeds, there exists,
at the front edge of the storm, a swiftly moving line of great power and
turbulence. As the storm moves, warm air is sucked in at the base of
the advancing front; the air rises, cools and then rapidly sinks so that
a powerful swirling cylinder, often with a diameter of more than two
miles, is formed at the leading edge. If you happen to have a sailplane
and if you are lucky enough to be able to enter the storm at just the
right point, there can exist for you, at about 10,000 feet, a small
area
of rising air currents which are traveling across Europe at
somewhere
between 50 and 75 mph. The flight can be fun, but it can
also be
somewhat tricky. The area of rising air currents may be
only a couple
of hundred yards across. Always 3 ust behind you,
hour after hour, there
2exists a rather good size storm, with thunder and lightening, at that
altitude usually some hail, and certainly adequate power to pull the
wings off your plane. Moving just in front of you, though you can't see
it, is an area where the air is sinking so rapidly that, if you happen
to fly into it, there is a good chance that you will be very close to
the ground before you will be able to fly out. So, all in all, it is
somewhat risky.
Still though, despite the risk or maybe because of it, I gather
that such a flight can be rather special. There is the risk, the over-
coming of danger, the objective measure of your skills in flying a
distance few have flown before in a sailplane. But beyond this, there
is a strange sense of having become for that time, somehow different: a
kind of rightness, a feeling that you had at last entered into the kind
of existence that had often been intimated but never before present.
I think that this feeling of rightness may be part of the skill
itself and that the pilot feels this rightness because he has, for a
brief time, totally entered into his skill. Flying a sailplane at the
front of a moving storm is a complex skill. When an automatic pilot
flys a regular airplane, it must make upwards of three quarters of a
million yes/no decisions every few minutes. Flying a sailplane is at
least as complex a process; and some of the skills involved, no computer
has yet mastered. A sailplane pilot must possess not only the normal
flying skills like those simulated by the automatic pilot, but also
skills which subtly judge, in advance, how the rising and falling air
currents will move and shift. This judgment, this feel, is a skill he
possesses and his success confirms this possession, but it is a
skill
3which cannot really be specified. No machine has yet duplicated this
skill; nor in fact does any theory or model offer the kind of complex
knowledge of the changing variables of a moving storm, which the pilot's
skill possesses.
The pilot's skill, therefore, can be viewed as complex in at least
two ways. First it is complex objectively when compared by analogy to
the automatic pilot; although the pilot cannot be said to be duplicating
the processes of the computer, he is duplicating its results; in fact he
is surpassing them. Second, in subtly maintaining his position at the
leading edge of the storm, he is demonstrating the possession of a kind
of skill and knowledge which neither he nor any scientist can fully
explain. These are two of the factors which lead me to say that the
pilot has entered into his skill. It is inconceivable that the pilot
could explicitly perform all the operations necessary to fly his
sailplane—for this stimulus I move the controls three inches left, etc.
By any objective estimate, the pilot is performing the equivalent of
thousands of these operations every minute, and at the same time he is
performing operations which have no objective analogy at all.
If it seems that I am already at odds with an enemy not yet even
introduced, you are correct. My knowledge of what I wish to discover is
only an intimation, but my knowledge of our present conceptions
of
skills is more specific. In some measure, I am proceeding by
defining
and attacking those conceptions which I feel to be in
error. Right now
I am covertly attacking a concept of skills, which,
if it were true to
its own logic, would make the sailplane pilot's
accomplishments a
logical impossibility. I'll return to that concept
in a while. Now, to
4the pilot. In a small and graceful machine, with no external power, he
flies more than one thousand miles in a single day, balanced
precariously but precisely on the leading edge of a powerful storm; and
in so flying he exhibits skills of incomprehensible complexity. Yet he
is at peace. He has entered into his skill. To fly, to remain in this
joyful, precarious balance, is his single awareness. He could never
explain all the myriad components of his actions, yet they are his,
neither visited on him, nor unconscious. It is his skill, and it is
right. Here, at the interface, the air will be rising. You follow the
edge of the storm with another sense—the flight sense, located nowhere,
filling all your nerves. As long as you stay always right at the edge
between fair lowlands and the madness of the thunder, it will not fail
you, whatever it is that flies, this carrying drive forward.
O.K. That's at least an idea of the kind of meaning and coherence
which I feel may exist in the practice of physical skills. I have had
similar experiences in my own practice of skills, in tennis and sKiing,
though mine were perhaps not as intense as those described above. Now
you may object that although this type of experience may be very
interesting, it doesn't really seem to exhibit what we usually regard to
be meaning and coherence. You are right, and that's the "problem I
have
come across in my work with physical skills." To me such skillful
experiences are meaningful: they do establish contact with
reality, and
their structure does exhibit a meaningful coherence
within that rea y
But for now, that's just my opinion, and it's a difficult one
to defend.
In ray exploration of the subject of skills, I ve done a
lot
reading. Most of the books on sports are
rather poor. Take just one
5aspect of such books, the photography. Sports photography usually
considers itself successful when it destroys time at precisely the right
moment, forcing an eternal extension upon a transient shape. But the
motions of sport are a far less understandable process than the
arresting, gracious, somehow comprehensible forms that the athletes’
bodies assume on a piece of paper. The motions of sport are about
something beyond the syntactical ability of graphic images to describe.
Neither the quality nor the structure of these motions is adequately
described. Or take another aspect of such books. What follows is part
of a description of how to fly a sailplane in thermals, from a book
called New Soaring Pilot :
Considering now the performance of the glider when circling;
it can be assumed without much error that the lift/drag ratio
at a particular angle of attack is the same as it was in
straight flight. Making use of this assiimption, any
particular point in the straight flight polar can be
translated into a corresponding point on a polar curve for a
set angle of bank by making use of the following formulae:
V2 cos S2 cos cos
where is speed in straight flight at a particular angle of
attack ....
None of this information is inaccurate; in fact it would be very
useful for a man who designs and programs automatic pilot systems.
It
is just of little use to the pilot. It represents in no way what
the
pilot actually does when he flies, and if the pilot tried
to use this
type of information in the actual practice of his skill,
he would have
little chance of remaining aloft. In a similar way,
sports photograp
Like the technical description
are not of much use in learning a skill.
6above, photographs accurately describe some aspects of a skill; in fact
photographs usually describe skills much more accurately than do
technical descriptions. But both photographs and technical descriptions
describe skills from what I must call here a non-human frame of
reference. Neither photographs nor technical descriptions describe the
structure of a skill in a way that makes sense to one who must learn the
skill
,
nor do either of these approaches ever convey the coherence and
meaning of a skill in the way it is understood after one has learned the
skill
.
Books which attempt to describe skills usually take one of two
2different approaches, which I will label objective and subjective. I
use these labels because books on skills never seem to approach their
subject directly, understanding its structure and meaning from within
the processes of learning and mastering a skill. Rather they seem to
structure their descriptions on the model of some other discipline,
usually psychology or physiology, and ultimately, I would argue, on the
model of an even deeper philosophical foundation. The above description
of flying in thermals, I would label objective. Objective books on
skills are usually very technical, with lots of data and detailed
studies and analyses. They have a pretty specific idea of what the
right approach is, of how to describe skills in the most accurate way.
Objective books on skills seem to be based on a model in which all
knowledge is ultimately explicit and in which the best way to arrive at
such knowledge is through a kind of logical analysis. Again, none of
the descriptions, based on such a model, are inaccurate; they are
just
irrelevant. Within the philosophical standards Mew Soaring Pilot sets
7itself, this hard, factual type of description looks great. For the
real soaring pilot, however, the pilot who must balance hundreds of
unseen variables within the complex and largely unspecifiable framework
of his skill, such information is of no use. Flying skills are not a
kind of explicit, mechanical technique for dealing with specific
variables. But New Soaring Pilot is typical of objective books on
skills. In one way or another, almost all of them attempt to be
empirical or scientific in a way that really misses the point; and none
of them, as I've said before ever even attempts to convey the coherence
3
and meaning of a skill as it is understood by a master of that skill.
The subjective writings on skills are, in a similar way, based on
a deeper philosophical foundation. These books are more difficult to
find, but the few which do seem to exist usually talk about skills in
vaguely mystical or psychological ways. Eugen Herrigel, in Zen and the
Art of Archery
,
describes skills in terms of unconscious or even other-
worldly forces. Tim Gallwey in The Inner Game of Tennis , sees skills as
a constant battle for control between various selves within the mind.
While I am generally more sympathetic to this type of approach, I
believe that it fails in two ways. First, most of the subjective books
seem to assume that skills are innate within us; all the motions pre-
exist, and we need only achieve the proper frame of mind for them to
emerge. Such a concept is difficult to grasp, especially say, if one
were about to receive service from Arthur Ashe. Second, although
these
books sometimes talk about the kind of feelings one has when
engaged in
a skill, feelings similar to the rightness the sailplane
pilot felt,
these feelings are granted no real validity. Rather they
seem to arise
8independently within the mind, with connection neither to the practice
of the skill nor to any kind of communicable reality. Such feelings are
limited to a very narrow range of existence. They are granted reality
only to the subject himself.
Neither the objective nor the subjective books seem to offer an
adequate understanding of the structure and meaning of skills. Both
types of book offer a few insights which are helpful, but at a more
basic level, both are deeply antithetical to the kind of meaning and
coherence which I feel to be present in the practice of skills. My
readings, my conversations with others engaged in skills and my own
experiences offer evidence of many intimations similar to that of the
sailplane pilot. These intimations suggest to me that the practice of
skills is analogous to any of the structures, be it the sciences or
arts, through which man reaches beyond himself toward understanding,
toward achievement, toward meaning. The fact that such meaning can
neither be explicitly expressed nor logically analysized does not
obviate my intimations. Nor does the fact that this meaning seems
inextricably enmeshed in patterns of strong feeling preclude my claims.
The objective and subjective books are wrong and I am right. That such
intimations and claims are not widely recognized indicates only that the
philosophical foundation which governs these books is so deeply
pervasive that it governs not only the books on skills but books on
other aspects of our lives as well. In fact, I would claim, it governs
many of our day to day thoughts and feelings, our perceptions of
4
ourselves and our existence.
9This may seem a very fast transition, from books that offer an
inadequate conception of skills to a philosophical foundation which
somehow underlies these books
,
and now suddenly to the suggestion that
this same foundation underlies much of the structure on which we build
our lives. I agree. At this time I can only ask the reader to bear
with me. I am unable to defend such a transition directly. I can only
hope that by the end of my paper, my argument will have at least
partially explained and defended the thesis I so blatantly here purpose.
I believe that the problem I have in understanding physical skills lies
essentially within a philosophical foundation which not only does
violence to the conception of skills but which also seems to deny
reality to many aspects of existence. This pervasive philosophical
foundation is a major obstacle to all our understandings, and the
pervasive nature of this foundation cannot be avoided if I am finally to
explore and overcome the problems I have encountered in my work with
physical skills.
A Secondary Theme—Negative Aspects
in The Practice of Skills
This paper is intended primarily as a philosophical exploration.
Within "the problem I have come across in my work with physical skills,"
I am most interested in those intimations which suggest that something
is missing, that within the practice of skills, there are possibilities
for a kind of meaning and coherence which is not presently recognized or
experienced. Further, I believe that the problem I have come across
does not lie with any of the surface manifestations of skills, and
that
10
it cannot be cured by any superficial techniques. Such techniques,
labelled mostly as humanistic psychology, are already widely available
'"^i^hin our present culture, but like fad diets or smoking cures, their
lasting results have been less than profound. I believe that the
problem I have run across is less easily diagnosed and cured. The
problem lies not with its surface manifestations
,
but rather within our
conception of skills.
Although I am focusing on physical skills, I have come to believe
that all human skills participate in basically the same structure.
Therefore, when I use the term "skills," I am denoting physical skills,
but I am also implying certain parallels with the intellectual and
affective skills as well. We are unable to experience the possibilities
of meaning and coherence existing within skills because our conception
of skills is inadequate. This conception of skills is founded within a
larger philosophical foundation which itself offers an inadequate
conception of existence—of man, of the world, and of man's knowing
relationship with himself and that world. The solution to the problem I
have come across lies, therefore, with a reformulation of those
conceptions. This solution, like the diagnosis, cannot be done
superficially. Both must begin by identifying the most basic principles
within our present philosophical foundation. They must then trace these
principles through their evolution and elaboration within that
foundation, until some understanding of the many complex forces and
conceptions of knowledge, present within our culture, is achieved. Only
then may a reformulation be suggested, a reformulation which must
also
begin with the most basic principles. Starting with these new
11
principles, a more adequate conception of existence may eventually be
envisioned, and within that conception, a more adequate conception of
skills
.
This is obviously a long range solution. I will attempt to trace
the basic principles of our present philosophical foundation back over
300 years, and they are probably much older than that. Therefore, it is
difficult to imagine that new principles could lead to an immediate
solution. Nevertheless, I believe this to be the best course of action.
While certain men within any epoch may be able to escape the cultural
and intellectual constructs of their time, the general themes of
individual and cultural development indicate that a solution to the type
of problem I am discussing may take many generations. Perhaps it is the
task of our generation to begin.
The main purpose of this section of the introduction is to suggest
some side issues which may accompany my main theme. While I am pursuing
my primary task of exploring our present and future philosophical
foundations, it may be possible to notice some interesting secondary
themes. The problem I have come across in my work with physical skills
is manifest not just in intimations of possible meaning and coherence,
but in the many direct negative effects of our present conception of
skills; effects such as tension, loss of power, of grace, of joy. These
negative effects may also be seen to have their roots within the basic
principles I mentioned above and within the philosophical foundation in
which those principles have become elaborated and influential. Thus
these negative effects may serve to substantiate the existence of
that
foundation and to illustrate its connection with our day to day ways
of
12
thought and being. In substantiating the connection, these secondary
themes will aid my primary exploration, which involves even more basic
elements in our conception of knowledge. This is not to say that these
secondary themes will not have an intrinsic interest of their own.
I think that these "negative effects" will be familiar to most
readers, probably more through psychological literature rather than
through that of sport. Their connection to various aspects of our
philosophical foundation will probably also be familiar. Nevertheless,
to encourage the reader to begin thinking in the categories I will later
discuss in some detail, let me briefly suggest two major aspects of that
foundation, and then mention a few of the "negative effects," which the
reader may wish to keep in the back of his mind, and refer to, from time
to time. Our present philosophical foundation can generally be
characterized as offering two disparate visions of reality. One vision
is of a reality contained and STobjective, totally inside the mind,
without motion, without power to reach out into the world. This
subjective vision allows personal thoughts and feelings no validity, no
meaning beyond the confines of the mind. The other vision is of a
reality totally outside, hard and objective. This objective reality
wants no contamination from subjective influences. It is a controlled
reality allowing meaning only to those things which are clear, distinct
and logical. Both of these visions of reality, I would claim, are
present in each of us, conflicting, combining in various ways but
always, in whatever form, narrowing our vision of ourselves and of our
possible achievements.
13
Many of the negative effects, present in the practice of skills,
can be seen to be connected, to have their roots, within these visions
of reality. As I proceed in my exploration of our present philosophical
foundation, these connections may become more clear. Let me suggest a
few of these negative effects. Often in the practice of physical
skills, there exists a certain mechanical quality, mechanical both in
the motions themselves and in the way the individual seems to think
about and try to control his body. I call it mechanical rather than
just clumsy or inept; because in other parts of his life, that
individual often seems to be able to move with considerable grace.
Basically, this kind of mechanical movement seems to be tied to a very
mechanistic conception of how the body is supposed to work. Sometimes,
however, such motions become so tense and rigid that it seems that the
individual almost fears his body. Shoulders and necks become tense;
sometimes this tension carries down the body into the diaphram and ribs
so that breathing becomes constricted. In extreme cases, the whole body
becomes almost rigid, balance is uncertain, and even vision can become
impaired.
^
There also seem to exist what might be termed more general
effects. The institutionalization of sport often focuses on performance
at the expense of experience, emphasizing competition, winning and
records rather than the simpler, more fundam.ental aspects such as motion
and interaction. Coaches, much like behaviorists , assume that they can
always get results if their teams are properly motivated. In teaching
sports, the emphasis is on separate parts of the various motions,
believing always that a complete motion can be described as the sum of
14
its parts. Teaching is almost wholly description rather than
explanation; all that is needed for success is good technique. And on
and on. The refrain snould, by now, be familiar. Often the literature
describing these negative effects is pretty good, far better than my
descriptions; it's the solutions that are inadequate. That's why I'm
gtrying a different approach.
This tension, this emphasis on technique, this teaching of parts
rather than wholes, are examples which the reader may wish to keep in
mind as he moves through my philosophical exploration. It may be
difficult to make one-to-one connections, but some of the themes should
correlate. There are certain negative elements present in the practice
of skills, and in our lives as a whole, which need not be as massively
present as they now are. Although my central concern lies with the
meaning and coherence now lacking in the practice of skills, rather than
with these negative effects, the themes are related. The reader's
awareness of these effects should augment, rather than hinder, his
understanding of my argument. Just as skills are more than a series of
techniques for the manipulation of our bodies , but are unextricably part
of our being, so too are these negative aspects related to many themes
in human life.
So generation after generation of men in love with pain
and passivity serve out their time in the world
silent, redolent of faded sperm, terrified of dying,
desperately addicted to the comforts other sell them,
however useless, ugly or shallow, willing to have life ^
defined for them by men whose only talent is for death.
******************
15
Every gain has its loss, not every loss
its gain but sinks into the waste
the primal pain unplastic, the chaos
^
without a future the astounding past.
CHAPTER I
PHYSICAL SKILLS VIEWED IN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE
The Interface: A Metaphor of My Central Purpose
Before I begin an exploration of our present philosophical
foundation, I would like to again emphasize my central purpose and
suggest a metaphor which may help to focus both mine and the reader's
attention on this purpose, throughout. In the first section of this
paper, the pilot's flight is an example of the kind of skillful human
activities which interest me. In particular, I am interested in the
structure of such skills and in the intimations of meaning which skills
sometimes arouse. For the most part in our society, both the structure
and meaning of skills seem to be misunderstood. Instructional books on
flying, on tennis and on other sports offer a deficient conception of
skills, a conception adequate neither to the learning of such skills nor
to an understanding of their meaning. This deficiency, I feel lies not
so much in the books themselves but more deeply in a philosophical
foundation which itself fails to develop an adequate conception of life.
This foundation offers basically a one-level conception of life, where
all reality is centered within one of two frameworks, each of which
tries to account for the whole—a reality centered either subjectively
within the narrow isolation of the mind or centered objectively within
the material world. This second and more frequent conception of
16
17
reality
,
is further narrowed in that all explanation within that
material world is itself one-leveled in terms of least particulars:
thus for example, complex order is ultimately explained by the one real
order which is molecules in motion, or thought is ultimately explained
as the compulsive outcome of neural processes.
A direct examination of these instructional books would not
fulfill my purpose. Because this deficient conception of skills seems
founded on a deeper foundation and because the writings on skills
themselves are not only inadequate but superficial, I have chosen to
center my inquiry at a philosophical level. I purpose first to
selectively explore the present inadequate philosophical foundation,
suggesting where possible, how its inadequacy influences our present
conception of skills. I will then purpose a partial reformulation of
the foundation and within that new foundation offer a new conception of
skills. This is a complex strategy and my focus on skills will
inevitably become enmeshed in many conflicting themes. Before I begin,
I would like to jump ahead and suggest a metaphor which seems to embody
at least part of the conception of skills I plan to eventually purpose.
The metaphor is intended neither as an explanation nor as a defense of
this conception. It is to serve only as a reminder of my central
purpose, so that this purpose will not be lost in the midst of
philosophical exploration and reformulation. The metaphor, like the
punch line to a joke, requires a little "building up to," but its a good
one and worth the wait. When I began this paper, I tried to
form a
conception of skills within the widest perspectives I could
imagine:
where do skills appear in the universe and what is their
function? Thus
18
ths in0taphoir arisGS out of what might ba callGd an ontology of skills.
Within the objective perspectives of the eons of time and the
vastness of space, the universe seems to be dominated by the disorder of
interstellar dust; and its destiny to be governed by the dictates of
entropy. However, from time to time within its entropic destiny, matter
takes on various manifestations of order. As these manifestations
become more complex, their existence becomes less probable, more
precarious: the existence of a star is less probable than that of a
nebula; the existence of a crystalline rock less probable than that of
an igneous one. But while such manifestations of order are improbable,
the structure of matter itself and the natural forces acting upon it
seem adequate to explain both the existence of that material order and
the transformations it may go through, including its final return to
disorder. When, however, one moves up the hierarchy of order from the
inorganic to the organic, existence becomes so complex, so improbable
and precarious, that structure alone seems no longer adequate to explain
existence.
At this point, some may wish to adduce that evolution is
sufficient argument to carry forward the structural explanation into the
organic orders of existence. I would agree that the structure of
evolution is important in explaining the higher orders of existence, but
to me, evolution is only a kind of ratchet to explain why higher
orders
do not slip backwards. Evolution may explain why a particular
species
survived, but it does not explain why that species came
into existence
in the first place. At some point in the hierarchy of
order, the
concept that the universe is just a huge clock-work machine in
which all
19
sxistence can be explicitly explained through one basic principle, no
longer works. To use the term organic or biological as synonymous with
functional, adaptive or conducive-to-survival does not develop an
adequate conception of life. The structure of evolution is a
mechanistic, one-leveled explanation in terms of least particulars, and
it does not suffice.
The emergence of life and further life is more than just the play
of chance and necessity; living things are not just adaptation machines.
Like machines they are dependent on conditions specifiaible in terms of
lower levels, but they are not explicable in terms of these levels. A
machine may be dependent on the principles of physics and chemistry, but
its function is not explicable in terms of these principles. Living
things, like machines, are also dependent on basic principles, but they
are certainly not explicable in terms of them. Even if one sneeks some
minimal purpose into the supposedly neutral concept of evolution, as
many biologists do—molecules in motion for the sake of motion, for
instance, or survival for the sake of survival, such a purpose still
does not offer adequate explanation for even the static conditions of
life: its complexity, its multiplicity, its intricacy—much less so for
the harmony of life's various adaptations or the persistent structures
and rhythms with its development.
Within the vastness of the universe, life seems an improbable
occurrence. Neither the existence nor the transformation of living
things can be explained wholly in terms of their structure, nor can
the
complexity and multiplicity of life be accounted for solely by
the
principles of evolution. The conditions of life seem to demand
a more
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complex logic than the one-leveled reductionism of evolution. What is
needed to begin this logic is a new focus. Rather than viewing living
things as just one more form of matter, passively dependent on the laws
of a mechanistic universe, I would like to suggest that living things
owe their improbable existence to the fact that they can interact with
their surrounding and that they therefore maintain a certain flexibility
within their structure. Through this ability, living things can
selectively take in parts of their environment and can also extent
themselves out into that environment.
The existence of living things is not just given them: it is also
earned and maintained by them. Within most of the universe, such is not
the case; though it may take billions of years, the fate of a star is
determined by its structure. Flexibility within structure, however,
offers life a destiny not shared by the inorganic. The destiny of
living things is not wholly pre-existent, not fully determined. Because
living things can interact, there is always the possibility for change
and growth. Even at the lowest levels of life, organisms seem to be
involved in sensing and performing; and even so simple a creature at the
paramecium, H. S. Jennings would argue, has already entered the class of
learners. In studying life, one must focus not merely on the structure
of living things, nor on the fact of their survival, but on this ability
to interact. In distinguishing this principle within the organic, such
a focus makes the existence of life less improbable; it suggests
an
escape from mechanistic, one-leveled explanations, and offers
the
possibility of a more adequate conception of life. Within this
focus,
its lowest levels, can be seen to have a certainlife, even at
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flexibility within structure and thus to be explicable by principles not
wholly contained within that structure. With such a focus, the vast
majority of living things can be seen not only to interact, but to
choose and to choose skillfully. These living things not only maintain
their existence, they earn it. Their existence is dependent on
principles which, by their actions, they acknowledge and in part create.
Their lives can be seen as an achievement.
This flexibility within structure, this ability of living things
to perceive and perform, this skillful interaction, I would like to
term, the interface. Throughout the remainder of my paper, I hope that
this metaphor will help to remind the reader of my central purpose.
Again, my interest is in the structure and meaning of skillful human
activities. I hope eventually to suggest a conception of skills which
will adequately explain their structure and meaning. Presently, the
rigid formalism of basically one-leveled ontology precludes an adequate
conception. What I am suggesting in the metaphor of the interface is
that the essence of life lies not in its structure, but in its
activities. When one focuses on activities rather than on structure,
certainty is lost; and philosophical explanations are no longer as
inclusive, as formal, as explicit. But in their stead may come
explanations more adequate to the myriad complexities of life
explanations in which the sense of beauty, of the intrinsically
meaningful, will dominate our grasp of what is real.
The metaphor of the interface implies that living things
are not
isolated physical systems nor can they ever be solely
considered or
All living things do not live merely "in" the
world;
studied as such.
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they live "within" it. All organisms live within and are related to an
ecological niche. The extent of this relationship is dependent on the
nature of the organism; a rock, therefore, can be imagined to have no
interface, the paramecium a rather narrow one, and man, one which is
broad. Whatever its extent, this relationship is not a static system,
^ process; the organism is constantly interacting, ceasing to be
what is was and becoming what it is not yet. All living things, even
the most simple, interact with their environment. They have a certain
flexibility within their structure, and therefore cannot be known solely
through that structure. Most orders of life, perhaps from the
paramecium on up, not only interact, but interact skillfully: they
choose and choose well. Their perceptions form hypotheses about the
world, and their actions are governed by these hypotheses. These kinds
of living things can be called learners. In skillfully projecting
themselves out into the world and in selectively assimilating it to
themselves, they are participating in a process of skillful interaction,
which, in the higher orders, can continue throughout the lifespan of the
organism. By this process, an organism can broaden its interface,
creating knowledge and deepening its own coherence. Thus an organism
can surpass its given structure; and in so doing, its existence and
being can be seen as an achievement. There is no ultimate logic which
dictates that we must fasten on the structure of nerves and muscles, and
call them the one sure reality. Nor must we ourselves despair of all
worldly knowledge and retreat into the confines of consciousness. The
essence of life, I will claim lies at neither of these extremities, but
at the interface: in the engagement of living things with their world.
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in their creation of knowledge and of themselves, in their achievements
and their becoming.
Let me return for a moment to my original example of skillful
human activity; and thereby suggest first, how the human condition
itself demands that we acknowledge what is unique in our being, and
suggest second, how that uniqueness may be experienced. Look back for a
moment at the storm sweeping up from the Mediterranean. At the very
leading edge, between the turbulence of the clouds and the precipitous
descent to the lowlands, there exists a small, swiftly moving area of
rising air. This interface on which the pilot must skillfully maintain
his precise yet precarious balance. Mankind is himself a skillful
balance within a universe of entropy; the rise of man when viewed within
the immensity of temporal and spatial dimensions, is an improbable
occurrence: a delicate and creative moment, a fold in the eons of time,
a conscious interface in the vastness of interstellar dust. This
interface, this conscious point within the universe, is our improbable
existence. At every level of our being, from birth through maturation
and on through the range of human achievements , our skills keep us
balanced here at the rising edge. This balance, our very existence,
already exhibits a long heritage of skillful achievement. Being is
given to each one of us, and with being come not only the skills to
remain balanced, but the possibility for further skills, and the hope
and passion for further achievement.
But because being here is much, and because all this
that's here, so fleeting, seems to require us and strangely
concerns us. Us the most fleeting of all. Just once,
everything, only for once. Once and no more. And we,
too
,
once, And never again.
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Just as the human condition can be seen as an interface, a
balance, a point of consciousness with the universe; so too, as I have
already suggested, can an essential aspect of man's existence be viewed
as an interface. As the sailplane pilot flies at the edge of the storm,
ths flight sense is filling all his nerves: his eyes, his touch, the
feel of his muscles, his motions—all are aware, absorbed in his single
purpose. This awareness, this quality in ourselves which rises up to
meet the world, to be in the world, is the embodim.ent of our skills.
Through skills we enter both into the world and more deeply into
ourselves. Skills are the interface, the joining. It was said of one
of the great tennis players of the 1940 's that he had touch all his
life; this is said also of a great pianist, and it can be said, I think,
of a great artist or a great scientist. Touch is neither a quality of
introspection, nor is it a calculated series of techniques for dealing
with the world. Rather it speaks of flhency and subtlety at the
interface, of skills so refined and powerful that we choose to give
ourselves to their being. In their beauty and power, they catch us up;
and as in love or faith, our surrender to them offers intimations of a
truer existence.
The interface can thus serve as a metaphor for two aspects of our
existence; first, for the precarious balance of ourselves as beings
within the universe and second, and more importantly in this paper, for
the complex nexus of skills through which each one of us maintains that
balance and achieves his own unique human possibilities. The first
demands the second. "Because being here is much, and because all
this
that's here, so fleeting, seems to require us and strangely
concerns
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us," we are therefore compelled to acknowledge both the uncertainty and
the uniqueness of our being, and to center ourselves fully within the
essence of that being, which is the nexus of skills. We must not
philosophically detach ourselves in an illusive quest: there is
c®^bainty neither within a totally objective world nor within the
disorder of a mind cut off from all reality. Rather, like the pilot we
roust avoid both the secure lowlands and the chaos of the storm. Aware
of risk, aware of uncertainty, passionately involved in the unique
possibilities of human achievement, we must live at the interface.
Intellectual or Philosophical Foundations
Before I talk further about the interface and purpose a
philosophical reformulation within which a more adequate conception of
skills will be possible, I must first complete a rather complex task. I
must explore, at least selectively, the philosophical foundation which
underlies our present conception of skills. It is in this foundation
that the inadequacy of our present conception of skills lies. The
metaphor of the interface is interesting, but without this deeper
exploration, it will prove finally to be indefensible. In exploring our
present philosophical foundation, I am attempting to discover general
themes and ideas, themes which govern our various disciplines, and
influence cultural patterns of thought. The intellectual foundation of
every society is a generally accepted model of reality. This model is
comprehensive and includes in its range of influence, the formal
5'tructures of the physical and life sciences , definitions of logic and
truth within the society as a whole, and even the contents of individual
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perceptions and feeling. One of the major intellectual difficulties of
human existence is due to the fact that this model of reality is, in
every case, a mere interpretation of the world, and yet exerts, as long
as it seems the valid interpretation, the subtly compelling claim to
being accepted as the only true picture of the universe, indeed as truth
itself.
Our intellectual foundation governs much of the coherence of our
lives. In large measure we build our personal world upon such a
foundation; our hypotheses and interpretations are influenced by this
foundation, and we act upon them. Some foundation is, however,
indespensible ; it is a necessary concomitant to our thought processes,
an intrinsic and inescapable part of our commitment to living. Our
perceptions and our minds are so structured that we must understand the
world through a continual process of narrowing and definition. From our
birth onward, our parents and our culture guide first our senses, and
then the more articulate aspects of our being, toward the structures
3
already established by such a foundation.
To understand and perhaps eventually to alter the intellectual
foundation which is an intrinsic part of our being and which seem.s to
exist as truth itself, is a difficult task. Each one of us feels that
his perceptions and thoughts are not mere interpretation, but that he
sees and understands the world unquestionably just as it is. Theodore
Roethke says that "all lovers live by longing and endure , /summon a
vision and declare it pure."^ From our earliest desires to see, to
move, to create a meaningful life, we are all lovers of the world; to
begin to understand, we must at least admit as much. This is not to
say
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that our visions are in error. It is rather to admit that they are o^
visions, o^ interpretations. As such they are based on a foundation of
'^^hich we are largely unaware and based also on our own processes of
knowing, of which, as I shall later demonstrate, we can never be fully
aware. Thus there is always the possibility of error. To begin the
process of understanding and change, we must first admit this uncertain
aspect of knowledge.
I am including this long preamble to my exploration, because
without some measure of curiosity, some of that old-time-explorer-
daring, my enterprise is doomed. Our present intellectual foundation,
like every comprehensive theory, every vision of the universe, is
necessarily circular. It forms a closed system in which the mind of the
thinker dwells. Just as it is difficult to explore and see anew the
countryside where one has always lived, so it is difficult to explore an
intellectual foundation which has been, for so long, the landscape of
one's mind. Yet though it is difficult, such an exploration can be
meaningful. Though one may never be able to venture far outside the
system in which he dwells, one may at least acquire some knowledge and
understanding of that system. An exploration of our present
intellectual foundation may offer, if not an escape, then at least a new
freedom within that foundation. And such an exploration may offer, some
day, the possibility of altering, of changing some small part of that
foundation. Look back at what I have been describing; the pilot's
skills and intimations, the inadequacy of books about such skillful
human activities, the possibility of a more adequate conception
of
skills in the metaphor of the interface, and now, the
subliminal prison
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of our intellectual foundation. I am trying to provide an incentive for
exploration: an awareness that we do form conceptions of ourselves and
our world within such a foundation, a suggestion that our present
conceptions are neither adequate nor necessarily true, and an intimation
of the kind of meaning which, one day, might be possible within an
altered foundation.
I have emphasized that my exploration will be selective; the study
would otherwise be impossibly long and complex. Much of the foundation,
by its nature, cannot be systematically articulated. I will confine my
exploration to a narrow range of important ideas, first as they are
manifested in the work of one philosopher, and then as they come to be
influential in the work of subsequent philosophers and scientists. I
hope that the importance of these ideas will be apparent. I also hope
that a discussion of the context in which they were formed, and an
explanation of their subsequent evolution, will serve as an historical
example of the complex cultural and personal forces which have
influenced the formation of our intellectual foundation. Our present
foundation seems dominated by a kind of extreme formalism, in which
explicitness and indubitability are the hallmarks of true knowledge.
Many of the forces and themes within our foundation are basically
products of this one ideal, either embracing or rebelling from it, but
never disputing its basic definitions of truth. It is a foundation
which takes science as the paradigm case of knowledge. This formalism,
constructed on the ideals of science, had its beginning with the rise of
modern science in the 17 th century, and especially with the work
of the
most influential philosopher of that period, Rene Descartes.
I
therefore plan to discuss Descartes' work in some detail.
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The Unspecifiability of Knowledge
(In the next chapter then, I plan to attempt a relatively detailed
exploration of Descartes and his influence on our present intellectual
foundation. In order to provide sufficient perspective to guide and
sustain the reader's interest in this exploration, I would like to
introduce in the remainder of this chapter several themes which bear
both on the Cartesian philosophy and on a possible reformulation of that
philosophy.
)
0When modern transformationalists, such as Toffler, fasten on what
they term the human mania for categorization, and suggest that mankind's
salvation lies in overcoming our stunted and unimaginative visions of
life, their theories are incompatible with much of current neuro
psychology. Man's senses and brain are so structured that he is able to
perceive and think only through a continued process of narrowing and
interpretation. When I mentioned earlier that our senses form
hypotheses and that we act upon these hypotheses, this was not merely a
self-serving characterization designed to support my thesis. It was
7
rather the consensus opinion of the best of modern research. Sensory
data is always ambiguous; the same data can mean any of several
alternative objects, but we experience only one object and usually the
correct one. The brain is continually filtering and interpreting
conflicting information, and much of this information has already been
interpreted before it ever reaches the brain. Interpreting mechanisms
exist not only in the brain but in the retina and in the other sensing
The structure of these mechanisms seems "wired in"processes as well.
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but the mechanisms are flexible and have the ootential for a
considerable range of development, especially during the first nine
months of life. R. L. Gregory, one of the foremost researchers of
perception, here characterizes his central thesis:
Since perception is a matter of reading non-sensed, as well
as sensed, characteristics of objects from available sensory
data, it is difficult to hold that our perceptual beliefs
—
our basic knowledge of objects— is free from theoretical
contamination. We not only believe what we see, we also seeO'* '
what we believe.®
There is no knowledge which can be explicitly specified. When we
see an object or when we think a thought, it is the result of a long and
largely unspecifiable process. The general structures of interpretation
are amorphously present at birth, and the development of the specific
interpreting mechanisms is so subtle and complex as to be almost
unknowable. Furthermore, both the sensory and mental interpreting
mechanisms seem to form hierarchies which process and combine
information in ways which are even less specifiable. Our linguistic
abilities are a later manifestation of the brain's proclivity to code
and recode information. Even our most certain information, v;hatever it
is—the existence of a rock or the second law of thermodynamics—is only
an hypothesis, perhaps a good hypothesis—one which has proved reliable
over centuries of man's existence—but an hypothesis nevertheless. In
our situation as interpreting beings, what we call truth can never be
wholly explicit, never be wholly proved. William James characterizes
the mind:
Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts
again and add to them; which facts again create and reveal
new truth... and so on indefinitely. The facts themselves
meanwhile are not true. They simply are. Truth is the g
function of the beliefs that start and terminate among
them.
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This argument of the unspeciflability of knov/ledge will be elaborated
later in my paper. It is presented here to familiarize the reader with
my bias; like the metaphor of the interface, it should suggest a
perspective in which to view my arguments. To be consistent, I must, in
turn, admit that existence of the interpreting mechanisms is itself a
theory and not certain knowledge. The theory is supported by fine
studies in physiology and psychology; nevertheless, there is no
indubitable evidence for its acceptance. Those studies and my own
acceptance of the theory have proceeded by means of the logically
unspecifiable processes I outlined above. I accept the theory as true
and use it, acknowledging that, in the last analysis, it is my ovm
convictions which support my acceptance
.
My Arguments Viewed in the Light of the Theory
of the Unspeciflability of Knowledge
The theory of the unspecifiability of knowledge supports several
of the arguments I have and will use in this paper. First it supports
the idea of a philosophical or intellectual foundation. What I
characterized above as a hierarchy of interpreting mechanisms is very
similar to an intellectual fondation. We are able to think and voice
our ideas only from within a whole system of acceptances which are
logically prior to any particular assertion of our own. Further, this
system of acceptances is hierarchical. Both physiologically and
intellectually, it proceeds from a few basic principles to an
elaborated
conceptual framework. This is fundamentally the structure
I wish to
illustrate through Descartes.
I hope to argue pursuasively that a few basic principles,
formulated by Descartes, have, over the centuries, become so deeply
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ingrained in our disciplines and in our cultural structures of
knowledge, that they now powerfully govern our thought in ways of which
we are totally unaware. An intellectual historian may be able to show
that the principles I claim to be Cartesian are really the result of
many other influences. I will grant such a claim, but for my purposes
it is unimportant. It is the pervasive and hierarchical nature of our
intellectual foundation I wish to illustrate. Whether the basic
principles are Cartesian or whether they have other origins is relatively
unimportant. While I seem to argue the Cartesian origins strongly, it
is not because I vrish to be historically convincing, but rather because
I v/ish to make a strong and consistent intellectual case. If I succeed
in showing that a few simple ideas can become so embedded in our
traditions of thought that they deeply influence not just our present
disciplines but our day-to-day lives as well, then my proposed solution,
which itself begins with basic principles of its own, may have some
validity.
The theory of the unspecifiability of knowledge, while supporting
the role of the basic Cartesian principles within an intellectual
foundation, at the same time argues against the content of those
principles and thus anticipates my proposed solution. Descartes’
basic
principle is that explicit and certain knowledge is possible,
and he
builds his conceptions of man and knowledge around this
principle of
certainty. However, if knowledge must always be based
on elements which
are logically unspecifiable , then certain knowledge
is never possible:
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certainty is a false ideal. Our situation as knowing beings, the
structure of our senses and brains, does not lend itself to an explicit
and indubitable kind of knowing. With this in mind, the reader may be
able to view Descartes from a perspective similar to my own.
But just what is my perspective? Even while I contest the
Cartesian ideal of certainty and envision a truer conception of
knowledge, I cannot totally escape my Cartesian heritage. I have
suggested in my introduction that our present intellectual foundation
offe;rs us an inadequate conception of life and I will argue that this
inadequate conception is still due in great measure to the influence of
basic Cartesian principles. Our conception is inadequate because the
Cartesian principles are false. Now logically I cannot believe in the
unspecifiability of knowledge and still accept the Cartesian ideal of
certain knov/ledge. Yet obviously, by my very definition of an
intellectual foundation, I do accept the Cartesian principles. They are
so deeply embedded in my processes of thought, that I cannot possibly
trace them all, much less expell them. What does this mean? It means I
must argue against a conception of knowledge from within that very
conception. As this inconsistency is a major liability in my argument,
I would like to elaborate on it.
The Logical Inconsistency of my Argument
What I am writing purports to be a relatively straight-
i.orward
argument, leading from intimations of meaning in the
practice of skills,
onto the inadequacy of the structure through which
meaning is presently
perceived, and on, later, to a new structure. This
approach is.
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however, basically self-contradictory. I have already suggested through
the metaphor of the interface, and will later argue directly, that the
basic weakness of our present intellectual foundation is that it is too
straight-forward, too explicit, too logical. There is no hard core of
,
and so much logic and explicitness, however appealing, is an
illusion. That's basically the whole problem with Descartes: he grabs
onto the ideal of certainty, and then, to guarantee this ideal, he pulls
and twists all the rest of existence until it fits into a logical,
supporting structure. But I, too, could be accused of being too
straight-forward; my argument too logical; my ideas too explicit.
Basically, I'm arguing against a structure of knowledge from within that
very structure. I cannot help feeling that if my metaphors were a
genuine embodiment and exegesis of my intimations, if my work were more
truly an articulation and affirmation of the beliefs implied in my
intimations, then my argument would not need to be so structured.
Instead, as Polanyi would characterize the process: my intimations
would evoke further intimations, gather unto themselves a whole new body
of knowledge, and guide and sustain my efforts toward the comprehensive
achievement of a new structure of knowing.
Thus, if my intimations were as meaningful and powerful as I claim
them to be, they would create a new structure and language, through
which they could be known. I keep thinking about two books \\7hich do
succeed in creating their own structure. Personnel Knowledge , by Michael
Polanyi and Gravity's Rainbow , by Thomas Pynchon. Let me tell you a
little about Gravity's Rainbow . On the first reading, it is
exasperating; it seems to offer a simple, if somewhat confused
argument;
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but at the same time it is deeply disorienting in a way that no simnle
book should be. Upon further examination, Gravity's Rainbow seems to
offer intimations of a deeper coherence, a comprehensive view toward
which the reader is compelled to struggle. Yet, just as one struggles
bo articulate the central theses of the book, the whole enterprise seems
to betray a fundamental instability and falls apart. At the same time,
one is being subtly changed in unspecified ways and all before one has
decided how to take up a proper critical attitude. Gravity's Rainbow
has had great power over me: has enchanted me, involved me, changed me.
I first read the book at a time when I was also close to a very
small child. As I played with the child, images from the book would
flash across my mind. The parallels were many: my growing involvement
with the world Pynchon had created was an abbreviated version of the
child's fascination and involvement with his own new world. Both the
child and myself were irrevocably changing, beginning a journey toward
some larger coherence, entering a nev; world. For a new world is exactly
what Pynchon had created. My exasperations in trying to understand
Gravity's Rainbow were like the child's frustrations in trying to
understand and master a world, which on the surface, seemed so simple;
but which at a deeper level was profoundly complex. My intimations of a
deeper coherence existing within Gravity's Rainbow were similar to the
intimations which compelled the child to enter ever more deeply into his
own new world.
Pynchon, I would claim, is a genius whose intimations were so
powerful that they guided him toward the formation of a new
structure,
comprehensive enough to include and articulate those very intimations.
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If one wishes to change the world, this is how one should proceed. i
cannot. My ideas lack power. I am still arguing basically from within
the same structure I wish to change. Thus my argument is a compromise
and should be recognized as such. Because I cannot create a new
structure, I am attempting a lesser approach. I am attempting to
delineate the present structure so clearly that its existence may at
least be recognized, and its influence become apparent. Later in my
approach, I will suggest guidelines which may, some day, lead to the
reformulation of that structure.
How then should my paper be read, if not as a logical argument? I
suggest that the reader view my logic as I do, as a concession to an
outmoded structure of knowledge. Within the reader's normal patterns of
thought, such a logical structure is necessary to enable him to
understand my material; just as it is necessary for me, in order to
allow that material to emerge. ^’Jhat is more important, however, is not
the structure or the logical connectedness of the material, but the new
possibilities within it. VJithin my lesser approach, a detailed
understanding of the structure of our present intellectual foundation is
important, but more important are the new insights and patterns of
thought that this understanding may eventually evoke. What I can hope
to achieve, finally, are those moments of assent, of discovery—those
moments of "A ha:" "A ha, maybe he’s right; my life has felt just like
a long series of techniques;" or "A ha, there's something here he
doesn't seem to see; these two ideas are really just the same idea, only
seen from opposite sides.
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I am not implying that a new intellectual foundation, when it
comes, will be illogical. I am suggesting that it will be a new logic,
a new order, broader and more inclusive. Since I, myself, cannot
forroulate this new logic, but since I also believe that our old logic is
misleading, I am suggesting that the reader focus his attention not so
much on the structure of my argument, but rather that he try to look
through that structure toward those insights and intimations it may
evoke in him. Such a focus is, moreover, part of the process in which
discovery is usually possible. Neither Pynchon nor Polanyi were able to
create their new structures of reality by ignoring the old. Rather,
they spent years in detailed study of all that had gone before. But
they spent these years of study not in an attitude of total acquiesence,
but looking always for insights, for intimations of new coherence within
the old patterns of thought. Such is the process and attitude I am
suggesting to the reader.
Characterizing Our Present Intellectual Foundation
My argument might best be characterized as philosophical. I
believe that our present conceptions of man and his acquisition of
knowledge offer an inadequate, and really a false, vision of existence.
Any theory which ignors these deeper levels of reality and tries to
argue wholly within the conceptions offered by our present intellectual
foundation is condemned to superficiality. But that is just the
weakness of so many of the modern "cures" for man's social and
spiritual
illnesses. Whatever it is—E.S.T., P.E.T., T.M. , "Values
Clarification," Future Shock , The Revolution of Hop_e , or so
many others.
38
they either ignor or offer only a sham confrontation with our
heritage, and thus condemn themselves to phony orioinality
or witless repetition. The process of forgetting or ignoring is induced
by the nature of the foundation itself. In its depth and inclusiveness,
our present intellectual foundation appears not as interpretation but as
reality itself. It thus forms a closed circle, avoids direct
confrontation, and thus perpetuates itself.
Russel Jacoby calls this process of forgetting, social amnesia.
His interpretation of intellectual foundations is more psychological
than the one I present, but his argument supports my main contentions.
For Jacoby, social amnesia means that the roots of memory are driven out
of mind by the social and economic dynamic of the society. Thus an
intellectual foundation works to preserve the status quo by presenting
the human and social relationships of society, as natural and
unchangeable relations between things. Jacoby feels that most new
theories are so anxious to leave behind the dated past that they
unwitting, fall into it, advancing new labels for old ideas. He says of
some of these modern theorists:
The facility with which they present barren comments as
widsom cannot be explained by personal defects ; rather it is
derived from the movement of society that is squeezing out
of existence autonomous mind and thought. What is happening
is not only the decline of thought, but its repression.
In my paper I shall avoid direct confrontation with these modern
theorists. My argument is made in more general terms, and any
direct
examination or criticism of these theorists would inevitably lead
away
from my central concerns. Nevertheless, it would be helpful
if my use
of the term, "our present intellectual foundation were
not totally
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^^stiract. For tho most part, I will assuma that the reader can supply
his own connotations. However, in case he does not wish to let me
suggest, as an example, one of my own. Mine is a particularly
meaningful connotation for me because it suggests some of the weaknesses
of our present intellectual foundation, within a special context. That
context is the broad and sensitive mind of George Dennison. Although
Dennison cannot be said to have achieved a perspective which extends
beyond the bounds of our present foundation, as Pynchon perhaps has, he
nevertheless sees with great clarity. When I claim that our
intellectual foundation pervasively influences many aspects of our
lives, this is one of the connotations I may have in mind:
(O.K. Here's George Dennison very involved in teaching
children, and realizing at the same time that so many of the
problems which confront him really stem from the way our
society thinks about itself and its children. Here Dennison
is criticizing a piece by Mary Alice White from Urban
Review . First a paragraph from Ms. White, and then
Dennison's criticism.)
(Ms. White)
What we would propose... is that we should learn still more
about how children learn, and how different children learn
differently, before any solutions are proposed. When we
have enough data, we think it may be possible to construct a
better fit between the objectives of the curriculum and the
pupil's perceptions; and certainly a better fit between
those objectives, the evaluative system, and the pupil's
evaluative map.
(Dennison says:)
These words are such a quintessence of the self-absorption
of bureaucratic research, that I feel obliged to underline
them, as it were, in red. Who would suppose that this
educator was writing in 1968? Drop-outs, illiteracy,
vandalism, savagery, loss of intelligence, loss of spirit,
apathy rising into nausea, nausea rising into rage-
these
are the facts for many millions of pupils and families
in
their experience of the public schools. They are
such facts
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as indicate the basic responsibility of educators. Yet how
responsible this one manages to sound while she holds them
at arm's length in deference to her trivial data, her
batter fits and "evaluative maps," and her animistic
belief that curriculum itself possesses "objectives."
(At another point, Dennison in criticizing Bruner, is trying
to make a distinction between true thought and mere
intellection.
)
How is thought reduced to mere intellection? Ultimately, as
I shall try to show, by a failure of love. More obviously
by failure of imagination, sympathy, observation— failure of
response. Nor is the absence of response a merely negative
phenomenon. We do not find a gap where response should be.
We find instead the attempt to control. This displacement
corresponds exactly to the failure of thought that we refer
to when we speak disdainfully of "abstractions;" for we do
not mean that thought should use no abstractions, but that
when abstractions are allowed to usurp the place that
belongs to what can only be called the body of the world,
they no longer appear as vital components of thought, but as
mere abstractions.
Bruner tells us that every child experiences a "deep-sensed
commitment to the web of social reciprocity." Now in a
rough-and-ready way this seems to be a true statement about
life. At the same time it is quite obvious that children do
not experience webs and commitment, but rather experience
other children, adults, games, objects, etc. Are we
haggling about words? Far from it. We v/ant to speak of
motives, desires, needs. We want to know how experience
transpires for the child himself, and for the adult himself.
We want to know what the quick of it is, the life of it. It
is fatal to our investigation to fall into the error of
believing that our own abstract descriptions— "commitment to
the web, etc."—actually transpire as facts in the immediate
experience of those we are observing. To allow this to
happen is to lose sight of the object of study. It is to
begin to tabulate one's own abstractions under the
impression that one is speaking, still, of the organic
unfolding of life. Whether we are aware of it or not, we
have begun to limit and control the phenomena. 12
The Relation of Skills to Our Intellectual Foundation
My paper might loosely be characterized as philosophical.
The
quotations from Dennison are an example of this; they serve to
elaborate
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part of my philosophical argument. Why then do I begin with, and why
will I later write a whole section on skills, particularly on physical
skills? The best answer, I think, is the one I have already suggested:
my interest in philosophical questions arises from and will return to my
central interest, which is physical skills. There are, however, more
"logical" justifications for my concern with skills. Physical skills, I
will claim, participate in the same structure as do all other skills,
the whole range of human abilities. Therefore, to work toward a new
understanding of the structure of knowledge is to work toward a new
understanding of skills. While the structure of physical skills is
difficult to explore because such skills do not have and may never
extensively have the articulate components which our more intellectual
skills have, this short-coming has a certain advantage which, I believe,
served as a catalyst for this paper. Because physical skills are less
articulate processes of knowing, they are, therefore, less burdened with
the inadequacies of our present intellectual foundation. In the
practice of physical skills, the constraints and pre-suppositions of our
present foundation are not so immediately present. Thus, the practice
of these skills sometimes allows the participant to break through our
present inadequacies and to experience intimations of another way of
being. Such intimations are the impetus for my present exploration.
Dennison speaks of the "gsy intelligence" of children, that once
children are in motion among themselves the quality of gay intelligence
becomes apparent immediately and characterizes their games. No one
needs to be reminded that this is one of the loveliest of human
That quality of gay intelligence is a part of thetraits
.
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intimations I feel in the practice of skills. Though our present
intellectual foundation be circular, forming passageways of routine
always cogent enough, always herding us through time, though that
foundation must be essentially explored from within and by means of its
own definitions, there are still possibilities for another way of being.
Rilke, to whom "being here is much," knew one of the secrets of such
possibilities: like the children at their games, he always left a
space
.
The Unicorn
This is the animal that never existed. None of them ever knew
one; but just the same they loved it; the way it moved, the way it
stood looking at them in pure tranquility. Of course, there wasn't any.
But because they loved it, one became an animal. They always left a
space. And in the space they had hollowed out for it, lightly it would
lift its head, and hardly need to exist. They nourished it, not with
grain, but only, always with the possibility it might be. And this gave
so much strength to it that out of its forehead grew a horn. One horn.
Up to a virgin, silverly it came. And there within her, there within
14
her glass, it was.
CHAPTER II
DESCARTES: AN EXPLORATION OF OUR
INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION
A General Introduction to Descartes
An historical generalization would suggest that the world into
which Descartes emerged was a world ready for change. In the same way
that scholars theorize that particular men and certain significant
epochs in history come together, so Descartes and the first decades of
the 17th century seemed to be one of these unique meetings. The moment
had been prepared by the Parisian Doctors in the 14th century who had
initiated modern medicine, also by Copernicus, by Galileo, and by other
scientists—a moment to define the physical and mathematical sciences
according to their own value and to demand their free status.
Similarly, another kind of growth was ready to begin: a growth which
would consist in a process of reflection, in a turning back of thought
upon itself, making it more explicitly aware of itself and its problems.
Mind was ready for revolt. It had too long been fettered by the church
and by scholasticism. Into this moment of history came a man of special
talents—a genuis, trained in the logic of mathematics, and
possessing
the overwhelming egoism to attempt the reconstruction of knowledge.
A
world ready for change, a man of special talents: a unique meeting.
Thomas, a French historian, offers this view of the meeting:
During this long period of time, five or six men stand
out
as having thought and created ideas; and the rest
of the
world has worked upon these thoughts. From the time
of
43
44
Christ until the time of Descartes, I perceive a vacuum of
two thousand years. In that general torpor, a man was
needed who would again raise up mankind, who would add new
^^9or to understanding, a man who would have enough daring
to overthrow, enough genius to reconstruct. That man was
Descartes .
^
Other verdicts, however, have not been as generous. For while
Descartes claimed to have reconstructed the foundations of knowledge
solely with the aid of reason and truth, his philosophy, as I shall
attempt to show, was neither as reasonable nor as truthful as he
claimed.
Descartes' philosophy was essentially a formalism, a set of formal
definitions and procedures designed to establish and guarantee
certainty. Each definition had to be wholly explicit, and no step in
the procedure could be susceptible to doubt. Descartes' was a mind
dedicated to a kind of abstract and formal logic. Just as Piaget's work
seemed greatly influenced by his early training in biology or Polanyi's
by his training in chemistry, so Descartes' seemed influenced by his
training in mathematics. Before he became a philosopher, Descartes was,
and remained, a mathematician. It was as a mathematician that he
extended the professional mark of his calling to knowledge as a whole.
As a mathematician, Descartes had shown that it was possible, by
applying algebra to geometrical problems, to describe the properties of
whole families of curves by means of simple equations. He believed that
this method, which in the field of mathematics had been so successful,
might be extended to other fields; and thus enable the enquirer to reach
a similar certainty- Descartes' work can be viewed as attempting to
establish a universal mathematics within philosophy; a unification
of
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sciences, guided by mathematics, in that each of their
components was to be equal in clarity and distinctness, therefore, in
certainty, to algebra and geometry. Descartes' method was one of posing
and getting rid of problems, one after the other; and establishing at
each step certainties never more to be overthrown.
Paradigmatic of this method and its influence was Laplace's
conception that if an omnicient observer knew the position of all the
particles in the universe at time t^, he would then be able to predict
their position at time t^, and so would know everything there was to
know. Laplace's ideal was one of wholly explicit knowledge. This was
also essentially Newton's ideal; and it has been the ideal, not only of
philosophers and physicists, but the ideal of the life-scientists as
well— a dream that all science could be reduced ultimately to certain
knowledge. Thus it was hoped, for instance, that one day all
explanations in biology would ultimately be reduced to explanations in
terms of physics and chemistry, which were, in turn, really quantitative
explanations in terms of mathematics. In this dream, all science was
ideally, applied mathematics; and as the more "backward" sciences
advanced, they moved inexorably closer to this single model. It was a
model of a one-level world, where there were bits of matter moved by
mechanical laws, and nothing else. Wholes were explicable by analysis
into their parts, and events by their precedent events, which were their
causes
.
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An Eclectic View of Descartes' Philosophy
Descartes' philosophy showed not only a dedication to the ideal of
certainty, but also a sense of mission, and a scorn of all knowledge
that was not so singularly founded. After his training in mathematics,
Descartes left the university and began a private study and reflection.
In November of 1619, at the age of twenty-three, in the midst of a long
meditation, Descartes had a prophetic dream. The "Spirit of Truth"
descended and revealed to him the "admirable science," a unified program
of science, governed by reason and done by the hand of a single master.
Descartes' study had led him to believe that despite the efforts of
previous philosophers, "humanity had been unable to advance by a single
step in the pursuit of wisdom and had been but a child up to the
2
present, governed by its appitites and senses." Man had therefore
never had certain knowledge of anything. But nov;, through the program
of unified science, revealed in his dream, man would become master of
himself and capable of adjusting everything to the level of reason.
With the certainty made possible within a unified science, man would
reach his true maturity and become in Descartes' phrase, "lord and
possessor of nature."
Like most prophetic dreams, Descartes' revealed a vision of an
important and unique fate. His mission was claer. If the Spirit of
Truth had descended upon him, it was in order that he might consecreate
himself to the definitive founding of Science. For him was reserved
the
role of the great engineer, in the words of the French historian
f the modern city of the intellect, a cityMaritian, "an engineer o
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entirely geometrical and straight as a die, in no way resembling those
ancient, straggling and badly proportioned cities of the past." To
become such an engineer, Descartes had to overthrow all that men had
tried to build up through past ages, "an heroic enterprise, one which he
had no right to hold back from, but one which would never again be
3
necessary to undertake." In short, Descartes' dream commanded him to
reconstruct human knowledge.
At twenty-three years of age, Descartes dedicated himself to the
building of a new and unified philosophy, which would guarantee science
a universal and infallible method of reasoning, and which would thus
make possible the reconstruction of human knowledge. He began his
philosophy by reflecting within his own mind and from that reflection
proposed a method by which he could work toward certainty. His method
was to find principles which were self-evident, and "then starting with
the intuitive apprehension of all these ideas that were absolutely
simple, attempt to ascend to the knowledge of all others, by precisely
4
similar steps." Through this method, the mind would function almost
mathematically, starting with a few basic truths and from there move
toward all further knowledge. Instead of spreading itself outwardly,
the mind had only to study within itself, in order, there, to become
aware of the truth, the seeds of which were all there inborn. The
procedure was simple. In geometry one looked for some geometrical
absolute and then arranged in proper order the series of relatives which
were dependent on that absolute. So in philosophy, one had to
look for
some metaphysical absolute and then move toward the various
relatives,
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which when arranged in their proper order, would give an absolutely true
science of reality.
Descartes dream, the intuition of a unified science to be
achieved primarily by reflection, by casting the mind back into itself,
iri embryo, many of the basic principles still existing within
our present intellectual foundation: the indubitability of knowledge
achieved by correct method, the total explicitness of basic truths, and
the unity of the basic structure of all science. Descartes' was the
dream of a great and powerful mind, a mind destined to influence man's
conception of knowledge and of himself for generations to come.
Maritian says of this influence:
Descartes ' dream and early work implied in his youth of
twenty-three who was to lay anev; the foundation of
knowledge, an unusual strength of intellectual
concentration, passion for truth, energy of will, and a
fearless self-confidence accompanied by a hyperbolical scorn
of the past. It brought with it the out and out dogmatism
which was to characterize—and compromise— the metaphysics
of the modern, and by way of reaction, lead to the facile
skepticism of the empiricists. It presupposed the
possibility of a single science, accounting for everything,
easily possessed by man, and bearing, as does mathematics,
on knowledge made to the measure of mind. Above all it
actually isolated the human mind in the creation of Science,
which the mind deduced altogether from seeds of truth innate
within itself; and which, being true, as well as being only
an unfolding of our thought, became, in fact, the rule of
reality. Thus, along with universal mathematism of
objectivity, it instilled the Cartesian doctrine of ideas
and the Cartesian doctrine of evidence: the principles of
modern subjectivism.”^
Before I discuss how Descartes justified these principles,
consider their implications. These three basic principles contained
within Descartes' mathematical formalism are still major forces within
intellectual foundation. The explicitness of truth, theour present
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indubitability of method and the unity of science are still the ideals
of many of our disciplines. They may have become disguised or subtly
changed, as I shall later demonstrate; but their force and intent remain
intact. But why; what is their appeal? Why should our mathematicizing
of nature be true? There is no intrinsic reason, for example, why
Newton s geometrical proof of Kepler's second law should demonstrate
anything about what goes on in the sky. Why should the more complex
be explained out of and exhausted by those orders which are
simplest, and ultimately by the most simple, the one "real" order, which
is matter in motion? These are the principles which my metahpor of the
interface implicitly argues against. It is precisely this over-emphasis
on formalism which has allowed our disciplines to neglect the complexity
of the world and to insist that because mathematical formulae can be
written on one line, all living things must also be of one sort and on
one level. It is hard to understand how any human being can move
through the complex diversities of his life and still believe in the
kind of reductionism spawned by these Cartesian principles. Yet many
people do; Descartes' influence is still powerful. Despite the many
obvious objections against these Cartesian principles, they are still
deeply ingrained in our disciplines and in our intellectual foundation.
The supposed certainty offered by Cartesian philosophy held and still
holds great appeal for man. Descartes' justification for his basic
principles was powerful and pursuasive.
In his quest for certainty, Descartes' most fundamental concept
was the Cartesian intuition. This intuition, or as he later came to
call it, the clear and distinct idea, was the basic unit of knowledge.
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the underlying building block for all further knowledge. In order for
the program of a unified science to succeed, the basic unit had to be
wholly explicit and incapable of being doubted, in Rules for the
Direction of the Mind
,
Descartes stated, "In the subjects we propose to
investigate, our inquiries should be directed, not to v/hat others have
thought, nor to what we ourselves conjecture, but to what we can clearly
and perspicuously behold and with certainty deduce; for knowledge is won
gin no other way." That which was "clear and perspicuously to behold"
was to become his basic unit of knowledge, the Cartesian intuition. The
Cartesian intuition was a conception of a pure and attentive mind, a
conception so plain that no doubt remained concerning what was
understood. Marjorie Grene, a contemporary critic, discusses the clear
and distinct idea in her book. The Knower and the Known . She notes that
it is a conception of the mind, that is something the mind does, not
something that comes to us passively. The clear and distinct idea is
"self-guaranteeing because it is responsible, independent, an act of
complete attention, resting self-sufficiently within the firm bounds of
its own bright light: seeing clearly all that it sees and wanting
7
nothing more."
Descartes felt it imperative that his basic unit of knowledge have
the qualities of explicitness and indubitability . These are demanding
standards, even for a genius to set for himself. So much of man's
experience and knowledge is susceptible to questioning and multiple
interpretation, that certainty, within man's given situation, seems
rarely possible. Descartes’ solution to this dilemma was to view
man
and his acquisition of knowledge in an extreme way. Descartes
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characterized man as almost totally a mental being, and centered man's
acquisition of knowledge almost wholly within the mind. For Descartes,
the basic structures of true knowledge already existed within the mind;
these structures needed only to acquire content to become functional.
Therefore, the structure of the Cartesian intuition was already existent
within the mind. The intuition was, hov/ever, not completely isolated;
order to acquire content, the mind had to be focussed on an
object. Perception's role was, therefore, to break up the object into
"atoms of evidence," v/hich would correspond to ideas already present
within the mind.
Almost like a symbol in mathematics, the clear and distinct idea,
in the last analysis, was a unit, not directly of reality, but of
problem solving. The "reality" of the object did not matter; it was the
ordering of what was before the mind, to make it accessible to
understanding that counted. For the process to take place, perception
had to be limited; be disciplined. Mind was "focussed" on the world,
but did not interact. For the process to succeed, the clear and
distinct idea had to be, of necessity, the act of a pure and attentive
mind: the act of a mind unclouded by irrelevancies or obscurities, by
the drift of imagination or the impact of sense. Somehow a structure,
already present within the mind, so narrowed and purified the mind's
interaction with the world, that what the mind finally allowed itself to
see was explicitly before it; and thus these explicit visions
unquestionably confirmed those structures which had originated the
interaction. The Cartesian unit of knov/ledge was the result of this
self-contained clarity of mind, severely disciplined, and uniquely
focussed on its object of understanding.
In its explicitness and indubility, the clear and distinct idea
was Descartes' basic concept in his quest for certainty. It was simple
in that it could not be analysed into further parts, and absolute in
that it could be understood in itself without reference to anything
else. In the use of the clear and distinct idea as a basic building
block in constructing a unified science, Descartes' method v/as really
only an extension of the principles inherent in this basic concept. The
first step in the construction of knowledge, the acquisition of the
clear and distinct idea, was already intellectual; it was made possible
by the suspension of the crude and misleading information purveyed by
the senses. The clear and distinct idea was the essence of Cartesian
knowledge. The next step in the method was required only because no
finite mind c culd contain all that it knew within the grasp of a .single
intuition. Somehow the intuitions had to be combined, but combined in
such a way that no step in the process was at all obscure or accessible
to doubt. The Cartesian method was not really either logical deduction
or induction; it was not an exhibition of conclusions following validly
from premises nor of general laws following from their parts. It was
rather the movement of that same self-guaranteeing attention of mind
from one intuition to the next, by the simplist technique which might
offer itself as a guide. The Cartesian method was not a logical
argument, but an event, an action. It was the natural movement
of the
mind from one clear and distinct idea to the next, a long
chain of such
8
acts, all equal in purity, clarity and certainty.
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Through the Cartesian intuition and method, Descartes proposed to
construct a unified science, a unified intellectual discipline which
would be equivalent to human wisdom. Descartes believed that science
was in its essence unified because it was the activity of intellect
alone; and intellect was composed of structures within the mind, which
were everywhere the same. As the product of intellect alone, science
was the cultivation of pure intellectual vision; and intellectual vision
had no compartments, no varieties. Descartes himself offered this
advice to scientists:
If, therefore, anyone wishes to search out the truth of
things in serious earnest, he ought not to select one
special science; for all the sciences are conjoined with one
another and interdependent; he ought rather to think how to
increase the natural light of reason, not for the purpose of
resolving this or that difficulty of scholastic type, but in
order that his understanding may light his will^to its
proper choice in all the contingencies of life.
These concepts, the Cartesian intuition, the Cartesian method, and
the Cartesian unity of the sciences, may become clearer if I add some
Cartesian content to them. In the actual operation of these concepts,
Descartes proposed to make doubt his major guarantor of certainty. In
the midst of universal doubt, he found one thing that he certainly and
infallibly knew—the fact that he doubted. Descartes' mind, wholly
attentive and cleared of the clutter of the senses, turned to the
intrinsic evidence of its own existence. This event the cogito this
act of a pure and attentive mind, was the first Cartesian intuition.
God was the next major intuition. Through a series of steps which
Descartes considered, not a logical argument, but a movement from
intuition to intuition, he moved to the intuition of God: ideas
had a
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cause; one had an idea of God; nothing less than God was adequate to
cause the idea of God; God existed. From the clear and distinct idea of
God, there followed the existence of the material world: matter and its
properties underlay the principles of mechanics; the principles of
mechanics were beautifully clear; God in his goodness would not allow
man to be deceived about anything so clear; matter existed.
In the Cartesian intuition of the cogito and the intuition of the
existence of matter, Descartes, as he had implicitly done from the very
beginning, distinctly divided the world into two ultimate and
irreducible substances: matter and consciousness. Matter was *'res
extensa," extended* substance
,
occupying space, and ultimately
describable by the physical magnitudes of space and time. Res extensa
included not just the material world but also man's body, which could be
described and understood as having the same machine-like characteristics
as did inanimate matter. Consciousness, "res cogitans," was wholly
other than matter and time. It was non-spatial, indivisible,
instantaneous, self-directed and purely active. Matter was the subject
of the sciences and consciousness the knowing entity. Although this
dualism seemed to characterize all of the material world in the same
way, it was not so much the similarity of all matter as it was the
singularity of the knowing mind, which was the driving force behind the
dualism. The sciences were unified because the "intuitions" of science
were already within the mind; science was essentially a formalism, a
mathematical kind of knowing. Scientific ideas were pre-existent, given
by God: simple ideas like the premises of mathematics and
physics,
which were true merely by the nature of their form Thus within
the
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strict thoorstical definitions of Cartesicin dualism, scientific evidence
became a quality of ideas, ideas which would constitute reality, only if
they were purely and absolutely luminous; further these ideas were not
the property of matter but already present within the mind. Evidence
was ideas, and ideas were not means but already things. It was as
things they were attained by thought, as if they were pictures which
thought discovered within itself. Cartesian dualism was just not
theoretical but an operational separation of mind from v/orld.
Thus in Descartes' philosophy, there could exist only matter and
consciousness. Man was divided. But this should come as no surprise.
The concept of duality was already implicit in the first Cartesian
principle: both certainty and the unity of knowledge depend on this
duality. The wholly attentive and self-guaranteeing quality of mind
could only exist if the mind was cut off from all implications of its
connection with the crudeness of our bodies and senses. In seeking to
understand Descartes' philosophy, and the general theories of man and
nature implied therein, the duality of man comes even before the
Cartesian intuition; it was the implicit base on which all else was
constructed
.
All of these Cartesian concepts may seem so narrow, so self-
justifying, so at odds with human experience, as to be useless.
Nevertheless, they held great appeal for philosophers and scientists,
and with some modification, they still seem to hold great appeal
today.
The sciences of his day had long been fettered by scholasticism,
and
Descartes, by a master stroke, separated metaphysics from
science. By
this stroke, perceived in a dream of his twenty-third
year, Descartes
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effectively laid the groundwork for modern science. Descartes'
influence may be easier to follow if i abstract, as I did earlier, two
of the four Cartesian concepts I have described. In this way, there are
Cartesian principles or theses: the principle of indubility,
of self—evidence or explicitness, of the unity of science, and of the
duality of man. Marjorie Grene says of these theses:
These principles are not isolated; they form a structure.
There is knowledge which is incapable of being doubted
because there is knowledge which is self-evident, self-
contained; the sum of evident knowledge is wisdom, which is
the same everywhere; and both the evidence and the unity of
knowledge are possible because, and only because, knowledge
is the work of the intellect alone. Were the mind not
cleanly and essentially separate from the body, in nature
and function, the program would collapse.
These principles, powerfully combined within the Cartesian system,
greatly influenced science, philosophy, and most of man's other
disciplines as well. These principles have been both embraced and
resisted, but they have never been clearly rejected or overcome. They
have become so deeply embedded in our disciplines and in our structures
of thought, that they have come to form much of our present intellectual
foundation. Descartes' influence has been powerful and pervasive.
Some General Aspects of Descartes'
Influence on "Objectivism"
This first position paper is designed to elucidate the origins of
our present intellectual foundation, and to trace those origins through
their evolution into what may be generally recognized as our culture's
present conceptions of man and his abilities. The purpose of this
exploration is twofold. First, I believe that the inadequacy of
our
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present conception of skills is deeply founded within this intellectual
foundation, and that no resolution to the problem I have come across in
my work with skills can be achieved without some understanding of the
fundamental conceptions and forces within that foundation. Second, my
resolution to the problem will be basically to suggest new fundamental
conceptions of man and his abilities, new basic principles which I hope
may eventually lead to a reformulation of our intellectual foundation.
Because I can offer only new principles and not their elaboration into a
new foundation, it seems important for me to establish that an
intellectual foundation, can and indeed does, evolve from basic
principles. I can thus at least feel that I have proposed the first
logic step in such a reformulation.
Before I go on to suggest two major lines of Cartesian influence,
I would like to reflect for a moment on the general emphasis of
Descartes' philosophy. Most simply stated, that philosophy was
constructed to answer the question, how is knowledge acquired; and the
answer given was, truth is manifest to a mind properly circumscribed.
Descartes' philosophy was basically a conception of knowledge as totally
objective— impersonal, explicit and permanent. For Descartes, knowledge
was achieved by the power of reason alone, relying on nothing outside
itself. What made knowledge possible was the intrinsic certainty of the
knowing mind itself, needing no support beyond the luminous self-
evidence of its own clear and distinct ideas. All of Descartes'
philosophy was constructed in support of this ideal of certainty.
Descartes was first a mathematician; his discoveries in mathematics, and
other scientific discoveries of the period, particularly those of
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GalilGO, indicated to Descartes that it would now be possible for
science to begin the acquisition of all knowledge. Once this new
scientific method was extended to all subject matters, it would be
possible to solve all the problems which had ever confronted mankind.
To guarantee this acquisition of certain knowledge, Descartes had only
to free science—to get everyone off science’s back. In particular, he
had to free science from all metaphysical concerns and from the
contamination of any personal factors or human perspectives—that is
from all mentation which could be susceptible to doubt. But this was
not difficult. To free science Descartes had only to get men to think
correctly, to pursuade them of a better, simpler more rational way of
looking at the acquisition of knowledge, to offer men a new perspective,
a new ontology.
To free science and to guarantee a conception of totally objective
knowledge, Descartes built his philosophy. In this reconstruction of
knowledge, Descartes' underlying principle, the one that defended all
the rest, was his dualism. Unlike future thinkers who would center the
quest for certainty within a one leveled ontology, Descartes was still
too much of a moral philosopher to believe that human nature differed
only in complexity from the mechanical universe. Therefore, he set mind
apart from all the rest of existence and centered certainty within the
mind. Descartes looked at the precision of his own algebraic
discoveries, and at Galileo's mechanical theories; and he was
convinced
beyond a doubt that the theories were right—that this was not
only the
best way, but the only true way of looking at the
universe. Descartes
constructed his philoaohpy to defend the truth and the
n,ethod of this
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scientific vision. His philosophy was itself a formal structure, much
like his own mathematical theories. The principle of a dualism made
such a formal and mechanistic philosophy possible. Guided by the
principle of a dualism, Descartes fused his conviction of the uniqueness
with his conviction of the indubitable truth of a mathematical
conception of knowledge; and through a series of clear and precise
steps, constructed, what was to him, an irrefutable foundation for
knowledge.
Cartesian dualism divided existence into mathematicizing mind and
extended matter. Mind was uniquely structured for the acquisition of
knowledge and matter uniquely structured to be known. Cartesian dualism
was almost a matter/anti-matter division. Mind and matter were wholly
different, each a system unto itself. The material world contained all
matter, including man's physical body. It was a closed system, entire
in itself and containing all that was needed for its explanation.
Within the material world, all explanation was on one level, in terms of
least particulars. Wholes were explicable by their parts, and events by
their precedent events, which were their causes. The material world was
matter, extended substance, existing within spatical and temporal
dimensions, capable of motion, of dividing and combining, but
essentially dumb, having no outsxde purpose or direction. Mind was
anti-matter, everything that matter was not. It was non-spatial,
instantaneous, indivisible, self-directed and purely active. Yet
despite their completely different natures, animate mind was uniquely
suited to knowing inanimated matter. Innately within the mind were to
be found clear and distinct ideas, which were guaranteed by God
and
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''^hich WGre themsGlves indubitablG truths, corresponding precisely with
the structures of nature.
Descartes himself claimed that his division of existence was so
clearly founded as to be indubitable. Nevertheless, I suggest that
Cartesian dualism was a metaphor; just as my interface is a metaphor.
It was a way of looking at existence. Descartes' metaphor was implied,
if not already present, in his dream of a unified science. Possessing
complex scientific skills, devoted to the kind of certain knowledge
science seemed to make possible, and yet unwilling to relinquish the
special place moral philosophy had reserved for man, Descartes had an
intimation or a series of intimations that these disparate ideals could
be combined within a single vision. To achieve this vision, Descartes'
metaphor focussed narrowly on specific mental abilities and on certain
aspects of the world, to the exclusion of all else. Thus the metaphor
avoided all the uncertainties of perception and mentation by defining
them away, and similarly avoided all the complexities of the world by
choosing not to see them. Instead Descartes' metaphor defined and
reduced existence in such a way that everything, both the knower and the
known, fit into a simple, formal structure. The world of matter was a
closed system of material causality; the world of mind, not only
perfectly suited to understand this closed system, but somehow already
containing and thus guaranteeing the certainty of that explanation.
Descartes' metaphor, his vision of existence, was one of
tremendous appeal and influence. The historical generalization
I
suggested earlier proved to be true. Descartes' particular
genius
specially suited for those first decades of the 17th century.
was
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Descartes vision of manifest truth and all powerful reason did free
science, and offered it the kind of unimpeded progress it had never
before had. Although specific details and arguments in his philosophy
were slowly discarded, the major thrust and implications of the
Cartesian principles remained dominate. In return, the success of
science seemed to confirm Descartes' vision and solidified his
influence. The hope of an exact science, founded on the automatic
manipulation of unambiguous objective variables became a prominent ideal
of not just science but philosophy as well. Indeed, as I have claimed
before, his influence reached into the very heart of our intellectual
foundation. Although Descartes' vision has been partly resisted or has
been supplemented, we still, even today, stand on Cartesian ground. We
rely unthinkingly on the principles Descartes proposed.
The power and pervasiveness of Descartes' vision is manifest in
two lines of thought which followed. These lines developed and diverged
as some of the more fragile aspects of Cartesian dualism began to erode.
One line, which I have referred to earlier as subjective, was, in
effect, a continuation of metaphysics, but now operating within the
structures of Cartesian dualism. The other line, the objective, was
basically a continuation of the unified program of science Descartes had
envisioned, but without some of the more encumbering aspects of his
philosophy. Descartes had defended his conception of explicit
knowledge
by building a philosophy which excluded all hiiman or dubitable
elements
from the acquisition of knowledge. The simplest defense
would have been
to exclude all human elements by centering the
acquisition of knowledge
within the material world itself, within that closed
system of material
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causality. However, Descartes still felt that mind was somehow unique.
Therefore, he narrowed, limited and purified mind until it was safe to
center the acquisition of knowledge within it. Even then, the process
of acquisition was somewhat mysterious: mind did not actually think; it
only beheld what was already there. But in the last analysis, those
mysterious elements did not matter. The process was indubitable anyway
because it was guaranteed by God— it had God's seal of approval.
As science developed, however, this conception of knowledge
,
as
centered mysteriously within the mind, became burdensome and unstable.
The questions of how non-material awareness arose from physiological
processes and how it effected the acquisition of knowledge seemed
extraneous to science’s main concerns. Moreover, in the years that
followed, faith in God dwindled, and wisdom, also greatly influenced by
the success of science, became ever more secular. Descartes' real
import to science was not this strange isolation of the knowing mind,
but rather the conception that truth was manifest; that explicit and
indubitable knowledge was possible. If man was essentially dualistic in
his nature, fine; so much the easier to exclude all human perspectives
from science. Let the metaphysicians worry about the mind. For
science, knowledge became a province not of mind, but of the brain which
was wholly a part of the material world. Awareness need not enter the
world of scientific description. If awareness arose at all, it was only
a by-product of physiological processes and had no reciprocity.
Thus for science in the years that followed, the dualistic faith,
that God made and kept united knowledge and its objects, gave way to a
one leveled conception of knowledge where all complex order
could be
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explained out of simpler order, and ultimately out of the one real order
which was matter in motion. This was a conception of knowledge which I
have previously characterized as objectivism, and I will continue to use
the term although materialism might be more philosophically accurate.
Objectivism was bascially a one level ontology where everything,
including man himself, was explicable in terms of least particulars.
Taking its lead from Descartes, objectivism was a continued narrowing of
the conception and means of knowledge, an exclusion of all dubitable
elements. The last elements of the unique power of mind, which
Descartes had seemed to include, were not eliminated; and the reason was
separated wholly from experience. Science finally became not
explanation, but merely description. Scientific theories were denied
any claim to inherent rationality, but became merely the most economical
12
adaptation of thought to facts.
Although Cartesian philosophy greatly limited our intellectual
powers and narrowed our conceptions of knowledge, it still allowed
reason to be the final judge of reality. Thus for Descartes, the
mathematical conceptions of the clear and distinct ideas were the final
reality. In the Cartesian system, numbers and geometrical forms were
assumed to be inherent in the material world, and thus to reveal its
perfection and harmony. Starting with Newton, an even greater
limitation, an even more "objective and mechanistic" conception of
existence began to prevail. Newton was deeply influenced by
Descartes,
and like him was imbued with mathematical genius.
But at the same time
Newton believed that mathematical insight could be
read not from the
mind itself, but from the perceived phenomena.
Thus while Newton
claimed for his mechanics the Cartesian ideals of explicitness and
indubitability
,
he centered his claim not with the clear and distinct
ideas of the mind, but within the material world itself. From Newton
onward, rationality, which was for Descartes at least partially a power
of the mind, given and guaranteed by God, moved outside the mind, and
became another factor somehow implicitly existing in the material world.
With Newton, pure mathematics which had formerly been the key to
nature's mysteries, became strictly separated from the application of
mathematics to the formulation of empirical laws. Mind was denied the
power to apprehend reality, and theory could no longer reveal nature's
perfection. Mathematics, rather, came to represent, as Polanyi says,
"all rational thinking which appeared necessarily true; while reality
was summed up in the events of the world which were seen as contingent
—
13
that is, merely such as happened to be the case." After Newton, the
separation of reason and experience was taken even further, and
mathematics was denied the capacity of stating anything beyond a set of
tautologies. Scientific theory was denied the claim to any inherent
rationality. Scientific theory became only a convenient summary of
experience, a quantitative correlation of cause and effect. Therefore,
scientific theories could never go beyond experience or affirm anything
which could not be tested by experience. Scientific explanation was
forsaken for mere description.
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More Specific Aspects of Descartes'
Influence on Objectivism
Thomas saw Descartes as one of the five or six great intellects of
all time, a man with "the daring to overthrow" and "the genius to
reconstruct." As befits such a genius, his influence on succeeding
generations has been manifold. By a master stroke, Descartes separated
metaphysics from science, and in so doing, effectively laid the
groundwork for modern science. His ideal of a mathematical gnosis, of
universal method and doubt—a single Science in the pure state, offered
science an all-powerful rationale. With this rationale, science grew to
become absolute, the final arbitrator, unquestionably correct. Although
some of the specifics of the Cartesian system changed and evolved, the
power of the rationale remained. In his quest for absolute certainty,
Descartes gave to science intimations of a potential mastery and
certitude, intimations which were in time themselves to become
certitudes: the unquestioning possession of unquestionable knowledge.
While Cartesian philosophy and the subsequent principles of
objectivism freed science and gave it an unassailable authority , they
did not seem to affect the actual workings of science. The techniques
and operations of the sciences, particularly the hard sciences like
physics, chemistry and astronomy seemed to develop independently from
these principles. Thus while science claimed, and maybe even believed
that it was operating through the objective principles I outlined in the
last section, it was actually operating through processes
of discovery
much more consistent with the actual workings of the human
mind; these
processes 1 will discuss later. Descartes' major Influence on
the hard
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sciences was, therefore, not so much to change sciences 's inner workings
as to change what science claimed or thought it was doing, Descartes
did not so much change the content of science; rather he changed man's
conception of science. When the hard sciences claimed to be only
experimental, never venturing beyond experience by affirming anything
that could not be tested by experience
,
they were robbing themselves
,
and more importantly they were robbing a culture, which looked to them
as a model. They were depriving mankind of a conception of knowing
adequate to the human situation, a conception that acknowledged the
elements of passion, beauty and profundity which must be a part of any
process of discovery.
Nevertheless, in any strict accounting, Descartes cannot be said
to have influenced the hard sciences as greatly as he influenced many
other of our disciplines . Because he did not change the actual workings
of the hard sciences, they have been able to develop in a relatively
"natural" manner: they have made discoveries, have apprehended reality,
more skillfully, more truly than have any of our other disciplines.
Descartes' major influence has been on philosophy, and on the
biological, social and psychological sciences, which, developing later,
attempted to model themselves on the Cartesian principles and on the
misleading conceptions of knowing proffered by objectivism.
The philosophical influence of Descartes and objectivist tradition
is perhaps best exemplified in the positivist movement
which arose
toward the end of the 19th century. Positivism
denied to scientific
theories any claim to inherent rationality.
Scientific theory was
merely a convenient summary of experience, the
most economical
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adaptation of thought to facts. Positivism was at oncG a quest for an
indubitable rationale for science, and a total reaction against the
inherent power of reason. Positivism reached its extreme conclusion in
a movement known as logical positivism which grew in the 1920 's around a
group of men who became known as the Vienna Circle. One of the main
programs of the logical positivists was an attempt to drive a logical
wedge between what was on one hand verifiable and scientific, hence
meaningful; and what on the other hand was not verifiable and
scientific, hence not meaningful.
Just as Descartes had attempted to narrow and define reality so
that the all powerful reason of the self-contained mind would be the
final arbitrator of knowledge, so the logical positivists attempted to
define reality so that experience would arbitrate. The logical
positivists recognized only two kinds of meaningful statements, analytic
and synthetic. Statements concerning the relations of ideas were
analytic; they were true by virtue of their form. Analytic statements
amounted almost to tautologies, 2+2=4, and could be demonstrated by
simple logical methods without appeal to experience. Synthetic
statements could be verified or falsified by experience. Statements
which fit neither category were merely sophistry and illusion. A. J.
Ayer, a noted positivist, explained further:
The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of
apparent statements of fact is the criterion of
verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually
significant to any given person, if and only if, he knows
how to verify the proposition which it purports to express
—
that is, if he knows what observations would lead him,
under
certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being
true,
or reject it as being false. If on the other hand, tne
putative proposition is of such a character that the
68
assumption of its truth or falsehood is consistent with any
assumptions whatsoever concerning the nature of his future
experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a
tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence may be
emotionally significant to him, but it is not literally
significant.
Just as Descartes sought to eliminate, from the acquisition of
knowledge, all aspects of human persepctive which might be dubitable, so
the positivists sought to guarantee a hard core of certain knowledge by
eliminating from science, and really from all discovery, the passionate,
personal, human appraisal of theory. For both Descartes and the
positivists, this unique utopia of infallible truth could be reached
when each item in the acquisition of knowledge could be specified.
Descartes sought to specify his basic unit of knowledge by separating
reason from all dubitable influence and by offering reason the precise
mathematical certainty of the Cartesian intuition. With the
positivists, reason was separated wholly from experience; the only
specifiable units of knowledge became not intuitions but mechanical
certainties. Instead of a great natural machine and over against it the
mathematician's mind, intent on grapsing clearly and distinctly its
working order, the positivists proposed the spread of time-space events
in nature and over against these a kind of map or time-table, a system
of knowing equally mechnical. The Cartesian quest for certainty led
from the already limited conception of self-contained mathematical
truths guaranteed by God, to the positivist conception, in which
science
became only description, and in which, at any moment, one
must be
prepared to drop his quest for knowledge, whenever an
item of that
knowledge could not be verified by experience.
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Here, in its sterile splendor, can be seen part of the Cartesian
legacy to the modern world. The Cartesian quest for a manifest truth,
wholly specifiable in its least particulars, leads to a conception of
knowledge adequate perhaps to computers, but not to us as knowing
beings. As I suggested in my introduction, we are not automatic pilots,
but real pilots—balancing, precariously yet precisely, through
processes of knowing far different from those proposed by the
positivists. If we actually sought to so specify our knowledge, we
should have fallen long ago. Yet positivists still maintained that
certain knowledge was our birthright and our destiny. The separation of
mind, the quest for certainty, led the positivists to this isolation.
For the logical positivists, it was true that one might have images and
even feelings—that is passion, beauty, profundity—connected with his
thoughts. That fact might be of minor importance, but logically it was
irrelevant. What gave meaning to a proposition were not the attendant
images, but its verifiability. With positivism, the human mind had
completely lost its power to apprehend reality. What was real, what was
meaningful, not only in science but in men's daily lives as well, became
only that which could be proven, verified by experience.
Long before the positivists attempted to establish their credo,
objectivism was already a powerful force in the world of ideas. The
objectivism of the 17th and 18th centuries was both a philosophical
influence and an ever-developing rationale for the physical
sciences.
In the 19th century, objectivism also began to serve as a foundation—
not just a rationale, but a model— for the newly developing
life
The certainty and justification which objectivism seemed
to
sciences
.
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have given the physical sciences held great attraction for biology,
zoology, and later for psychology and sociology. Objectivism tended to
narrow the life-sciences and reduce them to a study of parts, of
details, rather than a study of the organism as a whole. In biology,
objectivist theories and explanations tended to be in terms of chemical
and physical properties; in psychology, explanations were in terms of
the behavior of the organism; and in the social sciences, particularly
in ethology, in terms of evolutionary and genetic development.
Much of the objectivist influence on the life-sciences can also be
traced back to its Cartesian roots. Of all the scientific issues in
which the objectivists have played a role, one of the most deeply rooted
was the mind-body problem, a problem, which even before Descartes, was
of great interest to scientists and philosophers. Although the
parameters of the problem changed as discoveries in biology and genetics
altered the scientific knowledge of man, the basic definitions of the
problem still remained those which Cartesian philosophy gave to the
world. Before the 17th century, the physical and biological world,
alike, were populated v/ith spirits which were cosubstantial with the
physical bodies they inhabited. For most thinkers, the body was the
natural home of the soul, and there was no incompatibility between them.
Medieval men were full of humors, shadowy characteristics of the soul
which permeated all portions of the body. Until the scientific
revolution and its great patriarch, Descartes, there was, for the
most
part, no mind-body dualism in the sense in which mind and
soul, as
unsubstantial entities in a deterministic mechanical world,
became major
15
intellectual problems.
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When the scientific revolution demystified the universe, and Des-
cartes reduced the body to a machine driven by an hydraulic system of
vital liquids coarsing down the nerves, there was logically no place
left for the mind. Descartes, needing to reconcile a mechanistic
universe with his own moral philosophy, placed the mind along with its
guarantor, God, in a kind of pre-cognitive realm inside the brain, where
it was the source of truth but could itself never be known. With the
advance of science and the decline of religious influence in the 18th
and 19th centuries, the objectivists no longer needed the concept of
mind to explain the acquisition of knowledge. Nevertheless, especially
in the life-sciences, the vexing notion of dualism remained.
The life-sciences, which had to deal with complex drives of human
nature, could not dismiss the problem as easily as the physical sciences
seemed to. The question remained: how did awareness arise, where was
the essential knower—how did the body which was a part of the world,
connect with the mind inside the brain inside the head, that infinite
regress back to the essential knower? The objectivists' attempts to
reconcile the mind-body problem were founded on the premise that if the
brain’s connections to the body could be specified closely enough, then
the mind, the essential knower, would somehow also be specified. Toward
such specification, the objectivists built models of brain-body inter-
action. The mechanically minded 18th century preferred a clockwork
model
in which the brain twitched the body's limbs like a master
puppeteer. By
the 19th century, the discovery of electricity gave rise to
descriptions
based on electrical attractions and repulsions. But these
models,
especially compared to the precision of Newtonian mechanics
and the
Mendeleev periodic table, seemed hardly objective. What was
needed was
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for the brain to be analyzed, for its constituent parts to be localized
and their functions specified.
The phrenoligists first attempted this localization by claiming to
distinguish, through the skull, such separate brain areas as mathematics
and love of children. Later in the 19th century, Ferrier and Broca gave
this kind of model a more rational basis by proposing that different
parts of the brain controlled different body functions, such as speech,
hearing and sight. With the technique of anatomical dissection, the
localization models became much more precise. Sherrington, in the early
20th century, built a model for postural control that was pictured in
terms of specific connections from sense organ to muscle, a conception
that implied a separate connection of every sensory cell with every
motor center. Research, using electronic stimulation, guided by an
electron microscope, produced even more detail localization models.
Despite their detailed specification, even these more recent
objectivist models did little to solve the essential mind-body problem.
Just as Descartes, once he had created the dualism, side-stepped the
problem by defining mind in a way that could not be questioned, so the
objectivists seemingly defined away the problem. As they subjected the
mind to ever more detailed analysis, they restricted the role of mind
further and further. The 18th century could still talk of "mind"
mechanically connected to the body, and in the very vagueness of
their
concepts, still preserve some "otherness," some uniqueness
for the
essential knower. But as objectivists’ research turned toward
brain
analysis, the concept of mind was banished altogether.
Henceforth, w
was being connected was physical brain with physical
body. The mind-
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body problem had again been surreptitously defined away. For the
objectivists, the Cartesian cogito, the "I" that thinks, seemed not to
exist.
Descartes considered consciousness a unity, separate,
incorruptible, immortal; and nevertheless capable of certain knowledge
—
all this guaranteed by God. Man's body was a machine ruled by a mind
totally separate from the body. Since animals did not have immortal
souls, their minds were of the same siibstance as their bodies; all
living things in nature, except those that were humanly conscious, were
really only highly complex machines. With the decline of religious
influence, with the advance of the objective brain-body models described
above, and v/ith the rise of evolutionary doctrines of natural selection,
man lost his exemption and became only the "naked ape." Thus the
description of both men and animals could be given in terms of the
arrangement and operation of physical parts in space and time. The laws
of motion of such animal-machines were, therefore, nothing but complex
forms of the laws of physics and chemistry.
Over the years, scientific advances dictated certain changes in
the analogy, but the machine image remained dominant. Consideration of
purposive or intelligent behavior was all but removed from most of the
life-sciences, and in much of psychology the results have been similar.
The radical disconnection of mind from body made a coherent
understanding of the world in terms of them impossible. As the
knowledge of physical nature increased, the mind
shrivelled to, m
Ryle's phrase, "a ghost in the machine," or else
vanished altogether
into the computer-like brain. Laplace's conception,
mentioned earlier.
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that if an omniscient observer knew the position of all the particles in
the universe at time t^...was a description of a universe wholly without
mind. This displacement of mind from the world seemed to offer the kind
of certainty science was supposed to have. Thus the displacement of
mind became an objectivist ideal, a model for aspiring sciences.
One of the best examples of a science modeled on this ideal was in
a psychology which came to be known as behaviorism. Behaviorism, also
strongly influenced by positivism, emerged as a revolt against the
excessive use of introspective methods. Behaviorism was begun, in
effect, by James Watson. In a paper he published just before the
outbreak of the First World War, Watson declared, "the time has come
when psychology must discard all references to consciousness. Its sole
task must be the prediction and control of behavior; and introspection
16
can form no part of its method." By behavior, Watson meant observable
activities, what physicists called public events. All mental events
were private and could only be made public by introspective statements.
Therefore, within the positivist doctrine, mental events had to be
excluded from the domain of psychological science. Behaviorism first
intended to objectify psychology by excluding consciousness, images and
other "subjective phenomena," as objects of study. Later this came to
imply that the excluded phenomena did not exist.
It was difficult, however, for psychology to study human beings
without reference to consciousness. Unlike the biological sciences
which confined their human studies to physiology, the behaviorists
had
to include some reference to mind-body interaction. In
an effort to
remain true to its objective ideals, behaviorism excluded the
direct
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study of human beings. Instead, it experimented with animals under
laboratory conditions, and then ascribed the results of those
experiments to human behavior. The basic design of those experiments
—
animal, box, lever, food pellets— is all too well known. For
behaviorism, this type of experiment became the archetypal model for all
learning, not only animal but human as well. The model was based on the
physiological concept of the reflex arc: the new-born organism came
into the world equipped with a number of simple, unconditioned reflexes;
what it learned in its lifetime was a matter of conditioning those
reflexes, that is connecting them, one to the next, by a kind of
learning which resulted from interaction with the environment. Each
connection, each learning event, was conceived of as a stimulus and
response, as an S-R unit. Whether the stimulus came first, or whether,
as later in behaviorism, the response was followed by a reinforcing
stimulus, did not seem to matter. What was important was that all
learning could be conceived of as a series of S—R units, one linked to
the next. With this S-R model of learning and with the transposition of
the results of their experiments to human behavior, the behaviorists
felt that they had objectified psychology and made it a true science.
They had indeed excluded consciousness from their study , totally
displacing mind from the world, but only by treating the brain as sort
of a black box, a mysterious computer, the only permissible
knowledge of
which was to found in statements of input and output.
If one confronted a behaviorist with the question of
how an
individual learned, of how knowledge was possible, his
answer would
contain the basic Cartesian principles, as modified by
objectivism. For
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a behaviorist, truth was also manifsst to a mind proparly circumscribed.
The technique of problem solving for the behaviorists was merely the
manipulation of simple variables which eventually led to the emission of
the proper response. One began with the S-R unit, which was the
simplest and most obvious unit of experience, a unit proven beyond all
doubt by strict scientific experiments under laboratory conditions. The
S-R unit was the behaviorist building block for all knowledge, a unit so
clear and distinct as to be indubitable. To form a theory, one merely
sought within further experiments, some obvious combination of such S-R
units. Thus through an almost formal science of human nature, starting
with the simplest, most explicit units of knowledge, one arrived at a
kind of knowledge equal in clarity and distinctness to the "mindless"
17
sciences of physics and chemistry.
What this behaviorist theory of learning became, more than
anything else, was a kind of extreme form of environmentalism. The
human brain became a kind of tabula rasa, a computer which could never
adjust or affect its own program, but must always learn and react in a
simple, mechanistic way. As behaviorism grew, it became interested in
showing how human beings could be better fitted to their environment,
that is how they could be shaped into particular categories to best fit
society's needs. This kind of "reductionism" not only reduced human
beings into programmed automatons, but reduced sociological events
into
behavioral one; for example, the alienation of youth in advanced
industrial societies could be explained by the lack of adequate
reinforcing stimulae during upbringing. In this view society
was kind
of a reified abstract which controlled individuals,
rather than being.
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itself, the product of those individuals. This is essentially the same
view of society parodied by Huxley's Brave New World
,
but despite Huxley
and many other critics, this behaviorist conception of man and society
has become deeply ingrained in our present intellectual foundation.
Why this unquestioning acceptance of an ultimately degrading and
defeating doctrine? B. F. Skinner, a leading behaviorist, provided a
clue. Skinner claimed that no theory ever changed what it was a theory
^ 18 . .
about. Within the objectivist framework of behaviorism, this was
true. Man was changed by the environment, which was in turn largely
controlled by society. The doctrine was self-fulfilling: as soon as an
individual accepted it, he tended to become passive and did indeed begin
to fit into the category he believed that society had created for him.
For that individual and for the behaviorists themselves, theories only
reflected the conditions that already existed. Yet the remarkable thing
about men and society was that they were changed by theories, precisely
because theories were created by and therefore modified consciousness.
It was only by dehumanizing man, by doing away with consciousness, that
the behaviorist doctrine made sense. If the basic behaviorist premise
was accepted, if one believed that all learning was essentially a
mechanical series of S-R links, then all of the rest of the doctrine
inevitably followed.
Skinner's doctrine, that no theory changes what it is a theory
about, epitomizes the objectivist ' s vision of reality within our present
intellectual foundation. The Cartesian quest for certain knowledge
has
brought us to a conception of existence in which neither
mankind,
himself, nor his knowledge, has any meaning. Descartes
believed that
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once the new simplicity and clarity were extended to all subject
matters, mankind would have solved all the problems ever to confront the
human mind. But the extension of the supposed methods of physics and
chemistry to all disciplines, has led rather to a caricature of
knowledge. The incoherence of a vision of existence dominated by the
separation of mind from the acquisition of knowledge, and by the attempt
at the complete specification of the units and processes of knowledge,
has led to a world in which man himself has no place. The irrational
faith that more complex orders must be explained out of and exhausted
by, those that are simplest, and ultimately out of the one real order of
matter in motion, forms a conception of existence in no way adequate to
the human situation. Neither mankind himself nor his acquisition of
knowledge can be explained within a foundation which denies the power of
mind. Nor, as I shall now go on to explain, can an adequate conception
be arrived at by remaining subjectively within the confines of that
mind. Rather we must find a new vision, a coherent conception of
ourselves as knowing beings within a knowable world.
Descartes' Influence on Subjectivism
My exploration of the Cartesian principles and their influence has
been able, I hope, to suggest some of the inadequacies within our
present intellectual foundation. The various tenets of objectivism have
been, perhaps, the most prominent source of these inadequacies,
but
within our present foundation there exists another, and
radically
different conception of existence, a conception which has
proven equally
harmful. Despite the success of science and the
power of the objective
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doctrine, there have been other thinkers, the subjective philosophers
and writers, who have been unwilling to center their conception of
existence wholly within the material world. Yet because of the
influence of the Cartesian system, there existed for these subjective
thinkers no middle ground; if they wished to include mind in their
explanations of existence, then they were forced to make those
explanations wholly in terms of mind. The inadequacies of both
objectivism and subjectivism stem from that time, early in the 17th
century, when Descartes, in pursuit of manifest truth, split apart the
inner life of consciousness from the external world. As m.an's knowledge
of physical nature increased by leaps and bounds, the mind, understood
as disembodied spirit, shriveled within that objective world to a mere
ghost in the machine. Despite the ingenuity of some of Descartes'
remarks about the interaction of mind and body, the radical
disconnection of the two has made a coherent understanding and
conception of existence, in terms of them, impossible.
In his quest for certain knowledge, Descartes separated mind from
matter. The separation was total, a kind of matter/anti-matter division
in which mind was conceived of as wholly other than the extended world
of matter. To many of the writers who followed, this extreme, two
leveled ontology seemed to preclude mind's knowledge of anything but
itself. Yet for Descartes, despite the separation, knowledge
explicit
and indubitable knowledge—was possible. Set off from all
contaminating
influence, from feeling, from the body, from matter; mind
was still
granted the one attribute of consequence-the pure and
unique ability of
mathematical reason. As a subject matter for reason, mind
discovered
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innately within itself, guaranteed by God, the clear and distinct idea—
a unit of knowledge which by itself would serve as the building block
for all further knowledge. This Cartesian conception of knowledge,
especially as it developed into the simpler, one leveled ontology of
objectivism, offered the hard sciences a powerful rational. Yet it has
also done, as I have suggested, great damage to man's disciplines and to
his conception of himself and his abilities. Whether as an influence on
objectivism, or as I shall now show, on subjectivism, the Cartesian
system has so narrowed man's conception of existence that an adequate
understanding of life has become impossible.
Burdened with the secularization of thought in the 17th and 18th
centuries, and deprived of its props in God and innate ideas, the
Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter became unstable. Without its
Cartesian rationale, mind lost its innate ability to apprehend the
world; henceforth, with the total separation of mind and matter, each
part of the divided cosmology had to attempt to account for the whole.
Although Descartes had originally premised the dualism, it was the
objectivists who severed the final connections. Within the objective
conception of existence, mind was no longer needed. First with Newton's
conception of mathematical truth not as an attribute of mind but
inherent in nature, then with the success of the scientific method, a
method which with its techniques of observation, its experimental
evidence, its reduction of all order into its least particulars-
with
this all-powerful vision of science, the objectivists separated
reason
totally from experience and created a one level conception
of existence
sufficient unto itself. Within this objective conception of
existence,
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mind was so isolated that it became only a kind of private vagary.
Thought could attain only itself. It was not ruled by interaction but
by its own internal exigencies. For the ob jectivists
,
mind became a
world shut up, absolute, by itself alone.
Thus when the faith that God made and kept united man's thoughts
and their object gave way to the more irrational faith that complex
/
orders must be explained out of those orders that were simplest, man was
left with no alternative for any form of life except to be either a mere
body spread out in space or to be a mere bit of subjectivity completely
and secretly within. Still though, over against the objectivists
,
there
were thinkers who sought to center their conception of existence within
that mind. These thinkers protested against an objectivist spirit which
seemed to make man a pawn in the power of deterministic forces. For
such subjective thinkers, the objectivist tradition exemplified by
Laplacean science or more recently by behaviorism, contained no concepts
which could make intelligible the existence of conscious life. The
atomic topography of the central nervous system was not consciousness
,
and only the grossest psuedo-substitution could equate mind with its
conditions. The subjectivists, however, despite this antipathy, were
still bound by those principles, from which objectivism arose—that is
Cartesian certainty and Cartesian dualism; and thus the subjectivists
were forced to seek their conception of existence within that
"mere bit
of subjectivity." In order to offer man what they felt to be his
unique
birthright, the freedom of self-determination , they were
forced to regard
the human race as different from all the rest of
creation. To gain the
freedom of self-determination, man was forced to
turn his back on all
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theories or situations which might deny or reduce that freedom. There
have been many subjective thinkers; and as with the ob jectivists
,
their
influence on our present conceptions of existence has been manifold.
Because, however, the subjective themes relevant to my purposes, have
remained more constant than those within objectivism, I think I will be
able to adequately convey the subjective influence on our present intel-
lectual foundation through the exploration of the work of a single writer.
Jean Paul Sartre, in his book. Being and Nothingness
,
well
exemplified the subjective influence on our present intellectual
foundation. The cogito was for Sartre, the only proper starting point
for philosophy, but the "I" for Sartre, as for all Cartesian thinkers,
had to be radically other than, over against, the real, the given, the
out there. Sartre carried Descartes' "anti-matter" pre-suppositions to
their natural conclusions. If consciousness had to be wholly other than
matter, then there could be no innate ideas, no mysterious apprehension
of the material world. Given the Cartesian pre-suppositions, it was only
as nothingness that consciousness could exist. Human reality was a
negation, an emptiness. This negation was felt as dread and as lack. A
lack of what? A lack of the impossible synthesis of mind and the world.
But because emptiness and lack were always, in principle, a desire
wanting to be filled, human reality was both the aspiration to be what it
was not and the incapacity of such being. As Sartre said, "we are
condemned to be free"— we choose ourselves, we make ourselves be,
as
the unrealized, and by the very nature of our being, unrealizable
completion of ourselves.
Because Sartre's cogito was wholly self-contained, it
could have
no knowledge of anything outside itself. For all Cartesian
thinkers
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"real" knowledge had to be explicit: any shadowy intimations the mind
might acquire were by definition unreal. Thus for Sartre, the only
knowledge the mind could have was of itself. Consciousness could
neither appropriate into itself specific aspects of the world—an
object, a specific theory, the knowledge of another person; nor could it
surrender itself to the more general aspects of being— to the factual
contingencies, the social lore, the intellectual disciplines of the
world. Knowledge only haunted the world as an unrealizable. Sartre
said, "this perpetually indicated by impossible fusion of essence
(consciousness) and existence (the world) does not belong either to the
20
present or the future." For Sartre, an attempt by consciousness to
acquire knowledge of anything other than itself was inauthentic: that
attempt was made in what he called "bad faith." Man's authentic
existence could be only to seek in some isolated, empty center, the
utter self-sufficiency of his original choice of himself.
Sartre's philosophy was, however, not some pessimistic quest for
meaninglessness and alienation. Rather his was an attempt to understand
human existence; what he did was to face with appalling honesty, the
consequences inherent within our present philosophical foundation.
Sartre began with the cogito, but rather than a cogito co-existent with
its own clear and distinct ideas, Sartre began with a pre-reflective
cogito, which he argued, was presupposed by the Cartesian system.
"Every positional consciousness of an object," Sartre argued, is at
the
21
same time a non-positional consciousness of itself."
Such a pre-
reflective cogito stopped one from an infinite regress
back to the
essential knower-to know that I know that I know.
Sartre’s cogito was
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thG Gssencs from which all elsG started, but it was an essence which
could only be self-directed. The only authentic possibility for
consciousness, Sartre argued, was pure reflection, a kind of pre-
reflective reflexiveness in which consciousness could only face its
otherness than being.
Sartre's starting point may seem to differ greatly from
Descartes'. The Cartesian cogito has been stripped of its props in God
and substance, and carried to its extreme conclusions. But despite this
transformation, Sartre’s cogito is still similar to Descartes' in at
least four ways. Just as Descartes' cogito was anti-matter—everything
that matter was not, so too was Sartre's. First, Sartre's cogito was
22
instantaneous. All temporality was a decompression of the original
instant. Consciousness could be only that which v/as not time: as Iris
Murdoch put it, "the agent, thin as a needle, appears in the quick
23
flash of the choosing will." Second, the cogito was self-directed.
Because consciousness was wholly other than matter, it had to be purely
internal; knowing only itself. Thirdly, Sartre's cogito was purely
active. It could neither have the object, nor surrender to it, but
could act only within itself. The cogito was a center of total
responsibility, but a responsibility turned inward. Its only action
could be self-assertion. Fourthly, and I include this attribute again
because it is essentially Cartesian, Sartre's cogito was pre-reflective
or precognitive. Because all knowledge as defined within the
Cartesian
system had to be explicit, it was only by abandoning the
primacy of
knowledge that Sartre could discover the true being of
the knower. For
Sartre, consciousness had to come before knowledge,
before feeling.
before anything else. The Cartesian concept of a pure and attentive
inind, minus its innate ideas, became for Sartre, the non—substantial
absolute of pure, inward intuition.
Sartre's starting point, his cogito, contained in essence the
whole of his argument. Consciousness was the only entity in the world
which had the potential for meaning. Yet it had this potential only
because of its uniqueness, its total separation from anything else. The
world for Sartre must always remain unknown, an undifferentiated
plenitude of matter. Consciousness could never apprehend an external
reality. Its only authentic existence was in the recognition of its
otherness than being; only by keeping itself pure and uncontaminated,
only in its nihilating recoil for the meaningless of matter, could the
cogito find its unique existence. "Nothingness is the peculiar
• ..24
possibility of being and its unique possibility.
As long as the cogito kept always before itself the recognition of
its uniqueness, its separation, its otherness than being it could then
maintain its authentic existence. The cogito was free to choose its own
being, its values, its meaning, as long as it recognized that such
choices were totally subjective. Because reality could never be
apprehended, consciousness must remain always totally responsible
recognizing always that there was no true reality, that neither God nor
nature nor society could corroborate its choices, that such
choices must
remain always a kind of game. To the authentic man, life was
absurd, a
game which had whatever values the players chose to give
it. The only
authentic knowledge could be the recognition by
consciousness of its own
than being. Either on the level ofbeing, that is its otherness
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reflection, consciousness could rise to face itself as pure lack— in
freedom, anguish, total responsibility; or else it could sink into bad
faith, the complacent taking of its values as substantive realities.
Thus for Sartre, man was denied all ability to apprehend reality, and
knowledge must remain always and wholly subjective.
Conclusion
I now conclude my exploration on what I have characterized as our
present intellectual foundation. My exploration has been selective.
Its purpose has been to substantiate some of our culture's underlying
conceptions of knowledge. I have attempted first to establish the
existence of an intellectual foundation and then to suggest its basic
structure. For the most part my exploration has been abstract. I have
described our present foundation as dependent on a few basic principles
and have traced their influence on a few representative disciplines. I
have included exemplification only to the extent necessary to show that
my ideas have some connection to the actual world. Here, at the
conclusion, I would like to briefly summerize my argument.
An intellectual foundation is an interpretation of the world, a
vision of existence among many possible visions. As long as it seems
the valid interpretation, it exherts the compelling claim to being
accepted as the only true picture of the world, indeed as truth itself.
Ever since the efflorescence of the physical sciences in the 17th
century, our intellectual foundation has been dominated by two disparate
visions of reality: one which takes the supposed structure of those
sciences, and especially physics and mathematics, as the one model of
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existence—as the sole provider of relevant truth, order and lawfulness;
and the other which in revolt against this model takes human
consciousness, in purity and isolation, as the single certainty in an
otherwise unknowable world.
Both of these visions of existence have been greatly influenced by
a conception of knowledge proposed by Descartes early in the 17th
century. Descartes' goal was to construct a system which would
guarantee explicit knowledge. Toward this end, he proposed a formal
model of explanation which both isolated mind and mechanized nature.
Descartes sought a unified intellectual discipline in which a single
human ability, isolated within an insubstantial mind, would apprehend a
wholly external world. Within the Cartesian system, the conceptions of
both nature and mind are severely limited. All explanation within
nature is on one level in terms of least particulars. Mind is so
withdrawn from the fabric of existence that it becomes finally
unknowable. Knowledge leaves the plane of fallibility and instead
reaches some unique utopia of infallible truth.
Franz Kafka, himself as much as any of us a product of the present
intellectual foundation, said that he had never once, from within
himself, felt truly alive. The spiritual desparation of our age—what I
have characterized earlier as the great game of pretending that the
world we comprehend in sterile sobriety is the only and ultimate reality
there is—was as clearly recognized by Kafka as by any man; yet he could
not escape. The intimations of meaning and coherence in all
of life
remained for him, as they do for most of us, forever
unrealized. In ^
Great Wall of China Kafka characterized this dilemma of
modern man:
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He is thirsty, and is cut off from a spring by a mere clump
of bushes. But he is divided against himself: one part
overlooks the whole, sees that he is standing here and that
the spring is just beside him, but another part notices
nothing, has at most a divination that the first part sees
at all. But as he notices nothing, he cannot drink. 25
It is time now, I suggest, that we begin to overcome the
constrictions of our present intellectual foundation, that we find a
conception of existence which will allow us to see both ourselves and
our knowledge as complex and many-leveled achievements, a conception
adequate to all our intimations.
CHAPTER III
POLANYI AND A REFORMULATION OF OUR
PRESENT INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION
Introduction
My philosophical exploration now leads toward a reformulation of
our present intellectual foundation. In this chapter I shall attempt to
work toward a new understanding of human abilities and the world they
apprehend, to break away from the structure of understanding embodied in
our present intellectual foundation and to seek within a reformulation
of that foundation a conception of existence more coherent with and more
adequate to human experience. An interest in skills initiated and
continues to motivate my exploration. The inadequacy of our present
conception of skills led me in the last chapter to explore the
foundation on which that conception was founded. I now continue that
exploration and seek in what Michael Polanyi calls a "post critical
philosophy, an alternative to the Cartesian principles—an alternative
which may lead both toward a new intellectual foundation, and within
that new foundation toward a more adequate conception of skills. In
this introduction I will backtrack for a moment, briefly reviewing the
central conceptions of our present intellectual foundation and broadly
suggesting the inadequacies of those conceptions. In the section
following, I v;ill offer one further view of Descartes through
an
examination of the paradigm of science on which the Cartesian
system was
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founded. Then using this examination as a perspective, I hope to be
ready to proceed toward the next major step in my exploration— the
discovery of a tenable alternative to the Cartesain principles, an
alternative which, standing in opposition to the principles that lie at
the very heart of our present intellectual foundation, will argue both
against the conceptions of that foundation and toward new and more
adequate conceptions
.
In the last chapter my exploration led from the philosophy of
Descartes to its development into and influence upon objectivism and
subjectivism. A brief review of the major conceptions of our present
intellectual foundation must emphasize both philosophies. These two
broad philosophical visions, both strongly dependent on the central
Cartesian principles, are the major forces in our present intellectual
foundation. They dominate our scientific disciplines; our theories of
child raising, of education; our literature; our relations with one
another; our perceptions of our abilities, of our world; our perceptions
2
of our significance and meaning within that world. The tenets of
objectivism have become the ideals of most of the scientific
disciplines, and in many parts of our culture these ideals have in turn
become unquestioned truths: the ideal that both the means and ends of
knowledge can be specified—made explicit, the ideal of reason as
analysis and the mind as a mathematical machine, the ideal of
scientific
theory as description, as the most economical adaptation of
thought to
facts, as never venturing beyond experience by affirming
anything that
cannot be tested, the ideal of a universal and exact
science based on
the automatic manipulation of unambiguous variables,
the ideal of
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atoitiism, of a one level world in which whatever one asserts expressed in
the last analysis some change in the configuration of bits of matter
described by physics, the ideal finally of a Laplacean universe, of a
self-regulating machine in which man is just another cog. At the same
time though perhaps in a less specific way, the conceptions of
subjectivism are also a major influence: the conception of
consciousness as separate and self-directed, as having no logical place
in or connection to the "objective" world, the conception of man's
relation to and knowledge of external reality as arbitrary and
artificial, thus the conception of man's only authentic and knowable
existence as being wholly inward and self-contained, of nothingness as
3
the "peculiar possibility of being and its unique possibility."
A full examination of any one of the conceptions within either
objectivism or subjectivism could in itself be the subject for a
dissertation. However, my exploration of our present intellectual
foundation is not an end in itself but a means toward new and better
conceptions. My exploration of objectivism and subjectivism, indeed my
whole dissertation, can be seen primarily as an inquiry into the nature
of human abilities and the nature of the reality they seek to apprehend
and secondarily as an attempt to understand the ways in which those
abilities can rightly claim to apprehend that reality, or conversely to
understand which features of our experience can claim the status of
knowledge or can claim to contribute to knowledge. In the last chapter
my exploration indicated that our present conceptions of man
and
knowledge are not only inadequate, but so constricted as
to be
essentially misconceptions. Neither the objective nor the
subjective
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philosophies makes possible an adequate nor a rational conceotion of
existence. In its quest for certainty, objectivism has reduced the
conception of science, and thereby all existence, to a one level
physicalism in which reality is ultimately describable as a single flat
level of phenomena and in which the means to that description, the human
intellect, can be seemingly so refined as to be considered a
mathematical inference machine. In reaction against the impersonality
of such a philosophy, subjectivism has sought its own kind of certainty
within an even more constricted conception of existence, a conception
whose only reality lies wholly within the mind, and where thus all
external knowledge is equally arbitrary and inauthentic—a conception in
which man is forced to seek in some isolated, empty center the utter
self-sufficiency of his original choice of himself.
The inadequacy of cur present conceptions of existence can be
broadly suggested in several ways. Subjectivism seems to offer the
least acceptable vision of existence. Subjectivism accepts the
underlying Cartesian premise that all authentic knowledge must be
explicit, and then seeks to overcome the dehumanizing effects of that
premise by denying the possibility of any authentic knowledge of
external reality, and retreating into the confines of the mind.
However, from an ontological perspective, minds seem too rare in
nature
to count as the fundamental sort of thing there is. Some
of the other
Cartesian premises of subjectivism, particularly the subjective
characterization of consciousness, also seem a less than
adequate
foundation for human understanding. In addition, while
the whole no
exit" panorama of subjectivism, especially as argued by
Sartre, is
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logically consistent with its own premises, the authentic possibilities
for human existence allowed by that logic are so limited as to call
those premises and thus the whole system into doubt. ^ The one authentic
possibility which Sartre hints at, that of "pure" reflection, involves
such a radical conversion, such a total inwardness, that it seems too
illusive and too empty a goal for mankind. Within the context of my
exploration, subjectivism offers the most obviously inadequate
understanding of existence. In my criticism of the Cartesian
principles, this inadequacy, and particularly the inadequacy of the
subjective characterization of consciousness, should become even
clearer.
The inadequacies of objectivism, while probably greater than those
of subjectivism and certainly more demeaning, are at the same time less
obvious. The tenets of objectivism remain the prominent ideals of many
scientists and philosophers. Objectivism is a stronger and more
articulate influence within the general culture, and broad anti-
objectivist arguments are not often convincing. Objectivism owes much
of this support to its success as a model for the hard sciences, but as
I have argued in the last chapter, the objective model bears little
resemblance to the actual workings of those sciences. The processes of
discovery and understanding by which science progresses and is sustained
can in no way be represented by the objective canons of wholly explicit
truth. Within the hard sciences the conceptions of objectivism are
inadequate because they are false: they misrepresent the workings of
science and deny to its practitioners the acknowledgement and
satisfaction of their complex and personal achievements. This
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inadequacy should become clearer both in my examination of the paradigm
of science on which the Cartesian principles are founded and then in my
criticism of the principles themselves.
When one moves from physics and the other hard sciences on whose
workings the objective canons are modeled, and turns instead to biology
and the life sciences which adopted this model, the conceptions of
objectivism become even less adequate but seemingly more intrenched.
The conception that all explanation in biology must ultimately be one
leveled in terms of least particulars simply does not allow for an
adequate understanding of living things. The atomistic models of
objectivism fail to offer an adequate understanding because one-to-one
relationships among least parts do not exist as such in nature. For
example, the concept of the reflex arc, the concept, by the way, which
forms the biological basis for the S-R model of behaviorism,^ is simply
not born out by recent physiological research. More generally
inadequate is the mechanistic interpretation of evolution and the
dominance of that interpretation within biology—the concept that all
living things are solely adaptation machines, the concept, therefore,
that there is just one level of existence and that from the laws of that
level, all higher levels, or rather all larger systems, can be derived.
The existence of the conception itself argues against the objectivist
position: the existence of any statement presupposes the existence of
more than just matter in motion—the chemistry of paper and ink cannot
account solely for the existence of a book, nor can physics
and
chemistry alone account for the existence of living things.
Biology
of individual living things; analysis withindemands the recognition
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biology is always within the context set by such recognition. Analysis
living things which analysizes those things away contradicts itself
by destroying its own sxabject matter. The inadequacies of these
objective conceptions within the life sciences will, again, become
clearer in my criticism of the Cartesian principles. However, an even
better understanding of these inadequacies may be found later in the
chapter within the context of Polanyi's alternative to the principles on
which objectivism is founded.
Such broad attempts to suggest the inadequacies of our present
intellectual foundation are, as I have acknowledged, often less than
convincing. I myself have difficulty accepting my own arguments. Part
of the difficulty stems from the circular nature of our intellectual
foundation: that foundation tends toward self- justification, first
through a structure which denies its own existence—that is through an
underlying conception of manifest truth which denies that knowledge has
any non-explicit roots, and second through the inherent power of any
such foundation—a power which can assimilate even the most disparate
ideas into its own vision of existence. Both philosophical visions
within our foundation have a deep rooted appeal which is difficult to
overcome. The anti-objectivist position is difficult to accept. The
position is uncomfortable because it breaks through the security of a
simple one level physicalism without providing an alternative
foundation. It demands that one think hierarchically, in terms of
levels of reality, and we no longer know how to think that way.
The
arguments against subjectivism are almost as difficult to accept, they
seem to leave man with no uniqueness, with no meaningful
place m the
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universe. To be told that our present foundation is inadequate does not
in itself allow us to understand that inadequacy, or to accept
wholeheartedly an alternative which seems to be defined only through
negation. The anti-objectivist position, like the anti-subjectivist
one, seems here reasonable only in the perverse sense that its negation
is self-contradictory; it is not reasonable in the more substantive
sense of fitting smoothly into a new intellectual foundation, a
foundation in which human beings, acknowledging both the power of the
human mind and the success of science, nevertheless need not thereby
negate either their own personal significance nor their connection to
and knowledge of the world in which they dwell.
This difficulty was foreshadowed in my work with physical skills,
and I have, therefore, purused my philosophical exploration in such a
way that the problems inherent in such an enterprise may be, if not
overcome, then at least circumvented. In the last chapter I attempted
to isolate certain principles which I felt lay at the heart of our
intellectual foundation, and I suggested that if these principles could
be replaced with more adequate principles, then we might have, if not a
new intellectual foundation, then at least the beginnings thereof. The
basic principles of our present intellectual foundation take science as
the paradigm case of knowledge; yet as I have suggested and will now
argue directly, the conception of science—and to some extent the
conception of all knowledge—on which those principles are based, is
essentially false. For over three hundred years the quest for
certainty, for explicit and indubitable knowledge, has led
both the
interpreters and protestors of science toward ever more
illusive and
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convoluted visions, fundamental misinterpretations not just of science
but of all reality. These misinterpretations, essentially embodied at
the very beginning of the scientific revolution by the Cartesian
/ have grown to dominate and demean human life. Beginning
with Descartes' ideal of self-guaranteeing truth within a totally
isolated mind and progressing through the ever more constricted models
of the objectivists and subjectivists, we have arrived on one hand at a
wholly formalizable, wholly explicit vision of reality, a perfection of
knowledge through the exclusion of the knowing mind; or on the other
hand, at a vision v/hich in revolt against the limitations of objectivism
turns to the other extreme and so emphasizes the knowing mind that the
only reality becomes that isolated pinpoint of subjectivity within.
My philosophical exploration has, to this point, revealed the
inadequacy of our present intellectual foundation. I have discovered
that the conceptions of neither objectivism nor subjectivism offer an
adequate understanding of the nature of human abilities nor of the
nature of the reality which those abilities seek to know. The objective
conceptions of a mechanical mind and a one level reality certainty do
not adequately represent human existence; nor do the subjective
conceptions of an isolated mind and an arbitrary and inauthentic
reality. In my examination of the objective and subjective conceptions
and in my attempts to directly suggest their inadequacies, I have also
discovered how difficult such conceptions are to overcome. To escape
the inadequacies of both the objective and subjective visions of
existence and to begin a reformulation of our present intellectual
foundation, one must go to the very heart of that foundation— the
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underlying Cartesian principles must be squarely faced and overcome.
Inevitably inherent in such an enterprise are the same weaknesses which
exist in the broad criticisms I have already presented: my arguments
must still be made and understood within the context of our present
foundation. However, I hope that by beginning with the most basic
P^i^^ciples of that foundation and by offering not only a criticism of
those principles but more importantly offering a tenable alternative, I
may succeed in suggesting if not a new foundation, then at least the
beginnings thereof.
The Cartesian Principles and the
Paradigm of Science
The Cartesian principles, which I have argued lie at the heart of
our intellectual foundation—the principles of indubitability
,
explicitness, the unity of science and the duality of man—attempted and
in large measure succeeded in establishing a conception of existence
which would henceforth form the basis for much of mankind's
understanding of himself and his world. The Cartesian principles have
been the most basic influence witliin philosophy for the last three
hundred years; the conceptions of both objectivism and subjectivism were
founded and are still strongly dependent upon these principles. No
matter what philosophy one ascribes to, or as is more probably the case,
no matter how irrevocably one is caught up in the whole complex of our
intellectual foundation, that strange combination of idealism and
despair which characterizes so much of our vision of modern life, one is
at a still more basic level caught up in those deeper structures of
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undsrstanding which Descartes so long ago created. Any attempt to
overcome the inadequacies of our present intellectual foundation can
succeed only by squarely facing and overcoming these most basic
structures of our understanding.
I plan eventually to work against the Cartesian principles from
several perspectives, using not just philosophical arguments but
psychological and physiological ones as well. The work of Michael
Polanyi provides the major basis for my arguments and provides also the
basis for a tenable alternative to the Cartesian principles. Before I
begin my direct arguments, let me briefly offer, both as a context for
those arguments and as an introduction to the work of Polanyi, two
contrasting views of science. The Cartesian principles take science as
the paradigm case of knowledge. However, I suggest, it is not the
actual workings of science which form that paradigm, but rather a
misrepresentation of those workings, a misrepresentation of both the
means and ends of science, of both the nature of human abilities and the
nature of reality. The conception of science on which the Cartesian
principles are based is that of a wholly explicit kind of knowing, of a
series of pure intellectual certainties leading to a permanent, hard
core of impersonal and indubitable knowledge. The Cartesian principles
offer a model of scientific knowing in which truth is manifest to a
mind
properly circumscribed, a model in which the mathematical
abstractions
of the disembodied intellect become explicit truths—the
indubitable and
self-guaranteeing apprehension of a world whose simple, one
level
structure exactly mirrors the formal, anlaytic structure
of those
apprehensions. In thus isolating mind in the pursuit
of scientific
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wisdom and in mechanizing the world which that mind seeks to apprehend,
the Cartesian principles seem to offer a unique utopia of infallible
truth; but for human beings whose minds must exist within a body and
whose world is not a gigantic clockwork machine, this utopia has proven
to be a less than adequate dwelling place. The Cartesian principles, in
their quest for certainty, essentially falsify the processes of
scientific discovery; and in so misrepresenting their scientific
paradigm, they also misrepresent both the means and ends of human
existence, the complexities of human knowing and the manifold levels of
reality
.
Science, Michael Polanyi maintains, does not proceed by a series
of pure intellectual certainties; neither its methods nor its findings
are indubitable, nor can they be adequately represented within a one
level structure of reality.^ Science is done by human beings, and
nothing any human being does bears the wholly self-evident character of
the Cartesian principles. We and the fabric of the world are one in
such a way that we can never withdraw one item from the whole nexus and
say of that item that it is so explicit, so firmly established that it
could not conceivably by otherwise. Science lives by discovery, and
discovery cannot be explained in wholly formalizable, wholly explicit
terms. Discovery is the attempt to understand the unknown, to describe
the indescribable. As such it is paradoxical and cannot be represented
in explicit Cartesian terms. ^ If a scientist is looking for a thing
of
whose nature he knows nothing at all, if he is groping to
find a
problem, if at the center of his attention there is a puzzle,
a
conflict, if he succeeds in making a discovery but does
not realize what
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he has discovered, if the scientific community accepts a discovery but
cannot specify the reasons for its acceptance—then how can science be
characterized as "true and evident cognition"? VJhere are the explicit
apprehensions, the clear and distinct ideas, where are the series of
logical connections which never leave the plane of infallibility, where
indeed is that hard core of certainty which discovery is suppose to
achieve?
Science, as Polanyi demonstrates in Personal Knowledge
,
does not
operate in a unique utopia of infallible truth. It is not the activity
of some secret, infallible part of the Cartesian mind, the cultivation
of pure and self-guaranteeing intellectual vision, nor does it reveal
the mechanical certainty of the objectivists
. Although their methods
may be tremendously refined, scientists, like all human beings, are
trying to make sense of some aspect of experience, trying to find a
pattern in what is otherwise disorder. As such, science is not wholly a
series of pure intellectual certainties, a mathematical analysis from
evidence to conclusion, a one level description of the world; but rather
is a process of trial and error in which hunches, the imaginative use of
example, definition and redefinition must play their role—a role which
seeks not the summary of one flat level of pure phenomena but the
discovery of stable mechanisms in nature. Einstein's discovery of the
"Special Theory of Relativity" is a good example of this. As Polanyi
shows in Personal Knowledge , Einstein's processes of discovery cannot be
represented within the Cartesian framework. Einstein did not v/ork, as
most textbooks would have us believe, from the experimental evidence of
Michelson and Morley—he did not proceed from an analysis of that
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evidence, through a series of clear and distinct steps, and thereby
arrive at this theory. Rather through intuition, through the power of
mind, following no one definite method, no series of explicit steps, and
unaided by any experimental evidence that had not been available for
fifty years, Einstein discovered and committed himself to a four-
dimensional conception of reality, a conception which both he and the
scientific community accepted as true, not primarily because of its
logical agreement with experimental evidence, not because of some
indubitable proof, but because of its greater intellectual satisfaction
—its coherence, its beauty, its profundity, its grandeur, its boldness
8
and directness of thought.
Polanyi maintains that no matter how seemingly abstract or
purified the discoveries of science,, they still cannot be adequately
understood or represented within the scientific paradigm on which
2
Descartes based his system. e = me may be a universal truth and indeed
we believe it to be so, but neither our acceptance of the theory nor its
discovery has the wholly explicit, wholly proven character of the
Cartesain system. Polanyi agrees that the paradigm case of knowledge in
modern culture must be science, but the paradigm of science is not a
model of a wholly manifest and explicit truth but rather of discovery
the recognition of a problem, the seeking of what we do not yet know.
If we insist that all cognitive acts are wholly explicit, that
we can
know only what is plainly at the center of our attention,
then discovery
becomes an impossibility, and knowledge cannot advance
beyond what is
already known. Instead, Polanyi asserts, we must
admit as essential to
the very nature of mind, the kind of groping
which constitutes the
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recognition and solving of a problem. Polanyi's solution to the paradox
of discovery rests on the distinction he makes between two kinds of
awareness, focal and subsidiary. His central thesis is that no
knowledge can be wholly focal. In the case of a problem, the subsidiary
aspect looms large. The scientist does not know in the focal sense what
hs is looking for, and yet he can look for it because he relies in
looking for it on clues to its nature, clues which he holds in
subsidiary rather than focal awareness.
The concept of focal and subsidiary awareness forms the central
structure of Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge. For Polanyi, all
discovery must be arrived at by tacit powers of mind. In any case of
discovery, the scientist does not knov/, in the focal sense, what he is
looking for; and yet he can look for it because he relies in looking for
it on clues to its nature, clues through which he anticipates what he
has not yet plainly understood. Such clues are held in subsidiary
rather than focal awareness. Focally, at the center of his attention,
he is av/are of the problem only as a puzzle, a conflict. The clues of
which he is subsidiarily aware do have a bearing on the solution; they
are in fact aspects of the entity he seeks to comprehend. At the same
time, these clues are also aspects of himself, of his attitudes, skills,
memories, hunches. The scientist's explicit awareness, his focal
consciousness, is always founded in and carried by the tacit acceptance
of something not explicit, which binds him to and within his world.
Knowledge must always be rooted in these personal elements. The
impersonal, the more explicit aspects of knowledge, arise from and
return to the scientist's personal participation in the search
for and
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acceptance of the entity to be known. Tacit knowing directs the
scientist from the subsidiary particulars towards his discovery
—toward
a theory, a focal whole, which those particulars signify. They guide
him toward the comprehension of a reality which, in many cases, has the
same structure as his knowing of it: that is of a whole of parts, a
comprehensive entity, whose significance ranges in ways perhaps
unguessed by him beyond its specifiable particulars.^*^
Polanyi believes then, as did Descartes, that science is the
rightful paradigm for knowledge; but science, Polanyi maintains, cannot
be explained within a framework of wholly explicit truth. Science lives
by discovery, and discovery, Polanyi believes, can be better understood
within a framework of tacit knowledge. This contrast between the
explicit and tact conceptions of science should serve as a context for
the argument which follows, and it may serve also as an introduction to
Polanyi 's theory. However, it is meant to be only the briefest
introduction to that theory, and not be a full explanation or convincing
demonstration. On first glance, Polanyi 's conceptions of knowledge must
seem equally as arbitrary and illogical as any of the conceptions I have
been criticizing. Especially from an objective perspective, the theory
of tacit knowledge must seem almost a subjective crying in the dark, a
sundering of knowledge away from the objective world of common sense, a
separation equally as severe as Sartre's. ^ Indeed, the more
comprehensive explanation of Polanyi 's theory which eventually follows
may not succeed in convincing the reader of the truth of the tacit
conception of knowledge. Nevertheless, I believe that Polanyi 's theory
may make possible a cogent solution to the paradox of scientific
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discovery, and thereby a solution to many of the inconsistencies and
inadequacies within our present intellectual foundation. The theory of
tacit knowledge seems to offer both a valid criticism of the Cartesian
principles and a tenable alternative to those principles. It is my hope
that Polanyi's theory may eventually make possible a conception of
knowledge more adequate to the understanding of both human abilities and
of the world they seek to apprehend.
A Challenge of the Cartesian Principles
Taking an explicit conception of science, i.e. true and evident
cognition, as a paradigm, Descartes created his philosophical
conceptions. There are four principles or theses which lie at the heart
of Descartes' conceptions. These principles form the framework for all
of Cartesian philosophy, and thereby as I have argued for our present
intellectual foundation. Any attempt to form a new intellectual
foundation must begin by squarely facing and overcoming these Cartesian
principles. The principles are again: first, indubitability ; second,
total explicitness; third, the unity of science; and fourth, the duality
of man. These principles, as Marjorie Grene shows, are not isolated but
form a structure: "There is knowledge which is incapable of being
doubted because there is knowledge which is self-evident, self-
contained; the sum of evident knowledge is wisdom which is the same
everywhere; and both the self-evidence and unity of knowledge are
possible because, and only because knowledge is the work of the
12
intellect alone.
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It is these Cartesian principles and their joint structure to
which Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge may provide a valid criticism
and a tenable alternative—thus the means through which we may work
toward a new intellectual foundation. In my first two chapters, I have
offered several views of our present intellectual foundation, not with
the hope of presenting a single overpowering argument, but rather with
the hope that one or another of these perspectives might lead the reader
toward the beginnings of a critical understanding. In the same way, an
understanding of the alternative foundation suggested by Polanyi's
theory may require more than a single perspective. As one reads and
slowly begins to understand Personal Knowledge , Polanyi's most
comprehensive presentation of the theory of tacit knowledge, it becomes
clear that the book could have started from almost any point within the
theory and have been equally successful. Polanyi's theory is most
pursuasive not in its individual aspects but in its comprehensive power.
In the theory of tacit knowledge, there seems to be no logical beginning
or end. Neither is there a single perspective which affords the best
view of the theory. Indeed, Polanyi's later works confirm this thesis
by treating first one aspect of the theory and then another as central.
Therefore, as the reader continues his acquaintance with the theory of
tacit knowledge—next from the perspective of the Cartesian principles
and subsequently from other perspectives, I suggest that he
not allow an
overly critical frame of mind to reject the various tenets of
Polanyi’s
theory until its whole impact may be felt.
To begin to form a new intellectual foundation,
all four of the
Cartesain principles must be challenged, and
challenged in terms of
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alternative theory. Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge suggests
first, that because knov/ledge is personal, it is susceptible to doubt,
to criticism. Second, because knowledge is rooted in an act of tacit
knowing, it is never wholly explicit. A change of focus, an examination
of a subsidiary clue, can always bring to the level of attention—and to
criticism—what was previously unquestioned because submerged. Third,
since knowledge is a balance of tacit and explicit elements, it can
never be at one time wholly explicit. The elements which are tacit in
one context may become explicit in another. Given our finite powers,
every investigation must be partial. Further, because science is not
reductive but seeks to discvoer comprehensive entities, there is no one
single reality of atoms in motion. Therefore, on the grounds of both
method and content, science must be partial and plural. Fourth,
knowledge is not the work of the disembodied intellect. Because all
knowing must involve subsidiary elements, clues which are dependent upon
and inextricably enmeshed with the whole range of human skills,
knowledge must be personal—the achievement of the whole, psycho-
physical person. Man cannot be reduced to either the mechanical motion
of matter or to pure mind, but must exist as a unity.
A closer examination of these challenges may serve to substantiate
the validity of their criticism and may also suggest ways in which
Polanyi's theory provides a tenable alternative. Let me take the
first
two Cartesian principles, indubitability and explicitness,
together and
compare them with the theory of tacit knowledge. When
Descartes began
his philosophy, he wanted to find as building blocks,
ideas which were
so clear and distinct that they could not be
susceptible to doubt. The
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luminousness, the total explicitness of each of these primary acts of
understanding would guarantee the indubitable truth of its content. The
Cartesian clear and distinct idea is the act of a pure and attentive
mind, grasping what is before it in a single and instantaneous act of
attention. What is before the mind, what it grasps, is wholly explicit,
wholly focal. The theory of tacit knowledge challenges the principles
of indubitability and explictness. No act of attention, Polanyi
15
maintains, can be wholly focal. All knowledge, from the most basic
acts of sensory awareness to the abstractions of mathematics, must
reside in a from-to relation in which the knower relies on clues already
assimilated to his bodily being in order to attend through them, or from
them, to things in the world. Knowledge, therefore, can never be wholly
focal, but relies always on subsidiaries in order to focus on events or
entities to which these subsidiaries point. Take the case, mentioned in
The Boston Studies of the Philosophy of Science, of a naturalist
identifying a new species of a familiar genus. He spots a worm and
says, "Why, it's Rhyncodemus, but it's not bilineatus; it's an entirely
16
new species." Such recognition cannot be represented as the
apprehension of a single clear and distinct idea. The individual
features of the genus are not listed by the naturalist one by one, but
recognized implicitly in their coherent physiognomy. Such features are
clues which he has interiorized in order to focus on and understand
entities in the world.
The naturalist-scientist cannot specify all the elements
which led
to his recognition of a new species; yet he believes
that recognition to
be true. By the logic of tacit knowledge, this
type of recognition
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cannot be indubitable; yet such recognition plays a role in almost all
scientific discovery. The possibility of error is inherent in even the
most exact of sciences. For years, scientists counted 43 chromosomes in
the nuclei of hiaman cells; now it turns out there are only 46.^^
Pol3-nyi believes that all knowledge involves the use and interpretation
of clues of which the knower is only subsidiarily aware, perhaps even
wholly unaware in terms of the entity upon which they bear. Some clues
may alter; those that are submerged may become focal. Knowledge is,
therefore, always subject to reflection and revision. Even the most
purified knowledge of mathematics depends for its comprehension on
knowing what its symbols mean, and this knowledge, as distinct from the
symbols themselves, is necessarily tacit. The Cartesian clear and
distinct idea is simply a fiction. No subject matter, no concept,
however precise, can be as Descartes thought wholly at the center of
attention. Therefore, no subject, no concept, is ever vjholly explicit
and indubitable.
The challenge of the third Cartesian principle, the unity of
science, follows from the challenge of the first and second. Descartes
believed that because knowledge was wholly explicit it could be unified.
If science is in its entirety true and evident cognition, the
apprehension of explicit and indubitable ideas; if it is, as the fourth
Cartesian principle shows, the cultivation of pure intellectual vision
which has no compartments or varieties; and if science is not only the
apprehension of explicit ideas but of explicit and ultimate realities—
then Descartes was confident that all science could eventually
be
reduced to its ultimate particulars and unified into one
essential
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structure. Both because of the nature of the human mind and because of
the nature of reality, Descartes believed that science must ultimately
be everywhere the same. This third Cartesian principle can be
challenged on both epistemological and ontological grounds. Polanyi has
shown that because of the nature of the human mind, the clear and
distinct idea is an impossibility. Because all knov/ledge is partly
tacit and must rely on subsidiary clues which exist at many levels of
awareness, knowledge can never be wholly focal, wholly explicit.
the roots of knowledge can never be shown to be everywhere
the same
.
Knowing, Polanyi believes, is not a wholly defined process but
essentially skill-like. As the craftsman uses tools of which, in their
use, he is only subsidiarily aware, so the scientist uses abstract
tools--concepts
,
maxims, skills of recognition, of measurement— in order
to spy out the hidden pattern he is seeking. Any skillful act of
knowing implies an unspecifiable context out of which focal observations
arise. Many of the subsidiary elements and skills within such a context
are unspecifiable in such a way that they can never be transferred
neutrally from scientist to scientist. The unspecifiable skills of any
science must be assimilated within the framework of that science. To
become a naturalist, to learn the recognition of species, to be able to
tell a Rhyncodemus from a bilineatus, one must commit oneself to
becoming a naturalist, to learning skills which cannot be explicitly
taught. The tacit theory of knowing implies that unspecif iable elements
exist in all acts of knov;ing. e = me may seem an explicit and
indubitable proposition, but neither the discovery of that formula nor
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its acceptance and understanding can be wholly specified. That
discovery and understanding depend rather on skills which can only be
learned within the framework of physics. Those skills of physics would
not enable a scientist to recognize a Rhynocodemus
,
just as the skills
of naturalism would not enable a scientist to become a competent judge
of relativity. Nor finally could some scientist who had mastered the
skills of both disciplines somehow combine those skills into a single
science. Because unspecifiable and skill-like elements exist within the
framework of each science and because these elements cannot be
explicitly taught or combined, the sciences by their nature must be
diverse and cannot be said to be a unity.
Polanyi's epistemological arguments, valid as they may seem, are
not sufficient challenge to the third Cartesian principle. In fact, it
must be admitted that while a unity of method may still be a scientific
ideal, the complexity and specialization of the sciences has made
epistemological unity, even to the most ardent objectivist, more of an
abstract than a practical goal. It is rather in ontology, and
particularly in the ontology of the life sciences, that the damaging
effects of the third Cartesian principle are still dominate. For
Descartes, the unity of science was possible not only because of the
nature of res cogitans but also because of the nature of res
extensa.
If all knowledge could be constructed from basic building
blocks, ideas
so ultimately simple that no doubt could remain as to
their
understanding, then it was clear to Descartes and
especially to his
objective followers that this was possible because there
existed in the
external world a correspondingly simple structure,
a structure composed
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again of basic building blocks, elementary particals out of which the
whole of nature was constructed. If nature's ultimate reality thus lay
with its least parts and if science's job was to study this reality,
then it was obvious that all science was at heart a unity. Particularly
within the life sciences, this principle of reducibility is still
dominate. Ruducibility means that all scientific laws, including those
of the life sciences, can be translated into and are derivable from the
basic and universal laws of matter in motion. Whatever one truly
asserts about the world, about molecules, trees or human beings, must
express in the last analysis some change in the configurations of these
fundamental particals of matter as described by physics and mathematics.
Therefore, the goal of all science is a unity of atomistic explanation,
and as biology and the other life sciences perfect themselves, they move
ever closer to this unity.
Polanyi disagrees with this view of a unified science. He
maintains that the goal of science is not a unity of atomistic
explanation but rather the understanding of particular comprehensive
entities, not the summary of one flat level of pure phenomena but the
discovery of various kinds of stable mechanisms in nature. A theory or
model succeeds in science not by comprehending all the phenomena of
every kind, but rather by leading scientists to see, in the case of a
particular set of puzzling phenomena how those phenomena are produced.
Polanyi has already shown that given the specialized and finite
skills
of any particular science, every investigation must be
partial and
perspectival. This is so, moreover, Polanyi maintains,
because the
loast parts of nature do not constitute its ultimate
reality, nor does
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an understanding of those parts constitute an understanding of all of
nature. As I have already suggested, the existence of knowledge has
ontological implications. If the universe was in fact Laplacean, then
knowledge of it would be impossible. Just as Descartes' epistemology
suggests a reductive ontology; so the structure of tacit knowledge
suggests a many leveled conception of reality, a conception in which the
simplest, most tangible parts are not assumed to have the greatest
reality. Thus a focal whole cannot be specified solely in terms of its
siobsidiary particulars. A comprehensive entity must be more than the
sum of its parts. A comprehensive entity depends on its parts as the
conditions of its existence, but those parts exist as parts only as so
constituted by the unifying principles of the whole. It is the whole
that explains the parts. The reductive compulsion of the life sciences
may one day succeed in isolating every least particular of every living
thing, but such a study will not constitute either an ultimate
understanding of life nor a union of biology with the "ideal" sciences
of physics and chemistry.
For most of this century it has been the compulsion of the life
sciences, and particularly of biology, to seek the ideal of unity
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implied in the third Cartesian principle. The theory of tacit knowing
suggests that such a goal is illusive; but because of the prestige of
reductivism, Polanyi's arguments are still difficult to understand and
accept. Before I go on to challenge the fourth Cartesian principle,
let
me suggest one more argument against the unity of the sciences.
Reductivism claims that biology is essentially a molecular
science and
that the laws of physics and chemistry can be shown to
ultimately govern
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all living things. Because DNA molecules are the basic building blocks
things, the physical and chemical laws which govern DNA must,
therefore, also ultimately govern and thus explain all the structures
and processes of life. Polanyi challenges this reductivist claim. He
grants that the structure and processes of growth can be shown to be
dependent on DNA molecules, but this power of DNA, Polanyi maintains,
does not demonstrate that biology is reducible to biochemistry. Polanyi
argues that what makes DNA do its work is not its chemistry but the
sequence of the bases along the DNA chain. It is this sequence which
forms the code for the developing organism. While the orderly structure
of the molecule is due to a maximum of stability corresponding to a
minimum of potential energy, and is thus determined by the laws of
physics and chemistry, the sequence of bases on the DNA spiral is not so
determined. For this sequence there is no question of energy at all,
and statistically all sequences are equiprobable. Any sequence of bases
is possible physico-chemically ; therefore, while the molecule is
dependent on the laws of physics and chemistry, these laws cannot
specify which sequence will succeed in functioning as a code. In fact,
it is this improbability which is precisely the measure of the
information any particular sequence can provide. Polanyi writes that
"it is the physical indeterminancy of the sequence that produces the
improbability of occurrence of any particular sequence and thereby
enables it to have a meaning—a meaning that has a mathematically
determinate information content equal to the numerical improbability
of
the arrangement."^^ Such a system may be dependent on the
laws of
physics and chemistry, but it cannot be specified in terms of
these
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laws. The understanding of any entity, be it a DNA molecule or a human
being, must appreciate the coherence of that entity, and thus
acknowledge the existence of a value absent from its constituent
particulars. Because this coherence involves higher levels of
organization and function, levels which differ for different entities;
because these levels cannot be specified or understood in terms of one
single and ultimate level of molecules in motion; and because, as I have
argued above, the understanding of different kinds of entities requires
different skills, skills which can be learned only within the context of
a particular science—the sciences must, therefore, be diverse. There
cannot be said to exist one ultimate and ideal science toward which all
the rest must aspire.
As the challenge of the third Cartesian principle is related to
the challenge of the first and second, so the challenge of the fourth
principle is related to the previous challenges to all three. Within
the Cartesian system, the fourth principle, the duality of man, can be
seen as basic to all the others; similarly the challenge to that fourth
principle is basic both to a valid criticism of all the principles and
to an acceptance of a tenable alternative. In the Cartesian system,
indubitability , explicitness and unity are first possible because
knowledge is the work of the intellect alone, because the mind is
cleanly and essentially separate from the body in nature and
function.
The Cartesian building block for knowledge, the clear and
distinct idea
is guaranteed its explicitness and indubitability
from the very
beginning because it is the work of the disembodied
intellect alone.
The first and most basic of the Cartesian clear
and distinct ideas, the
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cogito, is not an argument but an event—the act of a pure and attentive
mind, the first of a long chain of such acts all equal in purity,
clarity and certainty. The whole of Cartesian science begins and
ultimately depends on the dualism implicit in the cogito: the mind
first cognizant of itself and its own separateness, turns in clarity of
vision to arrange and solve all the problems which may confront it.
One of Polanyi's central theses contradicts the principle of
duality. Knowledge is not a one-to-one relationship between a
disembodied (or later machine-like) intellect and an atomistic reality
—
a simplistic grasping of one bit of information after another. Polanyi
maintains, rather, that knowledge is personal—not the work of the
disembodied intellect—but an achievement of the whole, inalienable,
psycho-physical person, making sense of one aspect or another of his
situation in the world. The fourth Cartesian principle must also be
challenged. Man is not a duality but a unity. He cannot be reduced
objectively to mere matter or subjectively to pure mind, but he must
rather be understood in the sense of personhood—that is in tlie sense of
complexities of organization and levels of existence, levels which can
never be logically cut off from dependence on their bodily roots. Both
the development of human abilities and their apprehension of reality can
be seen as the achievements of an embodied being. Admittedly some
levels of awareness are so abstract that their bodily roots are
difficult to trace, but the whole logic of tacit knowing implies that
those bodily roots are still present. Knowledge is an achievement,
risen both phylogenetically and individually, from its roots
in the
learning processes of human skills. It begins with the child's
first
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motions, the achievement of upright posture, the attainment of a spatio-
temporal orientation, the acquisition of language and culture; and it
develops into further and further dimensions of mental, emotional,
spiritual and bodily orientation—but always of the total psycho-
physical person whose orientation it is.
The whole structure of tacit knowing argues against the fourth
Cartesian principle. The human intellect can be shown, in no aspect of
its development or functioning, to be wholly divorced from its bodily
roots. The infant's acquisition of skills and language, the student's
learning the various structures of hiiman thought, the scientist's
assimilation of more specialized skills and information—all these
processes, themselves tacit achievements, go on to form a continuous and
never wholly specifiable core by which and through which human beings
are able to strive toward further achievements of knowing and being.
Descartes felt that man, among all the forms of life, had some special
exemption which would allow him to separate his thoughts from their
"crude" bodily roots; but there exists no total discontinuity between
mind and body, nor between man and animal. All knowing can be
considered a form of orientation. The organism's placing of itself in
the environment, the dinoflagellate in the plankton, the salmon in the
stream, prefigures the process by which man both shapes and is shaped
by
his bodily being within the world, reaching out from what he has
assimilated toward what he seeks. The from-to structure of
tacit
knowing implies that the roots of all human achievement are
inextricably
enmeshed in man's bodily processes of being.
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I have one further argument to make against the Cartesian
principles, but before I do let me pause here momentarily to place these
challenges within the framework of my own philosophical exploration.
The primary purpose of that exploration has been to work toward a new
xanders tending of human abilities and the world they apprehend, to break
away from the structure of understanding embodied in our present
intellectual foundation and to seek within a reformulation of that
foundation a conception of existence more coherent with and more
adequate to human experience. My challenges of the Cartesian principles
form a transition within my exploration: they are both my last direct
criticism of our present structure of understanding and at the same time
my first presentation of what I hope will eventually be a more coherent
and adequate structure. The Cartesian principles have led, over the
past three hundred years, toward a constricted and demeaning structure
of understanding, a structure which offers man neither a significant
place in nor a logical connection to the world in which he dwells , a
structure which Whitehead calls "a mystic chant over an untelligible
universe." Our Cartesian heritage has led us to a dead end; the
search for explicit knowledge and the premises of that search a
disembodied intellect and an atomistic reality , have led our
understanding ever further from an adequate resolution. Polanyi s
theory of tacit knowledge suggests a more adequate structure of
understanding. Polanyi begins his theory with man's inextricable
embodiment within a world. He thus relinquishes both the
quest for
explicit knowledge and the simplistic Cartesian achetypes;
and suggests
in their stead a personal yet valid kind of knowledge,
a knowledge to be
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achieved by complex and varied ways of human knowing, a knowledge to be
found within manifold levels of reality. This new structure of
understanding should become clearer both in my final argument against
the Cartesian principles and subsequently in my presentation of
Polanyi's own argument.
Before I turn from Descartes and consider the theory of tacit
knowledge from some of Polanyi's own perspectives, I would like to take
my arguments against the Cartesian principles, and particularly against
the fourth principle, one step further, and challenge dualism in terms
of the objective and subjective components into which it evolved. Such
a challenge should serve not only to substantiate the validity of my
criticism but also to unify several of the arguments I have already
made. Ever since Descartes first postulated res cogitans and res
extensa and thereby split apart the inner world of consciousness from
all external reality, the radical disconnection of the two has made a
coherent understanding of human consciousness impossible. I have
already spent some time in criticizing the objective half of this
dichotomy. None of the reductive disciplines, be it cybernetics,
behaviorism, or neuropsychology seems by itself to offer an adequate
understanding of the human mind: thought cannot be understood solely as
the compulsive outcome of its own neural processes. The simplistic
ontology of objectivism, in effect, denies the existence of the knower
and thereby I would argue the existence of the known. Only persons
can
succeed in knowing anything. Without an adequate conception of
consciousness, there can be no rational foundation for knowledge.
The
objectivists , in ascribing solely to the materialistic half of Cartesian
120
dualism, are in effect denying themselves a rational basis for their
disciplines. Edwin Straus, an eminant psychiatrist whose views of
knowledge are in many ways similar to Polanyi’s, points out that
knowledge, in even the most abstract of sciences, is inexplicable
without some conception of consciousness:
The physicist's observations begin and end within the field
of human action. In it and from it he develops the
mathematical and physical conception of space. The personal
relation of the observer to his environment differs in
principle from the spatio-temporal relations of the things
observed. If the observer's original relations to space and
time corresponded to those in which the observed objects and
their ultimate hypostatizations
,
such as atoms and
electrons, are conceived, defined and measured, he could
never devise a science of physics.
Straus' argument is basically the same one I have previously made in
denying the adequacy of objectivism's one level ontology; and the
central point remains the same: the existence of knowledge has
ontological implications— the science of physics, as does any form of
knowledge, implies the existence of consciousness. Perhaps, by its very
nature, consciousness is fated always to appear mysterious, even
paradoxical, and thereby always to cast doubt upon the veridity of
knowledge; but its enegmatic nature does not mean that consciousness can
be removed from the processes of knowledge. The ontological arguments
against objectivism's denial of consciousness are as valid as the
epistemological arguments which Polanyi makes against Descartes'
separation of consciousness. Despite the Cartesian dichotomy of
res
cogitans and res extensa, and despite the attempts of
objectivism to
carry dualism even further and form a conception of
knowledge solely
within the material half of that division, it appears
that human
consciousness can be neither ontologically nor epistemologically
separated from the processes of science
.
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Cartesian dualism can also be challenged in terms of its
subjective component. Subjectivism attempts to overcome the
inadequacies, and particularly the dehumanizing effects, of an objective
philosophy founded wholly within res extensa; but when one looks at the
conceptions of mem and knowledge which evolve from the other half of
Cartesian dualism, it appears that subjectivism's attempt to understand
existence solely in terms of res cogitans is equally inadequate. The
problem is here again the underlying Cartesian principles. There can be
no real escape from the dehumanizing effects of Cartesian science by a
philosophy which still secretly ascribes to Descartes' basic conceptions
of man and knowledge. Although subjectivism attempts to resist the
limitations of objectivism, it has not in essence rejected the
principles on which objectivism is founded—in particular the principle
that all authentic knowledge must be explicit, and the principle that
man is basically dualistic. The subjectivists have set, as Sartre has
done, some quintessential inner truth over against the impersonal world
of knowledge, but they have not squarely faced the basic problem
inherent in any modern acceptance of the Cartesian principles: without
God as guarantor of its apprehensions, consciousness must always be
suspect within any Cartesian framework. The search for explicit
knowledge leaves human consciousness no adequate place in the liniverse-
there can be only atomism or isolation, nature or spirit, body or
mind.
In this regard, it is particularly illustrative to look
again at
the subjective conception of human consciousness. In my original
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examination of subjectivism, I showed that Sartre's conception of
consciousness, the conception I used as a subjective model, is
essentially still Cartesian in at least four ways : it is pre-
reflective, instantaneous, self-directed and purely active. Just as
Descartes took, the cogito as his first clear and distinct idea and used
the supposed certainty and isolation of that act of attention as a
justification for his philosophy, so Sartre takes the defining
characteristics of the Cartesian cogito to their ultimate conclusions
and bases his philosophy on the even more isolated conception of
consciousness implied in the Cartesian original—a conception of a mind
turned so wholly inward that it can find its only authentic existence in
negation. I have already broadly suggested the inadequacies of such a
conception, but again, as with objectivism, the greatest inadequacies
can be seen in a challenge of the Cartesian roots. If one re-examines
the Cartesian roots of Sartre's conception of consciousness, now in the
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light of the theory of tacit knowledge, their logic becomes suspect.
Polanyi believes first, that because all knowledge entails both
subsidiary and focal awareness, there can exist no ultimate and pre-
reflective pin point of consciousness—what I referred to in my previous
discussion of Sartre as "a non substantial absolute." The knowing mind
is not a total inwardness, but a from- to structure; it exists primarily
in its interaction with and assimilation of the world. Secondly,
consciousness cannot be instantaneous. Its from- to structure implies
a
stretch not only of attention but of effort; effort must be
lived and
living takes time. Thirdly, consciousness is not self-directed,
but
primarily other-directed. As in the example of orientation
above, the
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processes of interiorization exist primarily in order to focus on
something in the world—we reach out from what we have assimilated to
what we seek. Therefore, fourthly, consciousness is not purely active,
a form of self-assertion acting wholly within itself. Just as pure
potency—the pure exteriority of objectivism—cannot account for the
existence of conscious life, so neither can pure activity. Rather
consciousness exists apart from either of these conceptions. It may be
described as a tension between what we are and what we seek, as a
balance, as a surrender. It is all of these things, but it is also
something other—something which will be described and understood only
after years of living and working within a new conception of
consciousness
.
The substance of this criticism is that pure and unextended
consciousness cannot exist. In denying the Cartesian roots of Sartre's
philosophy, the theory of tacit knowledge denies the whole basis for
that philosophy and by implication the basis for subjectivism. Any
philosophy founded within the fictions of the Cartesian system can never
offer an adequate conception of human consciousness. Just as the
cogito, that first self-referring act of a wholly pure and attentive
mind, is an impossibility, so also is the existence of a non substantial
absolute—Sartre's pre-reflective distellation of the cogito. The
"fusion of essence and existence," that conjunction of mind and the
world which Sartre believed to be perpetually indicated but forever
impossible, turns out instead to be the very process through
which
consciousness does exist.
The subjective assimilation of the world into total inwardness
turns out to be as self-contradictory as the objective reduction of
consciousness into the pure exteriority of atomism. The examination of
dualism in terms of its objective and subjective evolutions reveals that
neither of these philosophies is any more logical or adequate than the
Cartesian original. In centering their conceptions of mem and knowledge
wholly within a single half of that dualism, neither objectivism nor
subjectivism succeeds in overcoming the problems inherent in the
Cartesian division. Neither the one level descriptions of positivist
science nor the subjective gesturings of the alienated self can offer an
adequate conception of human existence. When examined in the light of
the theory of tacit knowledge, objectivism and subjectivism both betray
almost the same inadequacies as do the Cartesian principles on which
these philosophies are based. The search for explicit and indubitable
knowledge can end only in one or another of these equally self-
contradictory alternatives.
The perspective of tacit knowledge serves then to illuminate the
inadequacy of the Cartesian principles and thereby the inadequacy of the
major structures of understanding within our present intellectual
foundation. In turn, the Cartesian principles offer, as did the
paradigm of science, a perspective for the understanding of Polanyi's
theory. The theory of tacit knowledge does offer a valid criticism and
a tenable alternative to our Cartesian heritage. Our one certainty
can
be neither a subjective disembodied intellect nor an objective atomistic
reality; our structure of understanding must be more than an
arbitrary
formalism based on one or the other of these certainties. We
must begin
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rather with the acknowledgement of ourselves as embodied within a world,
and we must base our understanding on the philosophic structure which
flows from such an acknowledgement—a structure which might be described
as a comprehensive realism. In seeking to overcome the constricted
structures of understanding within our present intellectual foundation,
we are directed by Polanyi's theory toward such a realism, toward a new
and more personal kind of understanding. Witliin the framework of my
philosophical exploration, it is time now to seek this understamding
from the perspectives Polanyi himself suggests. The transition away
from Descartes is complete. Using this critical understanding of the
Cartesian principles and their influence as a base, my exploration can
now proceed toward those goals which first inspired it—toward the
beginnings of an intellectual foundation more adequate to the
understanding of human existence, and most particularly, more adequate
to the understanding of human skills.
CHAPTER IV
TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF SKILLS
Introduction
This exploration was inspired, as I showed in the first chapter,
by certain intimations of meaning and coherence within the practice of
physical skills. Because an adequate understanding of those intimations
seemed impossible within the present conception of skills, I was led in
the second chapter to explore the intellectual foundation on which that
conception was founded. My exploration suggested that many of the
general conceptions of existence within that foundation were inadequate,
and that a more adequate understanding of skills could be best achieved
within a new and more adequate intellectual foundation. In the third
chapter, I discovered what I hope to be the beginnings of that new
foundation—both a valid criticism and a tenable alternative to the
principles which lie at the very heart of our present foundation. My
exploration now leads back toward the intimations which first inspired
it, and attempts to discover within a selective examination of that
alternative the beginnings of a more adequate conception of skills.
In the past two chapters I have been working toward a structure of
understanding which might allow the discovery of this more adequate
understanding of skills. More specifically, the purpose of my
exploration in these chapters has been to work toward a new
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understanding of human abilities and the reality they seek to aporehend,
to break away the structure of understanding embodied in our present
intellectual foundation and to seek, within a reformulation of that
foundation, conceptions of existence more adequate to human experience.
Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge seems to offer such
conceptions. Polanyi believes that no conceptions can have that kind of
formal certainty which is still so greatly our Cartesian heritage. The
clear and distinct idea, and all that flows from it is a fiction. An
intellectual foundation cannot begin with the arbitrary goal of finding
explicit knowledge and then artifically define both abilities and
reality so as to guarantee that goal.
To assume, within the immensity of time and space, that it is we
who are somehow perfectly suited for the indubitable apprehension of
reality is at best improbable- Rather, Polanyi believes, we must begin
by looking at ourselves as knowers—as embodied beings engaged in the
activitv of knowina—and from that beainninq see what we can sav about
our abilities and about the realitv we seek to know. From such a
becinninq and especially from an examination of the kind of knowing
involved in sceintific discovery, the groping and intuition which
constitute a significant part of man’s most profound intellectual
achievements, Polanyi is led to one of his fundamental acknowledgements
the ineradicable ambiguity of our situation as knowing beings.
Although our abilities are capable of profound apprehensions,
both the
complex nature of those abilities and the nature of our
existence within
an immense and intricately structured universe requires
of us a certain
modesty toward experience. Polanyi believes that we
can indeed
128
apprehend reality, but he shows that our apprehensions are neither
passively indubitable nor mechanically certain. Our apprehension of
reality requires an active comprehension of the things known; even the
most abstract of apprehensions requires, in some way, the personal
participation of the knower. For such knowing, there can be no final
guarantee. Given the nature of our abilities and our place within
reality, there can be no absolute foundation, no single certainty, no
ultimate clear and distinct idea. Every apprehension must rely, in the
final analysis, on an appraisal of our own arts of knowing. Any
apprehension or any ccnception which ignors our true situation as
knowing beings must be suspect. The structure of understanding
suggested by Polanyi relinquishes man's age old dream of certainty and
the foundation of arbitrary formalisms which inevitably flow from such a
dream. He begins instead with an acknowledgement of both man's
strengths and limitations: with both man's most profound intellectual
discoveries and with the personal foundation on which those discoveries
must ultimately rest. The conception of human abilities and the
conception of reality suggested by Polanyi 's theory of tacit knowledge
seem to form an intellectual foundation more adequate and more coherent
with human experience. It is my hope that within Polanyi 's conceptions
of existence, I may be able to work toward a more adequate conception of
physical skills.
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Conceptions of Existence Inherent in
the Theory of Tacit Knowledge;
Polanyi's Conception of Human Abilities
Although the purpose of my exploration is now first to work toward
an understanding of the conceptions of existence inherent in the theory
of tacit knowledge, and then to work through those conceptions toward a
more adequate conception of skills, my exploration will be also, of
necessity, an exegesis of Polanyi’s theory. As I move closer to this
new conception of skills, my focus will inevitably become more
selective; but nevertheless, all of the material within this chapter
should lead the reader not only toward a more adequate conception of
skills but also toward a more comprehensive understanding of Polanyi.
At the end of the last chapter within a criticism of our present
intellectual foundation, I presented several brief views of Polanyi's
theory. In opposition to the Cartesian paradigm of science, Polanyi's
theory appears as a more personal conception of science. Polanyi shows
that the processes of discovery cannot be represented within a framework
of wholly explicit knowledge. He suggests rather that science makes its
advances into the unknown through a kind of groping or intuition in
which the scientist interiorizes various kinds of clues in order to
attend through them toward the coherent pattern which he seeks to
discover. Within the perspective of a criticism of the Cartesian
principles, the theory of tacit knowledge takes on a more complex
appearance. Polanyi suggests that the from- to structure of
tacit
knowledge is essentially a skill-like process: the subsidiary
elements
of knowledge are not merely subliminal bits of
information which we can
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acquire and discard at will— rather they have been assimilated by us,
have become aspects of our being, in such a way that they are
inextricably part of the whole context through which we focus on and
dwell in the world. Polanyi suqgests further that just as tacit
knowledge directs us from subsidiary particulars to a focal whole, so it
directs us to the comprehension of a reality having the same structure
as our knowing of it: that is to a whole of parts whose significance
ranges in ways perhaps unguessed by us beyond its specifiable
particulars or even beyond the presently visible outline of the whole.
At the very end of the last chapter in comparison with Sartean
consciousness, Polanyi 's theory seems to become more inclusive. Within
this perspective, the from-to structure of tacit knowing seems not so
much a specialized explanation for the workings of science, but an
explanation for the workings and even the existence of all conscious
activity.
These views of Polanyi' s theory already suggest both the
conception of human abilities and the conception of reality toward which
I am working. However, rather than sum up those conceptions here, I
might be able to present them more intelligibly if I first looked at the
theory of tacit knowledge from one of Polanyi 's own perspectives, and
then worked, as the theory itself does, from a conception of human
abilities toward a conception of reality. In The Tac it Dimension
Polanyi offers his most systematic view of the fundamental aspects
of
tacit knowing, and this view perhaps most clearly suggests
the
conception of human abilities inherent in the theory.^ Polanyi
begins
here with the fact that human beings know more than they
can tell. One
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can recognize a person's face and its moods without being able to tell
by what signs he knows it. This is basically the same kind of
recognition I mentioned earlier by which a naturalist is able to tell a
Rhyncodemus from a bilineatus. Both our daily lives and our descriptive
sciences are highly dependent on the recognition of characteristic
2physiognomies—a kind of recognition which cannot be fully described.
Polanyi cites the Gestalt theories of perception as a possible
explanation for such recognition, but while Gestalt theory assumes that
perception is an automatic activity taking place through the
"spontaneous equilibration of particulars as they are impressed on the
retina or on the brain , Polanyi sees such recognition rather as the
outcome of "an active shaping of experience."
In order to clarify the structure of such recognition— "to show in
isolation the principle mechanism by which knowledge is tacitly
acquired," Polanyi cites two recent experiments in subception. Because
Polanyi ' s descriptions of these experiments are important to the
conclusions which follow, I will quote him here:
The authors presented a person with a large number of
nonsense syllables, and after showing certain of the
syllables, they administered an electric shock. Presently
the person showed symptoms of anticipating the shock at the
sight of "shock syllables"; yet, on questioning, he could
not identify them. He had come to know when to expect a
shock, but he could not tell what made him expect it. He
had acquired a knowledge similar to that which we have when
we know a person's face by signs which we crr.noc tell...
Another variant of this phenomenon was demonstrated by
Ericsen and Kuethe. They exposed a person to a shock
whenever he happened to utter associations to certain
shoe
words." Presently, the person learned to forestall the
shock by avoiding the utterance of such associations,
but,
on questioning, it appeared that he did not know
he was
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doing this. Here the subject got to know a practical
operation, but could not tell how he worked it. This kind
of subception has the structure of a skill, for a skill
combines elementary muscular acts which are not
identifiable, according to relations that we cannot define.^
These experiments show what is meant by saying that one can know more
than one can tell. In both experiments, the shock-producing particulars
remain tacit. The subject cannot identify them, yet he relies on his
awareness of them for anticipating the electric shock.
Polanyi uses these experiments to suggest several of the
fundamental aspects of tacit knowing. The subject in the experiment
knows the shock-producing particulars only by relying on his awareness
of them for attending to the electric shock. Hence his knowledge of
them remains tacit. The experiment reveals how one comes to know such
subsidiary, or as Polanyi here calls them, "proximal" particulars.
Polanyi calls this the "functional" relation between the two terms of
tacit knowing: the subject knows the first term only by relying on his
awareness of it for attending to the second. In non-experimental
situations such as perception when the focal or "distal" term is not a
single element like a shock but is rather an integration of particulars,
it can be said that the "functional" import of tacit knowing is that it
guides one from the proximal, interiorized particulars to the
integration of a coherent, distal whole. This functional relation or
structure can be seen when one relies on his subsidiary awareness of the
features of a face for attending to the characteristic appearance
of
that face, or when one relies on his awareness of a
combination of
muscular acts for attending from those elementary movements
to the
achievement of their joint pvarpose.
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Polanyi also uses the experiments in subception to illustrate
several other fundamental aspects of tacit knowing. Within the
experimental setting it may be said that even though one does not learn
specifically to recognize the shock syllables as distinct from other
syllables, one does become aware of facing a shock syllable in terms of
the apprehension it evokes in one. One becomes aware of the shock
syllables in terms of that on which he is focusing. In the case of a
physiognomy, it may be said that one is aware of specific features in
terms of the physiognomy toward which he is attending; in the case of a
skill, one is aware of the muscular moves in terms of the performance
toward which one's attention is directed. Polanyi says of this aspect
of tacit knowing: "we are aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit
knowing in the appearance of the distal term; we are aware of that from
which we are attending to another thing, in the appearance of that
thing. Polanyi calls this the "phenomenal" structure of tacit
knowing. Within the functional and phenomenal aspects of tacit knowing
Polanyi sees a third aspect. When the sight of certain syllables makes
the subject expect an electric shock, it may be said that those
syllables signify the approach of a shook— that is their meaning. One
knows these syllables in terms of their meaning; it is their meaning
toward which his attention is directed. In <-he same way it can be said
that a characteristic physiognomy is the meaning of its features:
one
identifies a physiognomy by relying on his awareness of its
features for
attending to their joint meaning. Tacit knowing directs one from
particulars to the whole which they signify; Polanyi
calls this the
"sematic" aspect of tacit knowing.
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It is important to note here one of the characteristics of this
semantic aspect. The meaning of the features of a physiognomy is
observed at the same spot where the features are situated; hence it is
difficult to separate mentally the features from their meaning. Yet the
fact remains that the two are distinct, since one may know a physiognomy
without being able to specify its features. To illustrate more clearly
this separation of meaning from that which is meant, Polanyi uses the
example of learning a typical medical skill—the use of a probe. As a
medical student learns to use a probe, his awareness of its impact on
his hand is slowly transformed into a sense of its point touching the
objects he is exploring. Polanyi explains that "this is how an
interpretative effort transposes meaningless feelings into meaningful
6
ones, and places these at some distance from the original feelings."
The student becomes aware of the feelings in his hand in terms of their
meaning located at the tip of the probe to which he is attending. This
structure is seen in the use of any tool, and it also applies in the use
.7
of more articulate tools such as languages and scientific theories.
Polanyi tells how the correspondence he reads at breakfast arrives in
many languages. However, he usually remains unaware of the language in
which a particular letter is written unless he wishes to share some part
of that letter with his son who speaks only English, At that point
he
must focus on the language itself to see whether the letter
needs to be
translated. In reading his breakfast correspondence, Polanyi
can be
said to be aware of the language of a particular letter
only in terms of
its meaning. It is one of the characteristics of the
semantic aspect of
tacit knowing that in all such acts of knowing meaning
tends to be
displaced away from the proximal particulars toward the distal whole
which those particulars signify.
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These three fundamental aspects of tacit knowing, when combined
with the views of Polanyi's theory already presented in the last
chapter, suggest a conception of human abilities which is inherent in
all of Polanyi's work. Polanyi believes that human abilities always
involve at least two different kinds of things or two different kinds of
awareness. The use of a human ability can be described as our attending
from proximal particulars to a distal whole, or it can be described as
involving two kinds of awareness, subsidiary and focal, through which we
strive in every endeavor, whether practical or theoretical, to master or
to contemplate our environment. Polanyi believes that this two-level
description is required for several reasons. Some subsidiary elements
are, because of the nature of our abilities, unknowable or
unspecifiable
,
and yet can be shown to contribute to a focal whole; such
unspecif lability
,
as I shall later show, is particularly apparent in
perception. In addition, the way in which many of these subsidiary
elements are initially integrated is also unspecifiable. However, more
important than either physiological or psychological reasons is the
logical relation which pertains between the subsidiary elements and the
focal whole.® Even in cases where the subsidiary particulars can be
identified apart from their general contribution to the focal hole, they
do not mean the same thing in isolation. Polanyi believes that just as
discovery must cross a logical gap, so all our apprehensions involve
a
kind of creation, a not-wholly-specif iable integration through
which we
move toward a new way of understanding. Neither the clues
to a
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scientific problem nor the features of a physiognomy constitute a
knowledge of the whole. Because human abilities do not function wholly
through explicit integration, the subsidiary particulars of any act of
apprehension subtly change their appearance or meaning as they are
integrated toward a focal whole. Thus although certain particulars may
be specified in isolation, that specification does not constitute a
specification of those particulars as they pertain to the whole. As the
above argument suggests, Polanyi believes that human abilities are to a
large degree active and thus involve the dimension of achievement. The
proximal particulars are not just given us; through an effort of our
bodies we also actively assimilate these particulars in order both to
attend toward—and in a sense to discover—the central object or purpose
of our attention. As the experiments in subception showed, and as all
perception more generally reveals, we apprehend that object in terms of
pattern and, therefore, meaning. Human abilities can thus be described
as skills entailing the active apprehension of both pattern and meaning
in terms of clues bearing on it.
Perhaps I can better suggest the conception of human abilities
inherent in Polanyi 's theory if I examine more closely that
unspecifiable context of assimilations out of which all our
apprehensions seem to arise. Let us examine some of the tools which
form a part of this context. First look at the medical probe
which I
mentioned earlier. The student uses the probe as he would use
his hand
and feels the impacts of the tip of the probe as though
it were an
extension of his arm. Polanyi says that "our subsidiary
awareness of
tools and probes can be regarded as the act of making
them form a part
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of our own body We pour ourselves into them and assimilate them as
parts of our own existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in
9
them." However, tools are felt not only in terms of our own body; they
are also felt in terms of the entity toward which we are attending.
This is easier to understand if one thinks about the use, not of a
probe, but of a less tangible tool such as a scientific theory or a
skillful motion. Polanyi says "whenever v;e use certain things for
attending from them to other things, these things change their
appearance; they appear to us now in terms of the entities to which we
are attending from them. . . .We are attending from the scientific theory
to things seen in its light, and are aware of the theory, while thus
10
using it, in terms of the spectacle that it serves to explain." We
are aware of a tool then both in terms of our body and in terms of that
entity toward which we are attending. Taking the term from Dilthey and
Lipps, Polanyi calls this use of tools "indwelling." Indwelling
includes both the sense of assimilation and of extension. "When we make
a thing function as the proximal term of tacit knowing , we incorporate
it in our body and extend our body to include it so that we come to
dwell in it."^^ Indwelling is a means of making certain things function
as the proximal term of tacit knowing so that instead of observing them
in themselves, we may become aware of them both in terms of our
context
of previous assimilations but more importantly in terms of
their bearing
on the comprehensive entity which they constitute.
If one imagines this process of assimilation and
indwelling as
beginning sometime soon after the inception of pregnancy
and continuing
throughout the lifetime of an individual/^ then one comes
close to the
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conception of human abilities inherent in Polanyi’s theory. The
structure of our abilities is genetically given us and in that sense
they are ours. But from our first sensations of uterine warmth, through
all our "higher" forms of learning and on to our knowledge of impending
death, those abilities are formed through a kind of sharing of ourselves
with the world. In the development of our abilities, we both assimilate
the world to ourselves and give ourselves to it so that we dwell in it.
Human abilities can be represented neither as the function of some
inner, arbitrary, significance-conferring "I," nor as a series of
explicit, mechanical steps. Our apprehensions and knowledge of reality
are neither chosen arbitrarily from zero, nor are they indubitably given
us. Our cibilities are aspects both of our facticity and our
transcendence. They are achieved both through our seeking to have—our
assimilation of the world, and throiigh our surrender—bur being
possessed by the world. Thus we live always in a tension or a balance
between what we seek and what we are, between the world whose facticity
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we share and ourselves whose shaping makes that world a world. From
our first beginnings, all of our abilities are formed through such a
sharing of ourselves, and all our apprehensions must ultimately rest on
this foundation.
This conception of human abilities inherent in the theory of tacit
knowledge stands in some contrast to our present conception. What
it
may suggest about a new conception of physical skills, I shall
go on to
explore. What Polanyi’s more comprehensive conception
suggests about
our present conception of human abilities—concerned as it
is almost
"intellectual" abilities— I shall here once more sumexclusively with
139
up. First there is no single and essential human ability— a pure and
attentive mind—either mysteriously yet indubitably apprehending reality
as per Descartes, or wholly isolated as per Sartre. To comprehend—all
the way from our most basic apprehensions to the grandest visions of an
Einstein— is to rely on oneself bodily in order to envisage a coherent,
intelligible spectacle beyond oneself. Second, acknowledging that it is
the structure of our bodies and our senses—and not something wholly
unknowable—which begins the processes of comprehension, nevertheless
those processes cannot be mechanically traced and explicitly known. Our
abilities are so formed that our comprehensions- must erst ultimately on
an unspecifiable context, a context both of assimilations to, and
extensions of, ourselves. As Marjorie Grene says, in a passage that
harks back to the paradigm of science:
Our explicit awareness, the focal core of consciousness, is
always founded in and carried by the tacit acceptance of
something not explicit, which binds, heavily and concretely,
ourselves to and within a world- This means that knowledge
is always personal. The impersonal aspect of knowledge
arises from and returns to personal participation in the
search for and acceptance of the object to be known.
Polanyi's Conception of Reality
Of the conceptions inherent in Polanyi's theory of tacit
knowledge, it is the above conception of human abilities which seems
most relevant to the purposes of this exploration. However,
before I
begin to work toward a more adequate conception of skills,
it is also
necessary to examine the veridical claims, and the conception
of reality
inherent in Polanyi's theory. What must be asked first,
is how the
abilities described above can rightly claim to
apprehend reality, and
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second, what is the nature of the reality thus apprehended. One of the
dominate ideals of our present intellectual foundation is to establish a
strictly detached, objective knowledge, and any falling short of this
ideal is accepted only as a temporary imperfection. However, if as
Polanyi's conception of human abilities suggests—that tacit knowing
forms an indispensible part of all our apprehensions of reality, then
the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would in
effect aim at the destruction of all knowledge. To conceive of
knowledge as the explicit integration of specified particulars is both
logically and psychologically inadequate. Such a model, if it were
adhered to, would first, as I have shown through the paradox of
discovery, effectively eliminate the quest for all further knowledge;
and would second, as Polanyi's conception of human abilities shows, so
misrepresent our situation within the universe that we could never
achieve an adequate understanding of our own existence. Given the
nature of our abilities, Polanyi believes that it is both futile and
demeaning to seek strictly impersonal verification for our
apprehensions. Yet despite our limitations, Polanyi also believes that
through our abilities we do come in contact with reality, and that many
times we rightly apprehend the reality which we thxis contact.
Polanyi describes true apprehension of reality as a fusion
of the
personal with the objective. He attempts to understand and justify
such
apprehension, just as he attempted to understand human abilities,
not
abstractly through a set of arbitrary formalisms but
through an
examination of human beings seeking knowledge. Here
again, as
often the case, Polanyi's model is science,
specifically the recognition
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of a scientific problem. So there will be no mistake here, let me first
present the most basic conclusions to which Polanyi
' s theory must lead.^^
Polanyi notes that when a scientist sees a problem, he sees something
that is hidden. He has an intimation of the coherence of hitherto not
comprehended particulars. There exist no rules to account for such an
intimation—for the way a good idea is found for starting an inquiry, and
there exist no firm rules either for the verification or refutation of
the final results of that inquiry. Given the structure of our abilities,
neither the particulars which we assimilate nor the integration of those
particulars can be indubitably known. Because only human beings can
achieve this kind of knowledge and because tacit knowing governs all
hiaman abilities, no item of information, no knowledge can be traced back
explicitly to its certain roots. The scientist's intimations and
discoveries, and all of the learning—personal, cultural and scientific
—
which guide him in his exploration, are governed ultimately by tacit
knowing. Because this is so, Polanyi must finally say that the problem
is good and will lead to a relevant truth if the intimation is true. The
truth of our apprehensions must rest finally on our own beliefs. Polanyi
says, "I declare myself committed to the belief in an external reality,
gradually accessible to knowing, and I regard all true understanding
as
„16
cin intimation of such a reality.
Polanyi believes that all our apprehensions, from our most
basic
awareness of the world to our most profound scientific
discoveries, are
achieved through tacit knowing; and that given the
structure of tacit
knowing, the truth of those apprehensions must rest
ultimately on our own
beliefs and self-accreditation. We develop our abilities
to their utraos
and we. use those abilities in the very best way
we know how; but
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ultimately it is our own self-set standards—our belief in the way we go
about the business of knowing—which accredits our apprehensions. "We
can voice our ultimate convictions only from within our convictions
—
from within the whole system of acceptances that are logically prior to
any particular assertion of our own, prior to the holding of any
17particular piece of knowledge." Such justification may seem at best a
kind of sophistry, and more likely only a tautology, and indeed from many
perspectives such objections seem valid. Polanyi is proposing here a new
intellectual foundation, and as I have mentioned before, such foundations
are by their nature circular—to have faith one must believe, but to
18believe one must have faith. What must be realized is that the same
objections could be brought against any foundation or even against any
statement. A proper study of this very sentence—that is a study which
is both an exploration the sentence and an exegesis of the fundamental
beliefs, in the light of which we approach the sentence—would reveal the
same kind of acceptances which in Polanyi' s foiindation seem so arbitrary.
Given the circular nature of intellectual foundation, I would suggest
again that what is needed for a better understanding of Polanyi is some
small suspension of disbelief. I would argue that what is required
ultimately for an understanding of Polanyi is a leap of faith a long-
prepared-for but when it comes a sudden and almost a-critical transfor-
mation to a wholly new way of understanding. I would also argue
that
Polanyi -s theory is at present not comprehensive enough to
induce such a
leap. That is why this dissertation is entitled "Toward a
New Conception
of Skills"; it is, in one sense, an aspect of that long
preparation.
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Given then that we can account for this capacity of ours to know
more than we can tell only if we believe in capacity itself and in the
presence of an external reality with which we establish contact, what
more can be said to lead the reader toward a better understanding of the
veridical claims of tacit knowing? Polanyi believes that there are
certain ways in which tacit knowing functions best. In order to
apprehend the truth, we must commit ourselves to seeking the truth.
Commitment, like human abilities themselves, is botli internal and
external, both an appropriation and a surrender, both a belief and a
passion
.
We can assimilate an object as a tool if we believe it to be
actually useful to our purposes and the same holds for the
relation of meaning to what is meant and the relation of
parts to a whole. The act of personal knowing can sustain
these relations only because the acting person believes that
they are opposite: that he has not made them but discovered
them. The effort of knowing is thus guided by a sense of
obligation towards the truth: by an effort to submit to
reality
.
Every act of personal assimilation by which we make a thing form an
extension of ourselves thorugh our subsidiary awareness of it— the use
of a tool, the seeing of an object in a particular way— is a commitment
of ourselves, a manner of disposing of ourselves. Yet if we act
responsibly, if we act in service to the truth, then these commitments
become something more: "the freedom of the subjective person to do as
he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act
as he must."^*^ This may seem an over-stating of any of our powers; and
it is true, that even in those acts of knowing governed by commitment,
there is always the faith that nature must somehow conform to our
intellectual desires. Yet within commitment, such desires are not only
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ours; they seem also to come, in a sense, from beyond us. These desires
are a passion which seeks intellectual satisfaction not only as that
which satisfies itself but with universal intent.
Yielding to our intellectual passions, we desire to become
more satisfying to ourselves, and accept an obligation to
educate ourselves by the standards which our passions have
set to ourselves. In this sense these passions are public,
not private : they delight in cherishing something external
to us, for its own saJce.^^
For Polanyi, the veridical claims of tacit knowing rest finally with the
realization that we can voice our ultimate convictions only from within
those convictions; but with commitment and with the intellectual passion
which the commitment situation seems to instill in us—a passion for
mental excellence which believes itself to be fulfilling universal
obligations—that resting place seems, if not wholly secure, then at
least adequate to our situation as knowing beings.
Before proceeding toward a new conception of skills, it now
remains necessary only to examine the conception of reality inherent in
the theory of tacit knowledge. I should point out here that the
division of Polanyi 's theory into various conceptions is itself somewhat
arbitrary. The structure of my examination here is more of a concession
to Descartes and my own structures of thought, than it is an accurate
reflection of Polanyi 's own ideas. Polanyi 's theory suggests not so
much a distinction of knower from known, as it does a continuum or
hierarchy of reality in which the knower, and indeed in which human
abilities themselves, are one reality among others. As I have
mentioned
in several contexts, the existence of knowledge has ontological
implications. There exists something other than bits of matter;
there
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is also knowing mind. The theory of tacit knowledge suggests not one or
two kinds of things within reality, but a whole variety of existences;
it suggests further than as knowing is not only passive but is also
an achievement, won through effort and through intelligent interaction
with one's surroundings, so also are many of the entities within
reality, themselves achievements. The existence of these entities is
not given them; it is achieved by them—save for their own efforts and
intelligence, they would not exist. Further as I have also mentioned,
because these entities have in a sense achieved themselves, their
existence is not wholly explicable in terms of the conditions from which
they originated. The logic of achievement implies that such entities
exist on at least two levels at once: the whole depends on the parts as
conditions of its existence
,
but the parts exist here as parts only as
so constituted by the unifying principle of the whole. The theory of
tacit knowledge suggests, then, a conception of grades or levels of
reality, and suggests also that within this reality there are not only
types of existence but types of achievement.
In The Tacit Dimension , as Polanyi systematically examines the
various aspects of tacit knowing, he shows that human beings form
intellectually and practically an "interpreted universe populated by
entities, the particulars of which they interiorize for the sake of
.,22
comprehending their meaning in the shape of coherent entities." From
the three aspects I have already discussed in regard to human abilities,
Polanyi "deduces" a fourth, the ontolotical aspect: "since tacit
knowing establishes a meaningful relationship between two terms, we may
identify it with the understanding of the comprehensive entity
which
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these two terms jointly constitute. Thus the proximal term represents
the particulars of this entity, and we can say accordingly, that we
comprehend the entity by relying on our awareness of its particulars for
23
attending to their joint meaning." Here Polanyi suggests that the
comprehension of an entity—and, by our convictions, a real entity—has
the same structure as the entity which is its object. He illustrates
this conception of reality by considering the situation where two
persons share the knowledge of the same comprehensive entity—that is
the knowledge of__an entity which one of them produces and the other
apprehends. The entity here considered is the skillful performance of
the "producer." The knower must here try to combine mentally the
movements which the producer/performer combines practically, and the
knower must combine them in a pattern similar to the performer's pattern
of movements. Polanyi notes that two kinds of indwelling meet here:
"The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in them as parts of
his body while the watcher tries to correlate these moves by seeking to
dwell in them from outside. He dwells in these moves by interiorizing
them. By such exploratory indwelling the pupil gets the feel of the
24
master's skill and may learn to rival him." Polanyi believes that
this "structural kinship" between subject and object is present not only
ij-j the study of bodily performances but also in the study of mental
performances and indeed in all knowing. All acts of knowing involve the
selection of clues which have "a presumed bearing on the presence of
something they appear to indicate. If we select these clues
skillfully, then we enter into the particulars of a comprehensive
entity; and if we integrate skillfully the particulars we have
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assimilated, then we come in contact with something that, in many cases,
accounts for the coherence of that entity.
Working from the idea of the correspondence between the structure
of comprehension and the structure of the comprehensive entity, Polanyi
suggests several other things about the nature of reality. He again
identifies the two terms of tacit knowing—the proximal which includes
the particulars and the distal which is their comprehensive meaning
—
with two levels of reality; and he argues, as I have demonstrated in
regard to DNA, that within any comprehensive entity it is impossible to
represent the organizing principles of the higher level by the laws
governing its isolated particulars. In regard to the various levels
which seem to exist within reality, Polanyi makes a further arg\ament,
one which harks both back to the veridical claims of tacit knowing and
forward to a more adequate conception of skills. Polanyi demonstrates
how, through tacit knowing, we can know such disparate things as a
person and a scientific problem and even a cobblestone. He then goes on
to argue that persons and problems are more real than cobblestones
because they carry the possibility of a greater range of interesting and
unexpected consequences.
The examples, which I have mentioned, point toward a new
aspect of this problem of philosophy. The structural
kinship between knowing a person and discovering a problem,
and the alignment of both with our knowing of a cobblestone,
call attention to the greater depth of a person and a
problem, as compared with the lesser profundity of a
cobblestone. Persons and problems are felt to be more
profound, because we expect them yet to reveal themselves
in
unexpected ways in the future, while cobblestones evoke
no
such expectation. This capacity of a thing to reveal
itse
in unexpected ways in the future I attribute to the
fact
that the thing observed is an aspect of a reality,
possessing a significance that is not exhausted by our
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conception of any single aspect of it. To trust that a
thing we know is real is, in this sense, to feel that it has
the independence and power for manifesting itself in yet
unthought of ways in the future. I shall say, accordingly,
that minds and problems possess a deeper reality than
cobblestones, although cobblestones are admittedly more real
in the sense of being more tangible. And since I regard the
significance of a thing as more important than its
tangibility, I shall say that minds and problems are more
real than cobblestones. This is to class our knowledge of
reality with the kind of foreknowledge which guides
scientists to discovery.
Polanyi is not arguing here that reality is unpredictcible or unreliaJDle;
reality is still characterized by many predicteible consequences. What
he is arguing is that many comprehensive entities are much richer than
our predictions of them, and so are capable of indefinite consequences
as well. Although the logic of predictability contributes to the
conception and thus to the acceptance of reality, we also conceive of
and accept reality for its depth, its significance, its profundity— for
its capacity of infinite relevation.
The conception of reality inherent in the theory of tacit
knowledge is one which contains a variety of existences—a variety which
need not, and which indeed given the nature of our abilities, can never
be exhausted by the multiplicity of formulae which we devise for the
knowing of it. Polanyi 's theory suggests a hierarchy or continuum of
reality in which many kinds of entities, at many levels of reality, both
exist and interact. To some of these entities, existence is wholly
given, and these inflexible entities are seemingly locked forever within
their place in the universe. But to many of the entities, only the
basic structure of existence is given; these entities have the capacity
to interact with their surroundings. The existence of these
flexible
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entities can be seen as a process, and to the extent that the
interaction of such entities is skillful, their existence can be seen as
an achievement. The processes of both interaction and skillful
interaction expand the structure of reality. These processes both
extend the existence of given entities and create new entities. Often
what is created in these processes is not tangible or not wholly
tangible. Nevertheless, Polanyi believes that these new entities are
real, and indeed that many of them are more real than the entities from
which they were created.
Perception; A Final View of Polanyi 's
Conceptions of Existence
I have almost concluded my presentation of the conceptions of
existence inherent in the theory of tacit knowledge; but before I do, I
would like to add one final persepctive from which these conceptions may
be viewed. Up to this point, my descriptions have been rather abstract.
Therefore, in conclusion, I think it might be appropriate to balance out
my presentation by looking at Polanyi' s conceptions in relation to an
actual human ability. Of all the examples of hiaman abilities Polanyi
uses to illustrate his theory, the one most basic to his argument is
perception. For Polanyi, perception is a learned skill, developed
first and usually beyond recognition by the infant, but a skill also
capable of specialized and refined development throughout the lifetime
of the individual. Like all human abilities, perception integrates
clues to which the individual is not directly attending, toward some
larger coherence. As in man's most refined scientific skills.
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perception is an active process. Our perceptual abilities select some
clues, reject others, and then integrate the assimilated particulars
according to standards which those abilities have both accepted and set
to themselves. Perception thus interprets the world, and interprets it
in ways which are largely inaccessible to explicit investigation.
Nevertheless, despite the mediation involved in the perceptual processes
and despite their unspecifiability
,
we still believe that perception
offers us access to reality. Polanyi notes that if all the functions of
perception could be eliminated by training oneself to look at things in
the way in which a newborn baby must first look at them— "with
unperceiving eyes, letting the images sweep across the retina like a
motion picture which is continuously slipping through the gate of the
projecting lantern," one would still not thereby feel assured of
gaining access to a core of indubitable "virgin data." Given our
situation within the world and given the nature of our abilities, we
must know the world through our tacit interpretation of it; nevertheless
we need not therefore relinquish all claims for the apprehension of a
true picture of reality.
In any act of perception there exists a structure in which some
elements must always remain tacit. This is so both because of the
nature of the visual mechanism and because of the logical relationship
which pertains within the act. The visual mechanism is active
and
complex.^® Perception is a process; an act of perception
requires u.e
interaction of all parts of the visual field to determine
what is seen.
The original retinal images are dependent on the active
adjustment of
pupils and lenses, on the convergence of both eyes, on
body position.
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head and neck muscles. The images enter the brain along with
information from the processes which affected their formation, and once
inside the brain the perception is co-determined by all these messages
along with information from the internal ear and from various other non-
visual parts of the brain. In addition, all during this process, a
complex filtering action has been going on. The lens and positional
muscles are themselves filters—we choose both consciously and
unconsciously what to look at and how to focus. Further, the fibers in
the optic nerve run both ways; this suggests that not only is
information filtered as it moves from the retina into the brain, but
also that the retina itself can be predisposed to receive or reject
various kinds of information. Most of the structures which contribute
to the formation of the final image are subsidiary—they remain tacit
and cannot be experienced in themselves. Nevertheless, these subsidiary
structures both guide the eyes in shaping the retinal image and control
the processes within the brain which form the final image.
The structure of the visual mechanism suggests that many of the
elements of perception are by their nature subsidiary. However, even
when some subsidiary elements within an act of perception can be
isolated, these elements, like the features of a face, cannot be
specified within the focal whole, and thus they remain tacit. One of
the examples which Polanyi uses to demonstrate such logical
,
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lanspecifiability is the viewing of a pair of steroscopic photograpns.
If one views a pair of such photographs, say of a landscape, in the
proper way so that each eye is forced to focus on a single photograph,
the objects within the landscape then appear distributed in depth, more
152
rounded and real, harder and more tangible. This result is due to a
slight difference between the two pictures, taken from two points a few
inches apart. Polanyi notes that "all the information to be revealed by
the steroscopic viewing is contained in these scarcely perceptible
31disparities." Although we can here isolate the major subsidiaries
—
the two separate photographs
,
we cannot know those photographs as they
appear in the focal image. Within the integrated focal whole, the
meaning of these subsidiary elements has changed; yet because no
explicit procedure or direction can produce this integration, we cainnot
specify the subsidiary elements within the focal whole. Because this
concept is so central to Polanyi 's theory, let me repeat the argument
once more. The viewing of steroscopic photographs reveals one of the
more general structures of human perception. In any act of perception
we fuse two different pictures of an object cast upon the retinas of our
eyes by forming its steroscopic image . We focus our attention on the
stero image and see the pictures only as they bear on that image . In
Polanyi 's terms, we are "focally aware of the stero image by being
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subsidiarily aware of the two separate pictures." Between this focal
and subsidiary awareness there exists, as there does in discovery, a
logical gap. Because this gap cannot be crossed by any explicit or
specifiable process of integration, even those elements of perception
which can be specified in isolation cannot be specified within
the focal
whole. That is what is meant by calling them logically
unspecifiable
.
The skills of steroscopic integration are probably
developed very
early in life, as are most of our perceptual
skills. Thus it is
difficult to acquire a siobjective awareness or understanding
of thes
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processes. However, specialized perceptual skills can be developed
later in life, and this development offers at least a clue as to how
such unspecifiable skills are learned. One of Polanyi's examples is
that of learning the skills of radiology. The student of radiology
begins by watching in a darkened room the shadowy traces on a
fluroescent screen placed against a patient's chest, and hears the
radiologist commenting to his assistants, in technical language, on the
significant features of these shadows. Polanyi describes how the
student slowly begins to maJce sense of these shadows:
The student is completely puzzled, for he can see in the X-
Ray picture of a chest only the shadows of the heart and the
ribs, with a few spidery blotches between. The experts seem
to be romancing; he can see nothing that they are talking
about. But as he goes on listening for a few weeks, looking
carefully at, the pictures of different cases, gradually a
rich panaroma of significant details will be revealed to
him: of physiological variations and pathological changes,
of scars, of chronic infections and signs of acute disease.
He has entered a new world. He still sees only a fraction
of what experts see, but the pictures are definitely making
sense now and so do most of the comments made on them.
Here can be seen the same kind of groping which Polanyi believes
characterizes discovery. The student is first aware only of shadowy
particulars. Yet over the weeks he is able to integrate those
particulars into a coherent meaningful whole, although he remains
substantially unaware of both those particulars and the processes
through which he is able to integrate them. The learning of such
perceptual skills thus both confirms the unspecifiable nature of the
perceptual structures and processes, and also suggests the way
in which
those processes are first developed.
My first description of the visual mechanisms and Polanyi's
steroscopic and radiological examples demonstrate the complexly
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mediated yet largely unspecifiable structure of the perceptual
processes . There are several general conclusions which may be drawn
from these examples; but before I do this, let me suggest two other
themes which run through Polanyi's discussion of perception. Polanyi
believes that perception, like all knowledge, requires certain prior
acceptances. Except at the very close of Personal Knowledge
,
Polanyi
does not really argue the most basic ontological questions, but begins
rather with the acknowledgement of ourselves within a world, a world in
which we through our senses are trying to find our way. Polanyi
believes that our perception of anything is already a form of
commitment; in seeing anything we have already chosen at some level of
our being to believe that life is not a dream, that there is something
to be seen,, and that our perceptual abilities are in some way suitable
for this seeing. Thus for Polanyi perception already acknowledges a
kind of metaphysical commitment. Our perceptions can be organized into
a system of knowledge only insofar as we believe that there are things
and events in the world causing those perceptions, and causing them in
an orderly and reliable way. Further Polanyi believes that we must
be
convinced that we do, more often than not, see them correctly—that
we
have the ability to truly apprehend some aspects of reality.
For
Polanyi, this means that we must be convinced that the
structure of our
perceptions evidences structurally corresponding relationships
in the
things seen.
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Let me suggest one further theme. Given the tacit structure of
Perception the unspecifiable nature of both the assimilated particulars
and their integration into a focal whole
,
given that perception seems to
imply an almost a-critical ontological commitment, and yet given also
that perception is a highly mediated ability, what factors can we
nevertheless abstract from these perceptual processes which might
indicate to us the standards through which perception interprets
reality. Polanyi abstracts several factors. Although the world is
first presented to us as a series of flat, inverted images on our
retinas, images which are continually changing size, shape, color and
position, we never see, and in fact cannot see, reality in this way.
Rather we see stable, three-dimensional solid bodies out there in space.
Polanyi believes that we see things in this way first because it is more
reasonable—because in constructing an interpretive framework of the
world, things fit together better in this way. But Polanyi also
believes that perception, like science, is not guided wholly by logic
and reason. He believes that some of the standards perception sets to
itself are aesthetic—standards such as beauty, symmetry and elegance.
Finally Polanyi believes that these standards, as they are also in
science, are not only self-set but come from outside ourselves. Thus
again they involve a kind of acceptance. Beauty not only
influences our
perceptual abilities as a kind of formal attractiveness in the
things
seen; it also exhilarates and entrances us. At times our
eyes are
grabbed, we are possessed. We seem to be taken up
out of ourselves by a
beauty we cannot explain. Here beauty, as other
aesthetic factors, must
be seen not as a subjective or emotional vaguary , but as
an attribute of
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reality. Beauty can be seen here as a part of reality; and with its
assimilation it will become in time a clue toward our further
perceptions of reality.
Given these various themes, descriptions and examples, what can we
conclude about perception? To begin, although perception has not been
until now a focus of my philosophical exploration, it is interesting to
note that none of the conceptions based upon a Cartesian foundation
offer an adequate description of perception. Perception is not a form
of pure intellectual vision nor is it wholly arbitrary—the chaotic
impingement of an alien world. Nor can perception be characterized as
judgment added to sensation—by the time the perceptual images meet
anything which might be described as active judgment, they are already
wholly formed. Perception exhibits basically the same structure as do
all h\aman abilities. Perception is a skillful interaction with the
world, a selective assimilation of particulars which are integrated into
a focal whole. Often, in turn, that focal whole itself becomes
assimilated in our quest for a larger coherence ; in this way we acquire
a whole context of unspecifiable assimilations. At times we come to
dwell in our perception as we dwell in a tool or a theory. At such
times, there is a sense of extension; and we seem both to rise and to be
pulled up out of ourselves. Our awareness is extended, and we seem to
become both more strongly ourselves and more a part of the world. Here
perception can be seen not only as skillful interaction but also as a
creative sharing of ourselves. Perception is an achievement; the
basic
structures are genetically given us, but it is through our
efforts and
our desires that we learn the skills of perception. In a
larger sense
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perception can be seen as one of the major ways through which we achieve
ourselves, through which we assimilate the whole context of
unspecifiable particulars in which and through which we dwell in the
world. Perception is itself a comprehensive entity and thus a reality
—
according to Polanyi's definitions, one of the more real things which
exist. It is hierarchical; the structure of the visual mechanism and an
examination of its working suggest that perception is a series of higher
and higher integrations. Perception is in no sense an isolated or pure
ability. At almost every level of integration other kinds of
information and other abilities can be seen to contribute to perception,
and at the higher levels it must be assumed that many parts of the
already assimilated context govern the formation of the final image.
The proper development of the perceptual abilities assiames the
concurrent development of many other kinds of abilities. Perception is
usually developed early in life. Although many of the processes of this
development are irreversible, specific perceptual skills can be
developed later in life. Often such later development makes possible a
better apprehension of reality. As seen in these later developments and
as evidenced in the original development, the perceptual processes are
both selective and interpretive. Yet because of the nature of these
processes, they cannot be explicitly known. Nevertheless, we accredit
our perceptual abilities and are confident that we do apprehend
reality,
and that more often than not, we apprehend it correctly.
Part of this
confidence comes from the reasonableness of the images we see, but
the
circular nature of any intellectual foundation should remind
us that
logical consistancy is not sufficient basis for perceptual
confidence.
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We must also recognize the role which intellectual passions play in our
acceptance of reality, and must recognize also that all our acceptances
rest finally on our own beliefs.
This concludes my presentation of the conceptions of existence
inherent in the theory of tacit knowledge. Although I have presented
more ideas than I have defended and although Polanyi's theory offers
conceptions more complex and more comprehensive than I have here been
able to describe, nevertheless I believe my presentation sufficient both
to suggest the beginnings of a more adequate intellectual foundation and
to allow me to work within those beginnings toward a more adequate
conception of skills. In truth, much of my work is already done.
Polanyi's conceptions not only support but also contain many of the
aspects of a more adequate conception of physical skills. It remains for
me now only to gather those aspects together.
Toward a New Conception of Skills
Descartes felt that man, among all the forms of life, had some
special exemption which would allow him to separate his thoughts from
their crude bodily roots, and for over three hundred years now the
intellectual foundation spawned by the Cartesian conception of pure
intellectual vision has led us toward an ever more inadequate
understanding of our existence. Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit
knowledge suggests a structure of understanding more coherent
with and
more adequate to human experience. The essence of human
experience is
not separation: our existence can be mderstood neither as
the
mechanical apprehension of a one level world, nor as the
arbitrary
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choice of a meaningless reality. Polanyi's theory suggests rather that
we exist primarily in our interaction with and assimilation of the
world. Inherent within this theory are complex and varied ways of human
knowing, and manifold kinds and levels of reality. The age old dream of
certainty and the foundation of arbitrary formalisms which inevitably
flow from such a dream must be relinquished, and we must begin anew with
the acknowledgement that all our knowing, all hiaman achievements, are
inextricably enmeshed in man's bodily processes of being. Short of a
message from the Gods, we can have no firmer foundation. There exists
no total discontinuity between mind and body, nor between man and
animal, and our crude bodily roots must be logically seen as the
ultimate basis for all our understanding. All knowing can be considered
a form of orientation; the animal's actions within his environment can
be seen to prefigure the varied ways and processes by which man both
shapes and is shaped by his world, reaching out from what he has
assimilated to what he seeks. Our Cartesian heritage has led us to
believe that we can find the essential meaning and coherence of our
existence only by denying our bodily roots and relying solely on our
pure intellectual abilities, but the theory of tacit knowledge suggests
not only are these intellectual abilities inseparable from a whole range
of physical skills but also that these physical skills have themselves
the potential for the apprehension of coherence and meaning.
This exploration began with an intimation of coherence and
meaning
within the practice of physical skills, and I hope now that
through the
conceptions suggested by Polanyi's theory, I may be better
able to
understand those intimations. In re-examining man's most
profound
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intellectual activities, Polcinyi seems also to have discovered a
structure within which all of human existence may be more adequately
understood. Polanyi's theory suggests a conception of human abilities
and a conception of reality, more comprehensive than those of our
P^®sent intellectual foundation; and I hope that Polanyi's conceptions
may eventually make possible a more adequate conception of physical
skills. As a prelude to such a conception of skills, I have already
described how perception might be conceived within Polanyi's more
comprehensive framework; but allow me here to present one further aspect
of this description. Marjorie Grene, working within Polanyi's
conceptions, describes, in one of her essays, those times at the
University of Davis when the smog over Sacramento lifts and the rain is
gone and she can suddenly see the Sierra mountains from her ninth floor
office window. She reflects on this experience:
What is this kind of seeing? It is a perceptual experience
and in its intrinsic quality entirely immediate, not, as
some philosophers would say, the product of an inference or
a set of associations: suddenly the mountains are there.
Yet it is somehow a hiaman perception, not just a biological
event. Nor do I mean that the gleaming whiteness of the
mountains forms an added titillation to an otherwise dull
day. To perceive the Sierra alters radically the world one
is in. 34
Grene uses the phrase, mediated immediacy, to describe this kind of
seeing. She believes that in any act of perception, the structure of
our previous assimilations—the natural, personal and cultural world
through which we have developed as humain beings permeate our very
seeing. Lifting up one's eyes unto the hills is then a hiaman
experience, perceptual and in this sense direct, yet made the
perception
it is through the mediation of much that has come before. Although
our
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physical skills airc neither as subtle nor as complexly mediated as are
our perceptual abilities
,
I nevertheless believe them to be capable of
meaningful and coherent apprehensions. It is my hope that the
conception of skills, toward which I am here working, will one day allow
me to say—that to practice a particular physical skill, to interact
with the world in this special way, radically alters the world I am in.
I have characterized my exploration as philosophical, and in
working toward a new conception of skills, the thrust of my argument is
still philosophical. It is my hope that my exploration has been
consistent, and that my "discoveries" will have, in themselves, the
power to suggest a new conception of skills . It remains for me now only
to draw from Polanyi's comprehensive conceptions those aspects which may
be reasonably thought to characterize a more adequate conception of
skills. I have suggested several times, not as an apology but as a
philosophical perspective, that the nature of our present intellectual
foundation makes the detailed articulation of any new conception
extremely difficult. In my own life, I have formed my views about
skills for so long within what is still essentially a Cartesian
framework that, even though I know those views to be inadequate, it is
difficult to imagine more adequate views in any specific detail.
Although I have attempted to "balance out" some of my philosophical
arguments by specific references to human abilities and although I will
here preface my final philosophical conclusions by presenting a
few
"non-Cartesian" views on basic physical skills, in no real sense
has a
balance been achieved; the philosophical arguments must still
stand or
The more adequate views about skills mustfall on their own merits.
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remain, for the most part, intimations; only the completion and
assimilation of the intellectual foundation inherent in Polanyi's
theory, or in similar theories, will allow those intimations their
proper fruition.
I attempted to "balance out" my presentation of Polanyi's
conceptions of existence by ending that presentation with a look at an
actual hxaman ability
—
perception, and I will here attempt a similar
balance by prefacing my final conclusions with a brief look at an actual
physical skill. One of the most basic of human skills is that of
walking. Walking is usually so taken for granted that, except in the
hvtman infant, the significance of the skill is hardly ever recognized.
Yet walking, I would maintain, not only predetermines many of the ways
in which we experience the world, but is in itself a meains of access
both to that world and to ourselves. The Cartesian structures of
separation error in telling us that only perception, or at best our five
senses, offer us an understanding of existence. There exists rather a
continuity in all our styles of being. There are of course those
writers who would admit that physcial skills provide an immediate and
undifferentiated kind of immersion in reality, and these writers would
thus grant that if we focused on our walking, we might gain some sense
of our "animal being" in the world. I maintain, however, that physical
skills are not only an immediate but a mediated kind of apprehension,
and that they reveal, therefore, not only our immediate
rootedness in
reality, but also our complexly human ways of being within
the world.
Although walking, like most physical skills, is admittedly
less complex
other kinds of human abilities , and althoughand less subtle than are
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this skill does not benefit from the kind of articulate framework which
characterizes many of our "higher" abilities; walking has, nevertheless
the potential for a valid apprehension of reality, eind can lead us,
therefore, toward an increased understanding of the meaning and coherence
of our existence.
Polanyi's conceptions reveal some of the ways in which man's more
iritellectual abilities may claim to apprehend meaning and coherence.
Let me here briefly suggest how a physical skill like walking might make
similar claims. The processes of any physical skill are neither
mechanical nor limited wholly to the motor cortex of the brain. Here
again, as with perception, only the basic structure of walking is given
US; and each human being must, through his efforts of tacit knowing,
achieve the skill. Just as in perception, so in physical skills a
progressive series of assimilations and integrations, both in the body
and brain, interpret and reinterpret our skill until a functional model
is achieved which seems to represent a true coherence between our bodies
and the various forces and elements within the world. Karl Pirbram, an
eminent neuropsychologist, states that "a hierarchical process, similar
to that which characterizes the sensory systems, occurs in the motor
mechanisms"; and that the coherence or "image-of-achievement" which
both informs and is apprehended by these processes is not characterized
so much by "object" or "interests" as it is by the "play of forces"—
forces both produced by those processes and inherent within the world.
The physiological processes of walking thus seem to suggest that,
through the achievement of the skill of walking, one forms a model of a
particular coherence between ourselves and the world, and that the
practice of the skill thus has the potential for the apprehension of
both ourselves and the world in terms of that model.
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Let me consider walking from another perspective. Its structure
suggests that walking has capacity for revealing various forces at play
in the world, but I would also suggest that walking has a larger
significance and the capacity for more varied relevation. To walk, man
must first achieve upright posture, and upright posture conditions much
of human nature. Erwin Straus, who has made a lifelong study of man's
way of knowing, states "there is no doubt that the shape and function of
the human body are determined in almost every detail by, and for, the
36
upright posture . " Because upright posture so greatly influences our
way of being in the world, I would argue that it almost certainly plays
a major role within what I have referred to as "the whole context of
assimilations," and I would also argue that eventually, within a new
conception of skills, not only posture's influence upon other skills but
posture itself will have much to tell us about ourselves and the world.
Straus comments how the vertical dimension of upright posture already
carries "many specific and expressive meanings." Physical skills also
evidence a more general aspect of our relationship to existence. Both
upright posture auid walking are, as I have already suggested,
achievements. They are skills won through our efforts; and even though
their basic structures is genetically given us, they are nevertheless a
form of commitment, a choosing of how we are to be in the world. As in
perception, there is nothing certain in the skill of walking. The child
chooses to stand and to try walking in the expectation that it will
work, that this motion will evidence a true coherence between himself
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and the world. The human gait is a complex and expansive motion
performed in the expectation of many things, among them, the expectation
that the leg brought forward will ultimately find solid ground. Straus
calls this "motion on credit; confidence and timidity, elation and
depression, and stability and insecurity are all expressed in the human
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gait." The child's original choice, his learning to walk, and his
continued reliance on the skill suggest the kind of commitment to be
found in all human abilities.
There is another perspective which also suggests that physical
skills have the potential for a valid kind of apprehension. Dance,
which can be seen in part as a skillful refinement and expansion of
walking and upright posture, suggests that physical skills can develop a
much larger and more comprehensive interpretative framework than is
normally thought to be possible. Straus claims that dance expresses
"the tendency of lived body space to expand against its surroundings and
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to actualize itself symbolically." Dance, as does walking, as does
perception, interprets existence so as to create the space within which
we live. We live within the world, not as we experience it directly,
but as we assimilate and interpret it toward a larger coherence. "The
space in^which we live is as different from the schema of empty
Euclidean space (Straus means to convey here the sense of totally
unhuman and uninterpreted space) as the familiar world of colors differs
from the concept of physical optics. As experienced, space is always
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filled and articulated space." In this way, the more complex
experience of dance—and other physical skills—can be seen as both a
human and a valid form of apprehension. I would hope that within a new
CMM\o»pUotv of thu Ivti rr<»m«^worK which mow i'l\v»rnot mt won
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desires. Skills are thus an achievement. Within this effort there can
be seen both a practical effort which integrates random motions into
effective ones and an interpretative effort which transposes meaningless
feelings into meaningful ones. This structure is in many ways
xinspecifiable . We are unaware of many of the particulars which
contribute to the focal whole: some particulars are by their nature
subliminal; some participate only as they have been already assimilated
within other acts of integration; and some particulars, even those that
can be specified in themselves, are transformed by their integration
and, therefore, have a new meaning within the focal whole. The
integration of the particulars is also unspecifiable
,
It is, in many
ways, a personal act of discovery. Such integration cannot be
explicitly taught but involves for each one of us a logical jump, a
commitment to a new kind of moving or being, a way of existence we have
both made and discovered. The process of assimilation and integration
is on-going, and as our skills grow—as we seek further coherence, what
was once focal becomes in turn itself assimilated. The theory of tacit
knowledge suggests a hierarchical conception of physical skills , a
series of higher and higher integrations in which the whole body
participates in many ways and at many levels to interact with and to
apprehend reality. Skills are, therefore, not isolated. New
assimilations are integrated not only with existent physical skills,
but
also within the whole context of previous personal, intellectual
and
cultural assimilations. The dependence between our physical
skills and
our "higher" abilities is mutual. Each gains from and
is formed within
the context of the other.
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Physical skills are themselves comprehensive entities
,
ones both
made and discovered by ourselves. Through the same processes by which
these entities were formed, they have the potential for further growth
and refinement, and thus a significance, and a potential for further
coherence, which ranges beyond our present knowledge of them. The
coherence which skills seek to achieve is both within our bodies and
within the world; but more importantly it is a coherence between our
bodies and the world. Just as we choose to accredit our perceptions and
believe that they reveal to us some aspect of reality, so we may choose
to accredit our physical skills and believe that this coherence also
reveals a meaningful aspect of reality. Physical skills may thus be
thought to apprehend certain truths about ourselves, about the world,
and about our relationship to that world. We may believe that physical
skills guide us to the apprehension of something real, and in many cases
to the apprehension of a reality having tlie same structure as our
apprehension of it—that is to a comprehensive entity, a whole of parts
whose significance ranges in ways perhaps unguessed by us beyond the
specifiable particulars or even beyond the presently visible outlines of
the whole . These apprehensions—and indeed the very formation and
fmctioning of our skills and ourselves—must rest finally on our own
self-accreditation: in the last analysis we must commit ourselves, a-
critically and beyond our knowing, to these modes of being and
apprehension. The structure of tacit knowing suggests a basis for
such
belief, and we may reasonably assume that our from-to interaction
with
the world is not arbitrary, that the particulars which we
assimilate
have some bearing on reality, and that our integration of
them—having
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as it does the same kind of structure as do all human integrations, and
being itself the foundation for many of our other already-accreditated
apprehensions has at least a similar chance for the achievement of true
apprehens ion
.
The theory of tacit knowledge also provides a further basis for
our belief in the truth of these apprehensions. The conception of
physical skills suggested by Polanyi's theory is not only that of a
from-to interaction with the world; it is also, what I have called above,
a creative sharing of ourselves- The acquisition of physical skills is
not only an interiorization of various particulars; it is also an
extension of ourselves out into the world. Physical skills are one of
our ways of being open to the world, and they can ultimately succeed
only to the extent that we give ourselves to being. The action through
which we assimilate particulars to ourselves becomes also the passion
through which we give ourselves to being. Our self-integration becomes
a self-surrender, and our self-surrender the process through which we
find ourselves. It is always, in some sense, we who do the
apprehending; and indeed we do experience ourselves as distinct from our
surroundings. However, what Polanyi's theory finally suggests is that
we feel ourselves to be thus distinct because we have created or
achieved ourselves—at least in part—through the processes of our
skills. Every hiaman being possesses, by genetic endowment, the capacity
for becoming a person; but our existence is not given us rather we
achieve it. By dwelling in our skills, we create ourselves. A more
adequate conception of physical skills suggests that the learning
and
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^sfin0insnt of such skills is both a dsspcning of our own intsmal
coherence, and an expansion of our coherence within the world.
In the introduction to this dissertation, within the metaphor of
the interface, I suggested that physical skills might be conceived as a
precarious yet precise balance. I believe that within the conception of
physical skills here presented, this concept of balance may be seen to
have a certain validity. Physical skills are achieved not only through
our efforts to appropriate and manipulate, but also through our desire
for surrender. In dwelling in a skill, we sometimes rise up out of
ourselves—we are possessed. This in-dwelling is again not an
abdication nor a meaningless surrender, but is rather a commitment of
ourselves to what we believe will be a truer reality. We seek to extend
ourselves, to refine our skills, to achieve an ever more precarious yet
precise balance, with the hope that we may become both more truly
ourselves and more truly a part of the world. The passion, the beauty,
the sense of grace which often visit us at such times may be a clue that
our efforts and desires are not in vain.
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